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i 
Between Worlds, Between Times: Thinking with Trans Narratives at the 
Limits of Ontology and Temporality 
Abstract 
My thesis offers up an explicitly transfeminist mobilization of the theoretical notions of 
ontological pluralism and queer temporality against the pervasive cultural norm of cis-
normativity and the dominant temporal logic of chrono-normativity. First, I critique the blatantly 
transphobic and fallacious rhetoric of Kathleen Stock, the face of the “gender critical” feminist 
movement in the UK, which I contextualize as part of a contemporary resurgence of the hateful 
legacy of trans-exclusion rooted in the second wave feminist movement of the ‘60s and ‘70s and 
cemented in academic theory by Janice Raymond’s (1979) Transsexual Empire. I then delve 
deeper, aiming to expose a subtle and under interrogated trend of transphobia and trans-resistant 
presuppositions endemic to Anglo-American and French feminist philosophy through an 
extended engagement with the work and thought of Luce Irigaray and Judith Butler. Next I trace 
an evolution of philosophical treatments of the notions of ontology and temporality, from the 
early groundbreaking interventions of Immanuel Kant and Martin Heidegger in the historically 
masculinist continental philosophical tradition, to the contemporary notions of ontological 
pluralism and queer temporalities. Finally, I engage in an affirmatively critical analysis of a 
selection of autoethnographic and autobiographical accounts of transsexual femininity and 
transfeminine transitioning. Ultimately I argue that the embracement of diverse and even 
seemingly conflictual narratives of gendered existence, including both transsexual narratives and 
narratives of gender variance or nonconformity – a possibility predicated on broadened and 
radically inclusive understandings of ontology and temporality – is crucial to both the theoretical 
goal of expanding and transforming hegemonic cultural understandings of gender in relation to 
personal identity, and to the political aim of fostering equitable and just conditions for persons 
who occupy nonhegemonic subject positions – specifically trans and nonbinary identities – in 
society. 
Keywords 
Feminist Philosophy, Feminist Phenomenology, Ontological Pluralism, Queer Temporality, 
Queer Theory, Transfeminism, Transgender Studies 
 
 
 
ii 
Summary for Lay Audience 
In my thesis I contend that the eradication of societal trans-resistance and transphobia depends in 
part upon embracing narratives of gendered experience which may depart from or conflict with 
conventional temporal and ontological norms. I start by exploring how the concepts of 
temporality (time) and ontology (the study of existence) have been dealt with in the history of 
philosophy in order to show how current avenues of thought in the academic domains of queer 
theory and transgender studies can build on and amend early philosophical approaches to 
thinking about the human experience in new and productive ways. Specifically, I emphasize how 
the work and thought of current queer and trans theorists is paving a path toward more inclusive 
and less “normative” ways of understanding and conceptualizing how human beings exist, 
ontologically and temporally, as gendered beings with distinct and equally valid ways of self-
identifying (i.e. “gender identities”). 
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1 Chapter One: Introduction: Gender and Subjectivity 
 
1.1 Acknowledgment of Positionality 
 
A desideratum of theoretical investigations of gender carried out by cisgender scholars or 
theorists is that they refrain from the presumption of “an insider’s view” (Lugones, 1990, p. 
234)1. Engagement with trans self-narratives is unequivocally imperative to the avoidance of 
perpetuating the material harms which can result from the uncritical tendency to construe trans 
subjects as “purely manifestations of discourse” (Hayward, 2011, p. 234). Each of the major 
spheres of mainstream discourse have historically been complicit – formally and informally, 
directly and indirectly – in perpetrating a widespread, systematic assault on transness which has 
entailed the virtually ubiquitous exclusion and derision of trans identity and, correspondingly, the 
near total elision of lived trans experience, from every aspect of social, cultural, and political life.  
As a consequence, trans people, particularly trans women, have long been subjected to 
various harmful and degrading stereotypes and false characterizations. In mainstream society, 
popular culture, and the fields of medicine and psychiatry, transness has been conflated with 
psychological and bodily abnormality, associated with self-deception or delusionality, and 
thought to imply sexual deviance or “inversion.”2 Trans women have been labeled as 
“deceivers,”3 depicted in film and television as mentally ill or psychotic4, and even viewed as 
 
1 The basic dichotomy between “insiders” and “outsiders” will henceforth be a recurring theme and will 
serve to scaffold its central political demand that trans femininity be recognized universally and 
unconditionally in all areas of life as a valid subject position worthy of celebration and recognition in 
equal measure to its hegemonic and normative counterpart: the subject position of cisgender femininity. 
Moreover, I employ the notion of ontological pluralism to justify the major theoretical claim of the thesis 
that ostensibly disparate, mutually conflicting narrative models of gender can harmoniously coexist 
within both mainstream “worlds” and “worlds” outside the mainstream. 
2 See Richard Von Krafft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis (New York: Physicians and Surgeons Book 
Company, 1935); Havelock Ellis, Psychology of Sex: A Manual for Students (London: Heinemann 
Medical Books, 1948). 
3 See Bettcher (2007). 
4 See Dry (2020). 
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dangerous, despite the documented reality that trans women themselves, particularly Black trans 
women, face an extremely disproportionate rate of fatal violence at the hands of a transphobic 
and trans-resistant public.5 In the recent history of feminist thought itself, trans women have been 
deliberately misgendered, accused of inauthenticity, and denied a prominent place within debates 
and discussions concerning women in general. In a particularly heinous show of transphobic 
prejudice, Janice Raymond (1979) attempts to charge all trans women with defiling the very 
symbolic image of the “female body.” She famously writes, in The Transsexual Empire, that 
“[a]ll transsexuals rape women’s bodies by reducing the real female form to an artifact, 
appropriating this body for themselves” (Raymond, 1979, p. 104). Disappointingly, 
transsexuality and gender variance have been routinely and frequently mischaracterized and 
misapprehended in these and similar ways in even progressive sociopolitical, legal, and academic 
discourses of both late- and post-modernity, including many current mainstream gender and 
queer theoretical discourses. At the root of the problem is, arguably, the extreme degree of 
cultural unintelligibility, or illegibility, associated with trans identity in the public view – which 
is to say, plainly and simply, that trans women as a group are in danger of being seen as not fully 
or really subjects.  
In the face of this bleak reality, a vast and growing body of literature and theory also 
exists under the heading of “transgender studies,” a domain of scholarship spurred on by the 
early work of vanguard thinkers such as Sandy Stone, a woman whose gender identity leaves her 
vulnerable to the harmful, potentially lethal, effects of systemic and interpersonal transmisogyny 
and transphobia. It is my intention to engage with this body of thought in a productive and 
respectful manner, and this necessitates an acknowledgment of my own gendered positionality. I 
occupy a position of privilege6 in relation to gender in the sense that the relationship between my 
gender identity, physical appearance, and gendered behaviour more or less aligns neatly with 
culturally hegemonic conceptions of masculine gender and its veritable synonymity with male 
biological sex. My experience of gender is not characterized by oppression, marginalization, or 
 
5 In a 2019 press release, the American Medical Association (AMA) refers to the ongoing “violence 
against the transgender community” as an “epidemic.” See AMA (2019); see also Human Rights 
Campaign (2019); see also Kaur (2019). 
6 “Privilege” should be understood as a purely relational term which does not imply superiority or 
preferability but denotes non-opposition to a norm, in this case gender normativity, or the presence of 
cisgender identity in combination with male-typical bodily appearance. 
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discrimination on the basis of difference, real or perceived, from the norm. My performance of 
gender rarely diverges from culturally established norms, and it causes me no anguish to 
maintain my adherence the rigid cultural ideals of masculinity consistently at all times and across 
all spheres of public and private life.  
Because I am cisgender, I cannot meaningfully contribute to the important task of 
conceptualizing and articulating what it is like to be, or be perceived as, gender nonconforming, 
or to feel dysphoric in relation to my own gendered body, as many trans and gender 
nonconforming scholars can and have. Nor do I have any insight, as a man, into what it is like to 
be a woman. I can, however, highlight the work of those with personal experiences of being or 
being perceived as gender nonconforming within a highly gender normative and trans-resistant 
society. In practice, this means seeking out, examining, and taking seriously the work of authors 
who have intimate firsthand knowledge of gender-based oppression. It also means consciously 
and deliberately examining my citational practices through a political lens. These two 
tendencies/policies constitute mutually integral aspects of my research methodology.  
However, I am not without my biases. I approach the phenomenon of gender, and the 
domain of gender theory, from the perspective of a former student of philosophy, which is to say, 
with an ingrained bias towards the fetishization of reason, an enduring tendency initiated at the 
dawn of the European Age of Enlightenment. But a cultural phenomenon as pervasive and 
insidious as transphobia does not sustain itself on its adherence to the rules of logic, and 
therefore cannot be eradicated through the use of logic alone. Thus, disproving or ‘debunking’ 
the logical accuracy, or ‘cogency,’ of transphobic discourse is not enough to eradicate the 
transphobic sentiment that continues to plague both formal theoretical discourses and common 
societal and cultural perspectives on gender and sex. Indeed, the numerous deeply held 
convictions about gender and sex perpetuated by dominant discourse and dominant culture 
cannot simply be eradicated on the grounds that they are technically “incorrect.”  
For the deeply entrenched ideological biases regarding gender embedded in Western 
culture, no matter how logically incoherent they may be, subsist primarily on the non-rational 
faith of the indoctrinated who perpetuate them and the institutions that uphold them and enforce 
adherence to, or conformity with, them. Accordingly, I must go further than mere rational 
critique. On a theoretical level, “going further” means not only cultivating a hermeneutic of 
suspicion as I navigate the realm of traditional, masculinist and male-dominated philosophical 
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discourse, but also stepping outside of that realm to explore the ideas of those relegated to its 
margins. It means, in my context, pushing the boundaries, conventions, traditions, and norms of 
established philosophical domains, including both epistemology and ontology, to 
unapologetically and unconditionally highlight trans ways of being and knowing, and 
nonnormative ways of performing or subverting gender. 
 
1.2 Initial Frameworks for Conceiving of the Subject 
 
It is widely assumed that the act of thinking necessarily implies some form of 
‘subjectivity’ or ‘I’-ness, even if it doesn’t guarantee the cohesive and fully formed ‘subject’ of 
René Descartes’ (1644) cogito7. Some would go as far as to say that human thought is never not 
imbued with a tacit awareness of the self. What is more, it is commonly held that the mind orders 
events sequentially or temporally, hence humanity’s seemingly universal and transcultural 
tendency to invest in the abstract notions of past, present, and future. Still another feature of 
consciousness is that it requires a body. It is embodied. The thinking subject – the ‘I’ – inhabits 
or is confined by what has come to be known in discourse as “the body,” or soma in ancient 
Greek. Plato, believing the body to be a kind of prison or “tomb” for the rational soul, sought to 
reason away the problem of the body by valorizing the pursuit of wisdom and the denial of 
sensual pleasures, or the pleasures or appetites of the flesh.  
In spite of the somatophobic legacy of privileging abstract thought over embodied 
experience and Forms/Ideas over particulars8, however, the problem of embodiment persists. Not 
 
7 Despite the enduring popularity of Descartes’ (1644) ‘cogito,’ I think therefore I am (Latin: cogito, ergo 
sum), the famous French philosopher did not technically prove the existence a substantial self beyond a 
shadow of a doubt. He does not in fact reach sufficient grounds to draw any exact conclusion regarding 
the nature of the being or thing (which he calls the “I”) that he believes his “meditations” have led him to 
discover. The most he can say is that there is thinking. Is he justified in going on to say that there is an I 
that exists necessarily, and further, that this I is a thinking thing? In fact, one might object that the 
apodictic certainty of the claim that constitutes the latter half of the cogito (“therefore I am”) is 
uncritically founded. If Descartes were only to take his own method seriously, he could never have 
arrived at the cogito in its self-assured entirety. That the ‘I’ exists necessarily is an unsupported 
supposition that he surreptitiously smuggles into his overall claim. The most we can say is that there is 
thinking, and that thinking is a feature of experience. 
8 This legacy of hyper rational somatophobic thinking in the history of metaphysics, as Judith Butler 
(1990; 1995) evocatively demonstrates, is closely linked to patriarchal constructions of femininity as 
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only have many postmodern and contemporary discourses sought to unsettle the neat paradigm 
of Cartesian dualism (viz. the hard and fast division between mind and body) but they have also 
problematized the category of the body itself, in some cases aiming to expose the supposedly 
objective medical and scientific category of “the body” as little more than a discursively 
saturated fiction. Similarly, the subject of modern discourse – Man9 – has historically been the 
source of much debate and disagreement, especially within the domain of feminist thought. 
Subjectivity is surrounded by a host of theoretical terms: consciousness, awareness, cognition, 
thinking, wisdom, knowledge, etc. But regardless of the terminological tack with which one 
chooses to breach the abstract domain of subjective human existence, the concept of subjectivity 
lies at the heart of the enterprise of philosophy, not as a discipline but as a way of thinking and, 
indeed, living. The very notion of subjectivity has itself been central to philosophical speculation 
since the time of Socrates and the pre-Socratic philosophers of ancient Greece who preceded 
him. relatedly, due to the acute and unrivaled self-awareness of philosophical thought qua 
philosophical thought, classical thinkers have adhered to rigorous programs of introjection and 
self-reflection which often require a great deal of both mental solitude and interpersonal 
isolation.  
For all its self-attributions of robustness and fortitude, however, the classical 
philosophical mode of thought can easily lead to solipsistic and aleatory dead ends which 
threaten to preclude or obscure pressing political and ethical considerations and objectives. 
Hence the interdisciplinary nature of my thesis is meant as a deliberate acknowledgment of the 
aporias which have arisen out of the narrow and parochial foci of traditional ways of thinking 
and knowing since antiquity. Foucault coined a neologism for discourses and ways of knowing 
that have been systematically relegated to the margins of dominant discourse: “subjugated 
knowledges.” In a related vein, the emergent domain of transgender studies aims to foreground 
voices and narratives that have been routinely ignored in the academy while transfeminism 
generally aims to put into practice anti-transphobic methods and practices of activism and 
thought.  
 
 
irrational and formless in contradistinction to masculinity, a category more heavily associated with 
rationality and substance. 
9 See Chapter One of Rosi Braidotti’s The Posthuman (2013); see also Wynter (1995). 
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1.3 A Preliminary Roadmap to Thinking Beyond the Gender 
Binary 
 
Capitalism – arguably the main linchpin of Western society – sustains itself and is 
predicated on a sexual division of labour whereby women's unpaid physical and emotional labor 
is simultaneously relied upon and invisibilized and devalued10 while men traditionally occupy 
the majority of political and economic positions of power. That many undervalued and under/un-
paid, historically female-dominated forms of labor (e.g. domestic and kinship work) which have 
long fueled the numerous structures of power endemic to the dominant socioeconomic paradigm 
of patriarchal capitalism in the West, continue to be performed mostly by women even today 
serves to perpetuate and reinforce a pervasive logic of hierarchal binary dualism which has not 
only dominated Western epistemology and influenced the cosmological and metaphysical 
narratives of Western philosophy for centuries but, accordingly, constitutes a guiding force in 
shaping and determining the production of (asymmetrically gendered) cultural norms and the 
organization of society at a fundamental level.11  
Hence capitalism is obviously not just an economic paradigm. Its reach extends to the 
political and social spheres, pervades the production and circulation of linguistic and cultural 
norms, and, arguably, informs the very production of subjectivity in late capitalist culture.  
The disproportionate relegation of domestic labour, kinship work and sex work (which is even 
more pathologized and invisibilized due to the widespread cultural demonization and 
invisibilization of women's sexuality and sexual autonomy/ agency which contributes to rape 
culture, issues of reproductive justice and access to abortion, and the feminization of poverty) 
perpetuates the systemic oppression of women as a group. Although seeking to construct more 
egalitarian juridical and sociocultural paradigms is no doubt a preferable alternative to resigning 
oneself to the inegalitarian status quo, proponents of “equality” between the sexes (specifically 
with respect to participation in the responsibilities associated with child rearing) unwittingly 
leave uninterrogated the driving force which underlies the notions of family, kinship, etc.: 
 
10 See Mies (1986). 
11 See Frye (1989). 
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namely, what Lee Edelman (2004) famously identifies as “reproductive futurism.”12 Within our 
dominant cultural paradigm, heterosexual reproduction is taken as an evolutionarily based 
imperative, and gender roles thus understood as epiphenomenal to the static and universal 
dictates of human biology.  
Moreover, the cis-heterosexual paradigm upholds the cultural matrices of intelligibility 
through which we deem behaviours and bodies as either normal or abnormal, acceptable or 
undesirable, from the standpoint of normativity – which is taken, for all intents and purposes, to 
be an objective standpoint. Biological reductionism upholds gender essentialism insofar as social 
gender is taken to be coextensive with biological sex. However, the immutability of 'sex' has 
been challenged and the possibility of its discursivity and malleability raised, most notably by 
Butler (1993). The possibility of sex as a discursive category, and not an ontological or 
biological given, cuts open dominant perspectives on gender roles and renders them vulnerable 
to feminist critique. Not only can we make the epistemological argument that scientific 
knowledge in general is not objective but permeated by cultural and personal bias, but we can 
observe genealogically that the various subdisciplines of biology such as Endocrinology fail to 
deliver truths about gender and sex and is permeated by a history of pathologization that 
permeates the entire sphere of medicine. For example, the related domains of psychiatry, 
sexology and psychoanalysis are three of the most obvious culprits in the contamination of 
scientific or quasi-scientific data with normative heteropatriarchal values.  
However, the fact that sex cannot be supported let alone proven to be a fixed or static 
entity corresponding to gendered forms of behavior, leaves us in a position of radical uncertainty. 
Although ideology often obscures the inherent ambiguity of what we call gender and sex (and for 
many leads to an irrational refusal to accept it irrespective of its logical self-evidence), the 
polysemic ambiguity of the contested terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ will be the starting point of the 
present investigation. Moreover, I hold that any degree of imprecision or inaccuracy in the 
external application of purportedly objective determinations of sex – which cannot be divorced 
from the dominant gender terms to which they are meant to correspond – to living human bodies 
is indicative of the instability of Western culture’s medicalized system of sex determination 
overall – and therefore of the taxonomic system of classification and categorization to which it is 
 
12 See Edelman (2004). 
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intimately related. However, the hypothesis of fundamental ambiguity to which I subscribe is not 
intended to be homogenizing or restrictive but to defend dissent from culturally established 
norms and expectations around sex, gender, and sexuality. Rather I aim to defend people’s right 
to identify however they choose on a spectrum ranging from the assertion of gender as a static 
and unchanging aspect of one’s ontological makeup to the belief that gender is a fluid or flexible 
entity influenced, to a greater or lesser extent, by sociocultural and environmental factors.  
Because of the legitimization, naturalization, and normalization of dominant gender positions, 
argues Sharlee Cranston-Reimer (2014), “other ways of being in the world become difficult—
and in some cases, impossible—to be read or be understood as legitimate, and this 
delegitimization lends itself very quickly to both pathologization and dehumanization” (p. 27). 
Overall, while I do intend in part to avow gender identity as a “locus of imaginative possibility” 
(Cranston-Reimer, 2014, p. 27) and freedom, it is equally my intention to affirm it as a site of 
certainty, immediacy, and authoritativeness from the perspective of outsiders, and in this sense to 
clarify its subservient role to the inviolable will of individual personal authority.  
I adopt this position with the open intention of combatting the persistent delusion of 
gender as a site of objective discoverability, which leaves nonnormative identities at the mercy 
of societal and scientific norms which determine the livability and social acceptance of their 
identities on the false basis of empirical verifiability. Judith Butler is right that gender requires 
repetition to acquire cultural legibility, however, no similar requirement applies to the 
determination of its ontological stability. The latter, I maintain, is always already implied and 
guaranteed by any relevant expression of self-avowal. The ontological stability of a given 
gendered subject position is automatically and immediately ensured on the basis of self-
identification alone. The burden of verifying one’s identity falls exclusively under the domain of 
the subject herself who can be said to possess an ethical authority over her identity of the type 
which all subjects universally possess over their identities. It is not temporally dependent on any 
specific duration; rather, it is immutable if the subject says it is, and fluid if the subject says it is.  
Moreover, the ontological qualities of immutability and of fluidity are not dependent on 
consistency or duration; their legitimacy is no less inviolable or immediate should one choose to 
shift between or traverse categories of identity (e.g. male and female) over the course of a life or, 
indeed, at the very same point in time. And to be quite clear, this leaves open the possibility of 
simultaneous identification with multiple categories of identity. 
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2 Identifying the Enemy: A Critique of Contemporary Trans-
Exclusionary Feminism 
2.1 A Brief Primer on the Term ‘TERF’ 
 
It is no secret that the history of mainstream feminism is marred by its legacy of hostility 
against trans women. During the “Second Wave” of feminism in the United States and Canada, a 
period roughly demarcated from the early 1960s to the late 1980s, mainstream Anglo-American 
feminisms – which, to indulge in a gross oversimplification, were divided into two camps: liberal 
and radical – inexcusably displaced trans women from the fold of liberatory struggle. As a rule, 
trans women’s perspectives were unjustly omitted from mainstream feminist discourse, which in 
turn neglected to prioritize the pursuit of rights and protections for trans women specifically and 
failed to show concern for or awareness of their dignity or humanity as women. Trans women’s 
presence in women’s-only spaces and attendance at women’s events was a source of contention 
and open debate, as the deployment of an array of codified propagandic rhetoric such as the 
infamous “Womyn-born womyn (WBW)” policy of the Michigan Womyn’s Music Festival 
(MichFest)13 curtailed the possibility of trans women’s full inclusion in feminist discourse and 
praxis.  
With this unbearably sordid history in mind, it is more important than ever to denounce 
trans-exclusionary feminism as a logically baseless and unjustifiable ideological regime 
engineered to advance and serve the interests of cisgender women only. For trans-exclusionary 
feminist ideology has not vanished but continues to be ardently upheld by transphobic 
gatekeepers of women’s rights, some of whom occupy positions which afford them unignorable 
degrees of social influence and culturally ascribed authority. In one related instance, a group of 
seven British and Australian feminist philosophers co-authored a guest post in the online 
interdisciplinary academic journal Daily Nous, entitled “Derogatory Language in Philosophy 
Journal Risks Increased Hostility and Diminished Discussion,” which they intended to be viewed 
 
13 See McConnell (2016). 
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as a public complaint about “two papers” published in an “issue of Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research (PPR),” the contents of which supposedly indicate the publication’s 
complacency in the “normalization” of the term “TERF,” which, in their words, “is at worst a 
slur and at best derogatory” (Stock/Weinberg, August 27, 2018).  
The first of the two papers under attack by the group of scholars for their use of the term 
“TERF” is a “discussion note” on Jason Stanley’s (2015) book How Propaganda Works in the 
form of a paper entitled “The Epistemology of Propaganda,” in which Canadian philosophy 
professor and transgender rights activist Veronica Ivy, formerly known as Rachel McKinnon, 
“[uses] Stanley’s account of propaganda to analyze a modern form of propaganda where so-
called trans-exclusionary radical feminists (TERFs) are engaged in a political project to deny 
that trans women are women—and thereby to exclude trans women from women-only spaces, 
services, and protections” (McKinnon, 2018, p. 483).  
While I have little doubt that the complainants’ motivations are nefarious, my unverified 
suspicions are beside the point. In what appears to be a genuine attempt to assuage criticism by 
reassuring readers of the purity of their intentions, however, the aforementioned complainants 
find it necessary to clarify that their shared  
concerns are not directed at transsexual women who have transitioned under medical care and 
acquired a Gender Recognition Certificate. Rather, the issues are around the intent to change the 
protocols for trans women to one operating on the basis of self-identification, and the way that 
could make women’s sex-segregated spaces de facto inoperative (Stock/Weinberg, August 27, 
2018).  
Ironically, this very attempt to pre-emptively ease the potential backlash to their grievance, to 
couch in explicitly in the ostensibly progressive sentiment of approval (at best) or tolerance (at 
worst) of medically and legally sanctioned instantiations of transfemininity to the exclusion of all 
other (unofficial or unverified) claims to womanhood, betrays a deeper and more stubborn faith 
in cisnormativity as the neutral ground of gender identity. It speaks volumes to what I am 
inclined to diagnose as an underlying tendency toward trans-resistance. In other words, they have 
not eradicated the transphobic bias within themselves but simply replaced it with an arbitrary 
belief in the necessity of official documentation in support of one’s self-avowed gender identity 
– a false requirement which, it bears pointing out, is by no means mandatory for the adoption of 
a cisgender identity.  
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Given that advocating for trans women’s freedom to “operate on the basis of self-
identification” is precisely a central concern at issue throughout my thesis, the disingenuous and 
conditional proclamation of trans acceptance displayed in the above statement strikes me as 
particularly heinous and counterproductive to the political objective of trans women’s 
unconditional social inclusion and protection from unduly intrusive interrogations into the 
authenticity of their feminine identity. It is statements of this type which I therefore unreservedly 
seek to condemn at the same time as I delineate my theoretical assertions. Along similar lines as 
my condemnation in this regard, Australian freelance writer Viv Smythe – credited with one of 
the earliest recorded uses of the term “TERF”14 – writes in a blog post entitled “An apology and 
a promise” (2008) that 
marginalising trans women at actual risk from regularly documented abuse /violence in favour of 
protecting hypothetical cis women from purely hypothetical abuse/violence from trans women in 
women-only safe-spaces strikes me as horribly unethical as well as repellently callous. 
 
2.2 Critique of Kathleen Stock 
“How did it come to pass that Stock’s blog-posts should be so widely discussed in philosophy?” 
(Bettcher, 2018)15 
 
Kathleen Stock, who teaches Philosophy at the University of Sussex, has come under fire 
in recent years for her views on gender identification. Stock (April 11, 2019) asserts that “neither 
social nor legal transition can change facts about individual sex determination and differentiation 
at a biological level.” First, it must be pointed out that it is a preposterously misguided approach 
to imply, as Stock does, a relation between the rational viability of “facts” about the biological 
(i.e. “chromosomal, hormonal, morphological”) basis of “sex determination” and the personal 
pursuit of seeking social or legal sex transition even if one is invested in defending the 
hegemonic biologico-cultural narrative regarding the static and binary nature of “sex 
differentiation.”  
To imply that trans people who choose to transition unitarily share a desire to “change 
facts” is to enact, quite presumptuously and arbitrarily, a blanket politicization of the act of 
 
14 See Smythe (2008). 
15 See Weinberg (May 30, 2018). 
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transitioning. The above quotation represents an attempt by Stock to perform a woefully 
transparent sleight of hand in which she conflates the personal actions of those seeking social 
recognition as members of the sex and/or gender to which they have rightfully and definitively 
asserted their membership, and the (politically or theoretically motivated) desire to deconstruct 
and challenge the commonly accepted narrative of a dualistic or dichotomous paradigm of sex – 
a hegemonic paradigm maintained in both the social sphere, under the heading of what has in 
recent years come to be known as the “gender binary,” and within the theoretical purview of 
mainstream biology under the heading of a model referred to as “sexual dimorphism.” It is flatly 
counter to the aim of trans liberation to attribute a desire to “change facts16” to members of a 
marginalized group, namely trans people, explicitly and primarily engaged in a battle to attain 
social recognition with respect to the “factuality” of their gender identities.  
Yet the indignant tone in which TERFs like Stock tend to emphasize the biological 
“facts” which undergird and inform their ideological ethos obscures and obfuscates not only the 
relevance of such debates to the urgent issue of obtaining legal rights and protections and access 
to adequate medical care for trans men and women, but also, and perhaps even more subtly and 
ironically, fails to recognize the symbolic and sociocultural connotations that the very 
terminological category of “sex” in the so-called biological sense, has undeniably accrued in 
both the ‘common view’ or ‘natural attitude’ regarding sex in Western culture and society and 
throughout the corpus of recent and modern medical, scientific, legal, political, and philosophical 
discourse. This is to say, in short, that the linguistic signifier “sex” encapsulates a plethora of 
conflictual symbolic and socioculturally fraught meanings which polysemically exceed and 
confound the parochial specificity of its use within and in reference or allusion to the domain of 
biology – a sphere powerless to restrain or circumscribe it absolutely.  
At the same time as we revere the authority of biology, moreover, we blissfully cling to 
societally normalized, mythically manufactured, and culturally privileged views about sex and 
gender regardless of the extent to which they may prove conflictual to the very scientific 
authority we appeal when, and only when, we feel threatened by the very existence of ostensibly 
 
16 Any objection to an objective “fact” or “truth” about reality has the appearance of an impossible 
delusion when compared to the rational-scientific will to knowledge which seeks to uncover the pre-
existing nature and order of phenomena in reality, and the medical and scientific discourses which inform 
the common public view on such contested phenomena as biological sex are bound historically to the 
paradigm of reason and scientific characterized by this very same will to knowledge. 
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nonconforming or nonnormative modes of embodied, sexed, and gendered human being. Before 
the turn of the last century, Butler gestured towards the possibility that the category of sex might 
not be immune to the effects of social construction. “If the immutable character of sex is 
contested,” she writes, “[then] perhaps this construct called ‘sex’ is as culturally constructed as 
gender; indeed, perhaps it was always already gender, with the consequence that the distinction 
between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all” (Butler, 1999, pp. 10-11). Though it 
is by no means necessary to go as far as Butler speculatively invites us to in this passage17, the 
fundamental insight that the linguistic signifier ‘sex,’ along with the phenomenon to which it 
supposedly refers, is not necessarily immutable but could be susceptible, to a greater or lesser 
extent, to extrinsic sociocultural influences outside of the human organism over which the 
discipline of biology has historically purported to stake claim, is profoundly unignorable.  
It seems, in contrast, that Stock has allowed herself to become swept up in debate over 
the factuality of biological sex – the precarious basis on which the Anglo-American societal 
gender binary is tenuously predicated – to the extent that her entire philosophical system (and 
she is a professor of philosophy) depends upon the current moment’s dominant definition of 
“biological sex” to provide an adequate framework for the conceptualization of the world in 
which we live and breathe – an environment of tumultuous complexity in which things, 
including perhaps our own bodies, often seem to offer endless possibilities of rediscovery and 
reinvention. Stock’s facile preoccupation in this regard only serves to distract from the urgent 
political issue of acquiring legal protections against transphobic discrimination and violence, 
especially for trans women who are forced to endure a well-documented statistically 
disproportionate onslaught of material harms as compared to cisgender women. What is more, it 
prevents her from apprehending the porosity or openness of the constructed linguistic category of 
‘sex’ to myriad conflictual ambiguous social and cultural influences and its ability to adapt and 
transform itself in accordance with the shifting nature of both cultural and scientific norms. For 
there should be nothing, I argue, preventing the formation of new attitudes and beliefs about 
what constitute the essential nature of sex from altering that essential nature in a concrete and 
literal sense. 
 
17 She seems to suggest that the influences of social construction and cultural normativity on biological 
science, in conjunction with the semiotic ambiguity of gender and sexual signifiers, constitute sufficient 
conditions to consider the eradication of the distinction between sex and gender altogether. 
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2.3 Transphobic Bias and the De-Literalization of Sex 
 
Corporeal interiority, in this case the notion that the body has a sex, is thus indexical of the 
literalizing fantasy of heterosexual melancholia, its incorporative response to the prohibition of 
homosexuality. It is only via this fantasy of literalization that the body comes “to bear a sex” as 
literal truth, that gender gets inscribed on the body as sex and sex appears as the literal 
embodiment of gender:  
The conflation of desire with the real—that is, the belief that it is the parts of the body, 
the “literal” penis, the “literal” vagina, which cause pleasure and desire—is precisely the 
kind of literalizing fantasy characteristic of the syndrome of melancholic heterosexuality. 
The disavowed homosexuality at the base of melancholic heterosexuality reemerges as 
the self-evident anatomical facticity of sex, where “sex” designates the blurred 
unity of anatomy, “natural identity, “and “natural desire.” The loss is denied and 
incorporated, and the genealogy of that transmutation fully forgotten and repressed. Th e 
sexed surface of the body thus emerges as the necessary sign of a natural(ized) identity 
and desire. The loss of homosexuality is refused and the love sustained or encrypted in 
the parts of the body itself, literalized in the ostensible anatomical facticity of sex. Here 
we see the general strategy of literalization as a form of forgetfulness, which, in the case 
of a literalized sexual anatomy, “forgets” the imaginary and, with it, an imaginable 
homosexuality. (GT 71) (Prosser, 1998, p. 64) 
 
Stock is quite emphatic about tying the concept of literality to the category of biological 
sex; she retreats into the conviction that although social transition and legal sex change are 
indeed possible and undeniably becoming increasingly socially accepted practices, changing 
one’s gender is a “literal” impossibility18 (April 11, 2019). In defiance of the position she 
identifies disdainfully as “sex eliminationism,” Stock declares “biological sex” to be “a 
politically important feature of material reality” (April 11, 2019). In spite of her excessive 
paranoia about the dangerous consequences of positing the “nonexistence of material sex,” 
however, she devotes little space to defining with any specificity the criteria one should possess 
in order to rightfully claim ownership of a female biological sex.  
Judith Butler’s seminal text “Gender Trouble’s most thorough accounting for sex as 
discursive effect,” according to Jay Prosser (1998) in Second Skins: The Body Narratives of 
 
18 Stock (April 11, 2019) opines that “current attempts to suppress talk of material facts about sex by 
progressive institutions and academics can be read as a sympathetic attempt to bolster the fiction of actual 
transition: to preserve an illusion that sex-change is literally possible.” She continues shortly thereafter to 
warn, in the context of legal sex-change, that we should not “lose track of the fact that sex isn’t literally 
changed.” 
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Transsexuality, “appears in the discussion of melancholia in the second chapter, ‘Prohibition, 
Psychoanalysis, and the Production of the Heterosexual Matrix’ (GT 35–78)” (p. 55). In 
Prosser’s (1998) view, the second chapter of Gender Trouble showcases the text’s undeniable 
primary achievement: a “thorough accounting for the construction of sex via a thorough 
accounting of the construction of heterosexuality” (p. 57). In it, Butler “begins to account for the 
construction of sex, that is how sex is ‘gender all along,’” by “turning to Freud’s writings on 
melancholia and incorporation” (Prosser, 1998, p. 59). According to Prosser (1998), Butler 
“[grounds her description of heterosexual sexing through melancholia] on a misrecognition, a 
mistaking of the signifier of gender for the referent of sex, of the metaphorical for the literal” (p. 
65). “For transsexual embodiment,” he continues,  
Butler’s harnessing psychoanalytic discussions of melancholia and incorporation to the processes 
of gendering has two interdependent significant effects: it refigures sex from material corporeality 
into phantasized surface; and through this it reinscribes the opposition between queer and 
heterosexual already at work in Gender Trouble, sustaining it by once again enlisting transgender 
as queer (Prosser, 1998, p. 67).  
 
In short, Prosser (1998) argues that Butler enacts a “deliteralization” of sex (p. 74).  
Thus, it might appear that Stock is in fact right to ignore Butler on the basis that the latter 
wrongfully and unjustifiably discounts the concrete materiality of sex. But even if this is the 
case, believing in the literality of sex does not have to be a trans-exclusionary position. And this 
is where Stock exposes her unforgivable bias against trans-bodies in favor of cisgender 
embodiment. The materiality of sex is by no means the exclusive domain of cisgender sexed 
subjects and should not be considered as such; rather, sex, even when defined strictly in a 
material-biological sense, is an equally crucial aspect of transsexual bodily inhabitance and 
embodied processes of transsexual becoming. Hence the surgical reconstruction of genitalia or 
the therapeutic replacement of male- or female-typical hormones can easily be viewed as 
naturally compatible with a radically materialist conception of sexual embodiment, provided that 
one is careful to avoid the trap of conflating the literal fleshly materiality of multiplicitously 
sexed corporeal bodies with a cisnormative model of sexed materiality. And this is precisely 
what radical feminism and “gender critical” feminism fail to do. 
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2.4 Trans-Exclusionary Anti-Essentialism 
 
Before moving on, I would like to focus briefly on the anti-essentialist aspect of Stock’s 
position. While I believe Stock’s arguments to be misguided and the hesitancy or refusal of her 
and her peers and supporters to embrace or advocate for trans women’s rights and freedoms 
inexcusable, her non-essentialist outlook of sex is one point on which we do not disagree. 
Interestingly, Stock’s rejection of essentialism stems directly from her acknowledgment that 
“information about people with Differences of Sex Development (‘DSDs’, sometimes also called 
‘intersex’) challenges what’s traditionally considered standard for the categories of ‘male’ and 
‘female.’” Relatedly, in 2019, Stock collaborated with a group of self-described “gender-critical 
and radical feminist academic philosophers,” to co-author an open letter in which they set out to 
“challenge their opponents to avoid some obviously bad argumentative moves” (Stock, May 23, 
2019)19. In the third section of their blog post, labelled “questions for our opponents,” the authors 
make the following appeal:  
If you think that the existence of people with Differences of Sexual Development (sometimes 
“disorders of sexual development” or “intersex”) shows something about whether trans women are 
literally women, what is it? Please lay this out clearly, in stages, with no skipping (Stock, May 23, 
2019).  
 
To form a productive reply to this vague and unspecific question, we should be clear in 
acknowledging from the outset that it is by no means a logical necessity that the existence of 
variability itself, specifically the presence of diversity in the biological processes of sex 
development, be seen as disproving or discounting the general rule/norm governing the 
distribution of sexed characteristics in human beings, namely that they can be seen to be 
distributed in a binaristic fashion20.  
At first glance, the lack of sufficient grounds for the necessary abandonment or 
condemnation of the law/norm popularly known as the “gender binary” might seem to render 
Stock’s overall argument condonable. Upon closer inspection, however, the possibility is 
 
19 This band of self-styled “radical feminists and gender-critical philosophers” include Sophie Allen, Jane 
Clare Jones, Holly Lawford-Smith, Mary Leng, Rebecca Reilly-Cooper, and Kathleen Stock. See Stock 
(May 23, 2019). 
20 This naturally leads to the construction of coextensively binary categories of male and female as well as 
the hypothesis that these two sexes pre-exist their discovery by way of scientific observation and 
subsequent linguistic signification. 
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revealed that perhaps the binary quality of the rule/norm was only ever a provisional hypothesis 
in the first place. Perhaps the attribution of an inherently or necessarily binary quality to the 
category of ‘sex’ – which can never be reduced to a ‘purely’ empirical-biological category but is 
also permeated by sociocultural, symbolic, linguistic or semiotic, disciplinary, and historical 
influences– is not strictly necessary, thus throwing into question the rigidly binary manner in 
which the category of ‘sex’ is formulated by, as well as perceived through the lenses of, both 
mainstream culture and biological science. Perhaps the binaristic quality of sex is less rigorously 
justifiable and more arbitrary than we first assumed. This does not obligate us to do away with 
the category of biological sex, but shows us that we are free, as it were, to do with it as we please 
– to expand and modify it as we see fit in accordance not only with potential advancements in the 
biological study of human bodies but also and equally in accordance with the evolution of social, 
political, and cultural norms and values.  
But it is evident that, for Stock and her colleagues, “literal” womanhood, which for them 
resides firmly in the register of “biological sex,” occupies a more primal and superior status in 
relation to what we might call sociosymbolic womanhood or femininity. Because it is the 
possession of biological femaleness which affords one (or precludes one from attaining) a 
feminine social status (i.e. the social right to be recognized as a woman), biology thereby also 
indirectly, but quite literally, presides over the arena of gendered social relations, including the 
abstract and nonliteral realm of sociolinguistic identification. While it is by all means reasonable 
and unproblematic to point out that the materiality and literality of sex can be distinguished from 
the social category of gender, the further insistence by so-called “gender-critical” feminists, that 
literal/material sex exerts a clear and undeniable causally determinative effect on the politically 
and socially oriented category of gender, does not follow necessarily from that initial premise by 
any stretch.  
American social psychologist Suzanne Kessler (1998) was among the first scholars to 
elucidate the indeterminacy inherent to medical constructions of gender, exposing the impact of 
personal and cultural biases on physicians’ determinations of “biological sex.” The presence of 
implicit bias, she argues, guides and shapes their official “recommendations” regarding the 
correct or appropriate course of action to be taken when the ambiguity of an infant’s outward sex 
characteristics becomes the source of parental uncertainty or anxiety. In her book Lessons from 
the Intersexed, she explains that “members of medical teams have standard practices for 
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managing intersexuality, which rely ultimately on cultural understandings of gender” (Kessler, 
1998, p. 12).  
When Kessler conducted interviews of six medical experts in the field of pediatric 
intersexuality in 1985, she discovered that the “management of intersex cases [was] based upon a 
theory of gender” developed by John Money and Anke A. Ehrhardt which “argues that gender 
identity is changeable until approximately eighteen months of age” (1998, p. 14). “To use the 
Pygmalion allegory,” write Money and Ehrhardt, “one may begin with the same clay and fashion 
a god or a goddess” (Kessler, 1998, p. 14). Money’s theory that “gender and children are 
malleable” and “psychology and medicine are the tools used to transform them” (Kessler, 1998, 
p. 15) – which contributed heavily to the formation of the current dominant epidemiological 
wisdom in the management of intersex births – constitutes what can be called an “interactionist” 
model of gender in which biological, psychological, and social factors contribute to gender 
development.21 According to our author, in the determination of “chromosomal and hormonal 
gender, which is typically taken to be the real, natural, biological gender, usually referred to as 
‘sex,’” a practice enabled by technological advancements in late twentieth century medical-
scientific practice, “biological factors are often preempted in physicians’ deliberations by such 
cultural factors as the ‘correct’ length of the penis and capacity of the vagina” (Kessler, 1998, p. 
12). Similarly, she estimates that for Money and his colleagues, the “male” sex defined less “by 
the genetic condition of having one Y and one X chromosome or by the production of sperm 
[than] by the aesthetic condition of having an “appropriately” sized penis” (Kessler, 1998, p. 19). 
One physician interviewed by Kessler candidly and tellingly remarks, “Why do we do all these 
tests if in the end we’re going to make the decision simply on the basis of the appearance of the 
genitalia?” (Kessler, 1998, p. 20).  
Sex, for Stock (April 11, 2019), is “determined by possession of most or all of a cluster of 
particular designated properties—chromosomal, gametic, hormonal and morphological—
produced via endogenous biological processes.” Conceding that “there is no hard and fast 
 
21 Incidentally, this model presciently prefigures the biopsychosocial approach to psychology first 
proposed by George Engel (1977) which, in contradistinction to the biomedical model of disease, 
considers the complex interaction between “the social, psychological, and behavioural dimensions” of 
illness and health (Borrell-Carrió, Suchman, & Epstein, 2004). Thus, the biopsychosocial model enabled 
researchers to acknowledge explicitly the ways in which medicalized phenomena “are affected by 
multiple levels of organization, from the societal to the molecular” (Borrell-Carrió, Suchman, & Epstein, 
2004). See Wade & Halligan (2017). 
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“essence” to biological sex, at least in our everyday sense: no set of characteristics a male or 
female must have, to count as such,” she nevertheless contends that “competent non-essentialists 
don’t think it follows from this that there are no real constraints on what counts as sex” (Stock, 
April 11, 2019). Rather, she defines sex as a “cluster concept,” leading her to depict the 
“possession of most or all of” a set of unnamed properties as the sole criterion for the 
determination of a male or female sex. In a short article entitled “Can You Change Your 
Gender?” published in the 2019 Summer edition of The Philosopher, she clarifies in slightly 
different terms her position that “maleness and femaleness are two clusters of non-essential 
characteristics”. In this article, the properties or characteristics (again left unnamed) to which she 
ascribes the capacity to dictate sex, fall within the purview of the “chromosomal, gonadal, 
genital, [and] hormonal” aspects of human physiology specifically (Stock, July 25, 2019). In her 
view, 
The majority of people have all of the characteristics in one cluster or other; a smaller proportion 
of people have most or many of the characteristics in one cluster or other, but not all of them. So, 
for instance, you don’t need to possess all of the “female” sex characteristics to count as female. 
However, you do still need to possess some of them. This is a real, material condition upon sex-
category-membership (Stock, July 25, 2019). 
 
Since no insurmountable barrier exists preventing trans women from obtaining and possessing 
numerous of the so-called “properties” or “characteristics” typically associated with biological 
femininity, no aspect of the above definition precludes the inclusion of trans women under the 
purview of biological femininity. Stock’s efforts to debunk what she views as the propagandic 
doctrine of “sex eliminationism” and to defend the “literal” existence of material sex makes her 
seem paranoiac of some conspiratorial consensus among trans and gender variant individuals, 
unanimously or by majority, minimally to portray sex as immaterial or non-literal, and 
maximally to dissolve the category of sex entirely. She fails to realize, however, that the 
possibility of changing one’s sex, both literally and conceptually, by no means implies the 
demise of sex as a meaningful category; cross-sex identification does not imply the 
“nonexistence” of biological sex but simply entails that its definition should not pose barriers to 
the social inclusion of trans-bodies and trans people, specifically trans women. It is plainly 
evident, however, that Stock’s trans-resistant interpretation of biological sex openly threatens 
trans women’s access to social acceptance and medical care.  
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Moreover, it is not remotely justifiable to imply, as she appears to, that transsexual 
women and trans allies uniformly wish to draw a singular hard and fast “conclusion about the 
nonexistence of material sex.” Many transsexual women do not seek to deny or downplay the 
existence of the visible sex characteristics which differentiate female bodies from male bodies 
but seek, on the contrary, to thoroughly embody a version of femininity and/or femaleness that 
exists in direct contrast to masculinity and/or maleness in both a social and biological sense. 
Such a pursuit is often accomplished, moreover, not by rejecting but by affirmatively enacting 
one’s conformity to feminized behavioural norms and modes of gender presentation, sometimes 
with the aid of surgical or hormonal aids. The variable and variegated practices of behavioural 
and bodily modification, maintenance, presentation, and performance involved in sexual 
transitioning and trans-becoming are not the exclusive domain of trans people, but are activities 
in which most, if not all human beings find themselves constantly and actively engaged, albeit 
with vastly different degrees of both visibility and volitionality in relation to social norms and 
standards of intelligibility, acceptability, and propriety. These various practices involved in the 
ongoing project of being/becoming22, for example, a woman, do not inherently privilege cis 
subjects over trans subjects.  
Over and against the divisive rhetoric of trans-exclusionary feminism, I insist that there 
is nothing of substance that separates trans women from their cisgender sisters on an ontological 
level.23 To defend this claim, we must, of course, resist the antecedent assumption that ontology 
is inextricably, deterministically linked to both biology and psychology in the sense that would 
imply a necessary correlation between (one’s) ontological status and (their) biological or 
psychological makeup. And in order to be successful in that endeavour – that act of resistance to 
the status quo regarding gender in society – we would do well to examine and interrogate the 
conventional ways that “gender nonconformity” is described and diagnosed by the medical 
professionals and scholars who safeguard hegemonic conceptions of (psycho-physiologically) 
 
22 Being and becoming can be seen as virtually synonymous in the context of gendered existence 
inasmuch as each of us, cis and trans men and women alike, are constantly locked in a processual state of 
becoming-with our gender, and realizing our gendered selves in relation to a gendered ideal, whether that 
ideal be cultural, personal, or as it often is, both. 
23 This in no way discounts the quantitative fact that trans women face disproportionate levels of violence 
and discrimination in comparison to cis women. 
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‘normal’ or ‘natural’ gendered existence and experience in relation to those with the potential to 
be deemed ‘abnormal’ or ‘disordered.’  
Importantly, one such descriptive/diagnostic term is the highly clinicalized and 
depersonalized condition of so-called psychological ‘dysphoria’ outlined in the DSM-5.24 The 
term, and the notion of, ‘dysphoria’ occupies a central role in the determination and classification 
of gender variance or nonconformity, and particularly affects trans people seeking to gain access 
to the medical means to transition or to obtain legal documentation that aligns with who they are 
and the way in which they identify.  
Although dysphoria is not a necessary or universal feature of being-a-woman but does 
appear to be a unique feature of transfeminine experience for certain trans women, it is also not a 
necessary precondition for being a trans woman. It should therefore go without saying that is not 
necessary for a trans women to claim affinity with the notion of dysphoria to be considered 
women. Stock, however, states categorically that “[m]ost trans women, trans men and so-called 
non-binary people have, in response to feelings of dysphoria, made the decision to live as the 
opposite sex” (2019). To be complicit, as Stock is, in perpetuating without exception or 
qualification the natural attitude that trans women are or must be dysphoric by virtue of their 
transness, is to erroneously and stereotypically distanciate trans femininity from cis femininity.  
Whereas Stock hastily and uncritically presupposes the ascendancy of the dominant 
medical-psychiatric model of gender, trans women’s relationships to the clinicalized category of 
dysphoria in reality can, of course, be far more complex and various. Yet this is precisely the 
narrative implicit, and often explicit, in mainstream medical scientific literature, which has not 
only served as the most ‘official,’ objective, authoritative discourse on the subject of gender and 
sex in society throughout modern history but also intimately informs our cultural and societal 
laws and norms and the practices procedures of their enforcement, both juridical and extra-
juridical (i.e. what is often classified in sociological parlance as “gender policing”). In reality, 
‘dysphoria’ is a condition experienced by some women – women who may personally identify as 
trans or be categorized as trans by the systems/institutions that grant trans women access to 
 
24 “In adolescents and adults,” the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) states, 
“gender dysphoria involves a difference between one’s experienced/expressed gender and assigned 
gender, and significant distress or problems functioning.” It is diagnosed on the basis of at least two of six 
criteria, the first of which being “[a] marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender 
and primary and/or secondary sex characteristics” (American Psychiatric Association, 2016). 
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medical care and social support – whose intrinsic femininity, female nature, or womanhood, 
should never be in question but should be viewed as always already certain and immutable (so 
long as they avow it as such) in precisely the same way as it is in cis women.  
With that said, it is relevant to emphasize that transsexual women’s participation in 
conventional, normativized and naturalized practices of gender presentation and performance can 
actually serve to reinforce the very binary model that Stock and others ironically claim is under 
threat by the existence of queer and trans people, whom she/they falsely subsumes into a 
homogenous group, thus failing to grasp, for example, the many palpable commonalities 
between trans and cis women who share a common belief in and desire to preserve and conform 
to a specific, culturally prescribed model of femininity which corresponds to the 
dominant/hegemonic social categorization system of 'gender binarism.'  
While trans-exclusionary radical feminists (TERFs) attempt to drive an ontological 
wedge between cis and trans femininity, their efforts will always be in vain. At some point the 
esteemed proponents of TERFism must emerge from the depths of their delusional and 
delimiting conception of sex and gender to face the reality that no tangible or intangible border 
or boundary between cis- and trans-femininity pre-exists their efforts to locate one. Refusing to 
abandon their evangelistic crusade against trans women, TERFs inevitably come up empty 
handed after each futile attempt at justifying their arbitrary and absurd hostility and exclusionary 
sentiment. They fail at every turn, and will continue to do so, to ground their divisive hatred in 
logic or biology or psychology or sociology. Even if, and when, authority figures in the fields of 
medicine, biology, philosophy, and so on purport to grant legitimizing power to the false 
ideology of trans exclusionary radical feminism, logic itself is not on their side; empiricism itself 
is not on their side; the concrete material effects of social constructivism on bodies and 
subjectivities does not conform or correspond to such a distorted model of social reality as the 
one peddled by the agents and structures of normativity.  
 
2.5 Critique of Meghan Murphy 
 
“Only a tiny number of ideologues believe that Murphy’s opinions are transphobic rather than 
female-defensive” (Kay, 2019, National Post) 
 
 
 
23 
Meghan Murphy is a Canadian writer and journalist who, like Stock in the UK, has 
gained infamy for her “contentious” views on the topic of gender. In an article entitled “How 
feminist Meghan Murphy fell victim to progressives’ double standards,” National Post columnist 
Barbara Kay (2019) sets out to defend Murphy from the backlash she has understandably 
received for her views, likening her to a “dramatic protagonist” caught amidst a theatricalized 
conflict between advocates of human rights for transgender persons (“trans activists”) and trans-
exclusionary radical feminists, or “TERFs.” Kay (2019) writes in her article: “[t]he conflation of 
biology with subjective feeling is, Murphy correctly argues, erasing women as a social 
category.” First, let us not lose sight of the logically incontrovertible fact that the inclusion of 
trans women into the fold of women as a distinct social group in no way poses a threat to the 
solvency of the category of “woman” itself, nor does it threaten to erase the status of any 
individual who claims, of her own accord, to be a woman as a member of a distinct, marginalized 
social group.  
With this in mind, not only does it become apparent that Kay’s words dubiously convey a 
wholly unsubstantiated sense of panic over the dissolution of the category of woman, but also 
and more importantly, that the Canadian journalist’s haphazard deployment of alarmist rhetoric 
in support of the false premise of women’s social erasure can all too easily serve to obscure the 
grave and urgent situation in which trans women specifically face disproportionate rates of 
patriarchal oppression and gender-based violence in comparison to cis women throughout North 
America. Regardless of Kay’s motivations or political leanings (a charitable reader might 
attribute her indiscretion on this subject to little more than a journalistic penchant for 
contrarianism), it is hastily strewn together arguments such as hers that threaten to lull 
unsuspecting readers into agreement with the harmful and logically fallacious ideological camp 
of trans-exclusionary radical feminism. Nevertheless, the quotation I have extracted from Kay’s 
article is demonstrative of yet another logical inconsistency common to much of trans-
exclusionary radical feminist discourse: Kay’s allusion to a “conflation of biology [and] 
subjective feeling” among proponents of trans rights is predicated, quite ironically, on an 
analogous presupposition of its own, namely the conflation of biology and identity – more 
specifically, the fervent belief in the existence of a coextensive relationship between biological 
sex and gender identity.  
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The subtle yet far-reaching implication here is that one’s gender identity results directly 
from his or her biology; in other words, it is the biological makeup of one’s body, to the 
exclusion of all other factors, which occasions the attribution of either one or the other of two 
mutually exclusive designations: male or female. The harmony between nature and culture, 
and/or biology and (social) identity, entails that one may be (and notably, no discrepancy is 
permitted to arise between being a man or a woman and identifying as such within this paradigm) 
either male or female, never both or neither. Furthermore, it is precisely the supposedly 
concretely empirical basis of biology – of physiological ‘maleness’ or ‘femaleness’ respectively 
– which in turn determines, in a straightforward, one-to-one manner, one’s social identity as 
either a man or a woman. The necessary and unchangeable correspondence between the body 
into which one was born and her assigned identity ensures, so the story goes, that the assignation 
of womanhood can be practiced without any initial or ongoing input on the part of the 
gendered/sexed subject; one’s gender identity becomes an independently verifiable aspect of her 
existence, inextricably bound to the contours, both visible and hidden, of her biology.  
As a result, “biology,” when deployed as a euphemism for biological sex, can be viewed 
as unaffected by, and unsusceptible to, the whims and uncertainties of “subjective feeling” (and 
here, of course, we are forced to bracket the complexities and ambiguities of the physiological 
body itself, which indeed throw the conflation of biology and identity even further into question). 
Even if social identity bore a straightforward causal relationship to biology, even if it were 
wholly reducible to biology, (and even this is in question within the very realm of biology itself), 
the analytically distinct question of whether a given social identity can be deemed ‘true’ or 
‘correct’ in a technical sense, from a strictly biological perspective, would be, and is, utterly 
irrelevant to the smooth functioning of the myriad social relations which flow from the initial 
assumption that one is the gender that she says she is. That one’s attestation of personal 
membership to the social group known as “women” can be verified by biological means has no 
bearing on her ability to adopt a female, or feminine, identity. Nor does the logic of 
verificationism hold sway in the contemporary sphere of gender and sexual identification in 
which a growing number of identities are proliferating exponentially, one of multiple gendered 
identities, operate independently of the dictates of biology.  
For “biology,” let us not forget, serves as a placeholder for a self-contained set of 
principles which remain applicable and relevant to our bodies and our selves only on the basis of 
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our provisional collective agreement, as critically thinking subjects, regarding their value to 
society. Considering the status of biology as one domain among an array of others engaged in the 
age-old pursuit of mastery over the slippery and evasive nature of human existence or human 
being (a phenomenon which many esoteric philosophical doctrines have failed to adequately 
capture or explain, not least because of our inescapable proximity to ourselves, the very beings 
whose existence we wish to study from a distance, an unattainable vantage point for even the 
most disciplined contemplators among us), it becomes apparent that the biological legitimacy of 
one’s claim to be a man or a woman (indeed, even to be ‘male’ or ‘female,’ terms which can be 
appropriated from their origin to mirror or mimic the symbolic authority historically exercised 
over sexed subjects by agents of the entangled domains of medicine, psychiatry, and biology) 
simply has no bearing on the ethical defensibility of a way of freely identifying, nor on the 
phenomenological certainty and validity of an identity which a subject feels to be an intrinsic and 
unchangeable aspect of his or her or their being (i.e. a core or ‘native’ gender identity).  
To hold that social identities must be mediated through the scientific domain of biology is 
only possible on the basis of a misperception of the nature of social identity itself and the various 
social relations engendered and supported by our participation in multiple modes of 
identification within multiple social spheres. Thus, it is indeed presumptuous to assert or imply 
that personal declarations of membership to a social group (or identification with a particular 
social identity) ought only to be accepted if they can be legitimized by the authority of biology, a 
discipline which, like any other, is not without a history nor immune to bias on the part of, or 
dissensus among, its numerous practitioners. While many of us identify in one way and one way 
only across all social spheres (i.e. we identify as a man or as a woman regardless of the social 
setting or environment in which we find ourselves), the broadscale social decontextualization 
(and physiologico-temporal hypostatization) of gender identity perpetrated by Kay and other 
sympathizers and proponents of trans-exclusionary feminism nevertheless erroneously implies, 
and in some cases demands, that one’s gender identity be reinforced or legitimized by an external 
authority, namely the authority which flows from the culturally coveted domain of biology, in 
order for it to maintain its integrity. Crucially, trans theorist Talia Mae Bettcher’s model of First-
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Person Authority (FPA)25 provides an alternative framework which easily overcomes the vain 
requirement of extrinsic verificationism with respect to gender identity.  
In actuality, the social policing of gender rarely directly seeks to extort proof from 
individuals as to the authenticity of their avowed gender identity. Make no mistake, instances of 
forcible verification do, importantly, occur from time to time, such as in the violent act of 
anatomical revelation enacted upon the body of American trans man Brandon Teena, or the 
intrusive and gratuitous biological scrutiny directed towards female professional sprinter Dutee 
Chand by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). However, the infrequency with which 
comparable demands for verification are directed towards cisgender or cis-passing subjects is 
palpably indicative of the intolerable incoherence endemic to the cissexist logic of gender 
verificationism. Every day, cis people go about their lives without the legitimacy of their chosen 
gender identities (and they are perpetually chosen; day to day and moment to moment we choose 
to behave and present ourselves in ways that either conform to what is socially prescribed for us 
as members of one or the other ‘sex’) ever being challenged or questioned as to whether they can 
back up their claims of womanhood or manhood with biological evidence – that is, with an 
appeal to the external authority of biology.  
And in order to protect the sanctity of this appeal, to demonstrate our faith in the 
objectivity of its findings whether they conflict with our desires or our “subjective feelings,” no 
matter how deep and unignorable they may be, we must offer up a sacrifice: we must give over 
our agency to the gatekeepers of our social and political welfare. For our own feelings can be 
deceptive, and our proximity to them can cloud our judgment of the appropriateness or 
justifiability of continuing to claim them as our own. Only biology can gain insight into our true 
nature, the nature which dictates clearly and precisely which of our inclinations to action, and 
indeed which parts of our anatomy, rightfully belong to us and which have been placed there 
erroneously. Without a doubt, our possession of radical agency means that we cannot be trusted 
to make the correct decisions regarding how to act and how to be, of our own accord, with only 
the limited and frequently deceptive mode of perception endemic to the untrustworthy practice of 
self-observation. And in return for this sacrifice, to add insult to injury, we receive no guarantees 
that the identity with which we have declared an affinity will be deemed the proper one for us; 
 
25 See Bettcher (2009). 
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we can only pray that our identity, our gender, is returned to us unharmed and we are allowed to 
continue to identify with it without consequence.  
However, this rigorous and intrusively interrogatory program of verification is not 
applied equally to each of us who claim a gender (that, of course, would be inefficient in the 
extreme) but rather is exclusively and forcefully on either those whom we believe, for one reason 
or another, to be mistaken about their own identity, or whom we suspect are guilty of deception 
with respect to the true nature of their gender or sex. Yet agency is the very thing that endows us 
with the potential to rebel against gender norms that also and simultaneously lends us our 
capacity to conform to the normative expectations of gender so idealized within our culture.  
It is with this in mind that I wish to contend that to deprive a human being of agency is to 
deprive her of her very humanity. To discount, disavow, or deny agency that facilitates one’s 
avowal of his or her gender identity is to violate, at the same time, that most basic sense of 
autonomy within us that has been called, by Sartre and others, our “radical ontological freedom.” 
To deprive an individual of the right to freely avow her own gender identity, and indeed also her 
‘sex,’ can only be seen as a repression of the fundamental human desire to be free – a desire 
which resides among the most fundamental features of human existence.  
 
3 The Ontology of Sexual Difference Through the Looking Glass: A 
Deeper Look at Transphobic/Trans-Resistant Sentiment in 
Feminist Philosophy 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In contrast to the emancipatory logic of resistance to systemic oppression typical of 
Anglo-American feminisms, it is not only a commitment to equality and non-discrimination but 
an irreducible notion of ontological difference which lies at the heart of Italian and French 
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feminist thought.26 Feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray – whose reputation outside France 
situates her amongst the most “active and vocal [advocates] of the concept of sexual difference” 
(Grosz, 1989, p. 100) – persistently maintains throughout her body of work the controversial 
assertion of the ontological irreducibility of the female sex to the male. She pits her insistence in 
this regard on a paradigm of “true difference,” or “twoness,” of which gender is an essential 
component, against the pervasive homogeneity, or “sameness” which she attributes to a 
historically patriarchal culture built around one male subject whose neutral and singular authority 
is predicated on the deeply entrenched repression of the feminine. Even the dichotomous 
polarization of the gender and sexual binaries we have constructed in the West constitutes, for 
Irigaray, a superficial and illusory framework of difference reducible to the underlying and 
insidious logic of sameness (Grosz, 1989, p. 108). Notably, she does not strictly reserve this 
criticism for the phallocratic regime of the dominant culture but applies it equally to the hitherto 
uncritically reflexive strategies of resistance endemic to representationalist feminist politics 
which, in striving for a position of equality (read: sameness) in relation to men, keeps female 
subjects captive within a masculinized (read: singular) conception of subjectivity (Grosz, 1989, 
p. 113).  
In “Ethical Gestures Towards the Other,” the eighteenth chapter of Building a New 
World, Irigaray plainly asserts a central tenet of her philosophical system of ethics: that “ethical 
relations between human beings…[prove] to be impossible in a culture or tradition which the 
subject appears as neuter or neutral” (Irigaray and Marder, 2014, p. 253). Throughout her corpus, 
she contends that the masculinist linguistic and discursive norms endemic to the current 
phallocratic order have obscured an unavoidable form of ontological difference which defines 
human existence—which is, at its core, a relational existence, an existence invariably and 
unavoidably affected by its fundamental inability to circumvent or surmount the existential 
alterity of the other, who is, above all, a sexual other. Hence the domain of the feminine in 
Irigaray, in which the corporeal female body figures prominently, takes on a high degree of 
specificity and existential autonomy, and it is precisely this point which has inspired much of the 
confusion and controversy over her work.  
 
26 “In contradistinction to Anglo-American feminism, which emphasized both equality and emancipation 
as ends,” writes Antonio Calcagno in his Translator’s Introduction to Lea Melandri’s Love and Violence, 
“Italian feminism can be said to have stressed female difference, autonomy, and liberation” (Melandri 
2019, p. ix). 
 
 
29 
My main objective in this chapter is to expand Irigaray’s “notion of woman’s sexual 
autonomy and specificity” (Grosz, 1989, p. 100) beyond the limited scope in which Irigaray 
articulates it. I apply a transfeminist lens to her hypothesis of a specifically feminine 
“morphology” as well as her psychoanalytically informed descriptions of “female sexuality” to 
argue that, while she should not be branded as an essentialist, she unwittingly relies, at certain 
moments, on outmoded traditional metaphysical presuppositions regarding the coextensive 
relationship between gender identity and biological sex, thus unnecessarily foreclosing the 
possibility of cross-sex identification. However, I contend that her notion of sexual difference 
can be elaborated in an inclusive manner not incommensurable with the breadth of philosophical 
innovation evident in the emergent “proto-disciplinary” (Currah, 2019, p. 2) field of transgender 
studies. As Elaine Storkey (2001) points out, Irigaray’s descriptions of female identity and 
sexuality (specifically her notion of “polymorphous sensuality”) need not be read as referential – 
that is, as “a ‘true’ or accurate description of women” insofar as Irigaray makes no attempt to 
“designate a female essence or anatomy” What she does intend to do, however, is to subvert 
what she sees as “dominant male conceptions of women’s essence” (Grosz, 1989, p. 116), to 
combat the dominant phallocentric representations of women and female sexuality which 
saturate the whole of discourse within our patriarchal culture.27  
 
3.2 The Sexually Differentiated Body 
 
Carving out and maintaining a crucial, but often implicit, division between anatomy and 
morphology, Irigaray shows us that morphological sexual difference can be understood as 
 
27 This is readily apparent in Irigaray’s notorious metaphor of the “two lips,” which Elizabeth Grosz 
(1989) lucidly analyses in the following passage from her book Sexual Subversions: 
“So woman does not have a sex organ? She has at least two of them, but they are not identifiable 
as ones. Indeed, she has many more. Her sexuality, always at least double, goes even further, it is 
plural…Indeed, woman’s pleasure does not have to choose between clitoral activity and vaginal 
passivity, for example. The pleasure of the vaginal caress does not have to be substituted for that 
of the clitoral caress. They each contribute irreplaceably, to women’s pleasure. (1985b:28) 
The ‘two lips’ is not a truthful image of female anatomy but a new emblem by which female sexuality can 
be positively represented. For Irigaray, the problem for women is not the experience or recognition of 
female pleasure, but its representation, which actively constructs women’s experience of their 
corporeality and pleasures. If female sexuality and desire are represented in some relation to male 
sexuality, they are submerged in a series of male-defined constraints” (p. 116). 
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pluralistic and relational instead of binary and hierarchal. However, her preoccupation with 
cultivating one’s natural identity in accordance with the body with which he or she was born 
must be addressed and reconciled with insofar as the subsequent foreclosure (or, minimally, 
pathologization) of cross-sex identification and gender nonconformity not only proves 
inadequate to the political and theoretical objectives of trans(feminist) discourse but negates the 
radical inclusivity inherent to the category of woman. Throughout her corpus Irigaray develops a 
non-exclusionary notion of solidarity among women which she seeks to maintain and defend 
against the partisan divineness of social activist groups in the women’s liberation movement as 
well as the realm of political feminist thought itself.  
Considering that such a feminist political outlook must necessarily be predicated upon an 
inherently anti-essentialist definition of woman that decisively rejects the incorporation of 
essential criteria such as the possession of a single trait or collection of essential feminine traits, I 
argue that although Irigaray’s notion of sexual difference does not fundamentally rely on 
biological essentialism and thus can be articulated along radically inclusive lines. In this vein, the 
Irigaray of I Love to You (1996) portrays the category of woman as a “plurality that seems to 
elude the definition of a unity” (p. 64). So, the category of woman cannot be defined positively. 
However, its conceptual irreducibility and categorical incoherence can be taken up as sources of 
strength insofar as the term ‘woman’ implies an irresolvably complex, various, and acausal 
relationship between nature and culture. It is precisely the combination of radical ontological 
ambiguity and perpetual openness which lends woman the unique freedom to constantly reinvent 
and rearticulate (or indeed, conversely, to embrace and affirm) her cultivated relationship to 
nature, thus preventing the category of woman on the whole from ever acquiescing to the 
epistemological trap of essentialism.  
As such, there is unity to be found, paradoxically and counterintuitively, in the radical 
conceptual disunity specific to female identification and embodiment which stands in opposition, 
in Western culture and Western thought, to the naturalized primacy, originality, and neutrality of 
the masculine subject position. In the same stroke as she affirms woman’s inherent multiplicity, 
however, Irigaray cites the possible unifying capacity of “natural immediacy,” a notion which 
lacks a clear definition despite the fact that she returns to it repeatedly, even possessively 
appropriating it as “my natural immediacy” (Irigaray, 1996, p. 63; Irigaray, 1996, p. 64). 
Elsewhere in the text, as she weaves between generic consideration of the phenomenon of female 
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birth and personal reflection on her own birth as a “girl,” she asserts: “[n]o doubt female 
physiology is present [at birth], but not identity, which remains to be constructed” (Irigaray, 
1996, p. 107).  
According to feminist biologist Ann Fausto-Sterling (2000), a majority of feminist 
scholars have tended to view the body “not as essence, but as a bare scaffolding on which 
discourse and performance build a completely acculturated being” (p. 6). Such a formulation 
stands in stark contrast to the hypothesis of essentialism, the “belief that there are properties 
essential to women and which all women share” (Fausto-Sterling, 2000, p. 6). However, the 
unfinished project of identity to which Irigaray refers in the above quotation—although it does 
not boil down to a matter of teleological determination—also does not align with the social 
constructivist hypothesis of the body as a raw material surface which pre-exists its sexed 
signification. To be born a girl, according to Irigaray, is to be born with a certain physiological 
makeup. “Of course,” she writes, “there is no question of [identity] being constructed in 
repudiation of one’s physiology” (Irigaray, 1996, p. 107). This statement amounts to a blatant 
and needless pre-emptive disavowal of cross-sex identification, and this is the crucial point on 
which I disagree with Irigaray. There is in fact an abundance of possibility to repudiate one’s 
physiology through the construction of identity, not in a merely theoretical sense but at the 
phenomenological level of lived actuality, as demonstrated in the wealth of trans narratives 
which provide contradictory evidence to Irigaray’s narrow sighted claim. For the contours of 
physiological sex are increasingly contested not only by sociological critiques of a feminist ilk 
but by the empirical findings of the culturally and symbolically authoritative domain of biology 
itself.  
The casual manner in which she glosses over the possibility of divergence between 
identity and “physiology” betrays an affinity with Freud’s biologism insofar as she fails to 
critique, and thus keeps intact, the determinative power of physiology over identity. But such a 
conflation of woman with a singular blueprint of her physiological makeup, however 
unintentional and secondary to her overall project, is unforgivingly untenable both politically and 
theoretically. The rhetoricity of her dismissal of refuting one’s physiology in the above quotation 
camouflages the uncritical assumption of a causal connection between identity and physiology; 
and the faith in the coextensive relation between gender identity and physiological sex of which 
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her remarks are indicative is a surprising presupposition to fall back on considering the otherwise 
keenly critical nature of her analysis.  
Ultimately, I intend to emphasize the historicity of the system of sex determination 
endemic the culture into which subjects are born without discounting the possibility that a 
genealogical critique thereof could easily function in tandem with Irigaray’s analysis of sexual 
difference. Although Irigaray’s philosophy of sexual difference, which frequently invokes the 
potentially hegemonic identity category of ‘woman’ and the biologically resonant term ‘female,’ 
has been decried and dismissed by critics for its incommensurability with the political and 
theoretical ends of poststructuralist gender theory, especially with respect to transsexual and 
transgender liberation, I argue that the deployment of dominant gender terms in Irigaray’s 
writings can be read through an anti-essentialist, non-biological reductionist lens which attends 
to the psycho-anatomical diversity of femininity, including both transfemininity and intersex 
femininity.  
It is possible, I claim, to reconcile the Irigarayan framework of sexual difference with the 
emergent perspectives on gender set forth in the myriad of burgeoning discourses in the field of 
transgender studies, as well as to tailor discussions of sexual difference inspired by Irigaray to 
the urgent political demands of trans resistance, inasmuch as sexual difference cannot simply be 
conflated with bodily difference (even if the latter is understood in broader than binary terms) 
but refers to a dynamic process whereby individuals cultivate their identity in relation to their 
embodiment. While Irigaray is acutely aware of the symbolic nature of bodily organization, as 
evinced by her invocation of the notion of “morphology,” which, in her parlance, signals a 
departure from the domain of “anatomy,” her delineation of female sexuality relies partially on 
outmoded presuppositions, both implied and explicitly stated, about female anatomical 
materiality and the connection between one’s cultivated female identity and the body with which 
he or she is born. Thus, a transfeminist reading of Irigaray will no doubt require, as Danielle Poe 
(2011) points out, that we read Irigaray against herself (p. 118).  
In the titular essay of her monograph This Sex Which Is Not One, Irigaray’s (1985) 
discussion of sexual pleasure and erogeneity revolves entirely around the body. Whereas the 
classical psychoanalytic construction of anatomical femininity remains trapped in a patriarchal 
framework of hierarchal binary opposition which imbues the materiality of the female body with 
the supposedly inescapable attributes of passivity and lack in relation to the active and fully 
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formed force of masculinity, Irigaray refuses to confine femininity to the negative by defining it 
as consisting in the absence rather than the presence of distinguishing features. She repudiates 
the reduction of woman’s multiple erogenous zones to “a non-sex, or a masculine organ turned 
back upon itself” (Irigaray, 1985, p. 23) perpetrated by Freud and others by emphasizing the 
embodied plurality of female sexuality in her descriptions of a variety of bodily erogenous zones, 
thereby circumventing the absolute primacy of masculine anatomical singularity which deprives 
the female sex of a positive definition.  
Over and against the androcentric solipsism of psychoanalysis, by which I mean 
specifically to emphasize the Freudian tendency to posit femininity as a lack in relation to the 
phallus, Irigaray (1985) imagines the female body as a multiplicity of sexual organs. Strictly 
speaking, according to her mimetic revamping of psychoanalytic language which, cleverly, does 
not stray from the biological intonation or technical specificity of its terminology, woman does 
not have a single sex organ but “at least two of them,” which are nevertheless “not identifiable as 
ones” in and of themselves (p. 28). For Irigaray (1985), the female sex, unlike the male, is not 
defined by her/its possession of a single sex organ (e.g. one analogous to the phallus), nor can it 
be reduced to its startling appearance of lack against the substantial backdrop of the male 
phallus. Rather, the female sex can be rendered in terms of a collection of many sexual organs: 
“woman has sex organs more or less everywhere” (p. 28). Female sexuality, therefore, is never 
singular (i.e. masculine), but always plural (Irigaray, 1985, p. 28). Further, it does not by any 
means appear necessary that the multiplicity of organs constitutive of the female sex must be 
observed uniformly in all women but may be subject to variances and anomalies.  
Precisely what is it, however, that requires the designation of the range of sexual organs 
Irigaray (1985) names (including the breasts, vulva, clitoris, and vagina) as feminine (p. 28)? In 
direct refutation of biological essentialism, I argue that the link between bodily materiality and 
ontological femininity must be autonomous and constative self-identification. For what does 
female embodiment amount to without the clarificatory addition of female identity? Irrespective 
of the influence of a plethora of cultural norms on sexed subjects, the saturation of identity with 
discursivity, and the potentially non-volitional nature of gender identification implied by Butler’s 
infamous theory of performativity, the enduring significance of identity must not be discounted 
or devalued. Regardless of whether femininity is ontologically innate or socially constructed, and 
correspondingly, whether the criteria for femininity are anatomically dependent or the result of 
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social conditioning, a vast array of transsexual narratives imply that the category of so-called 
“biological sex” is intimately and inextricably tied to identity. Furthermore, as our engagement 
with Kessler’s (1998) qualitative interviews with pediatric surgeons and endocrinologists has 
elucidated, the medical determination of sex at birth is more imprecise than one might hope for 
the simple reason that for the notion of biological ‘sex’ to be objective and applicable to human 
beings, the experience of perfect alignment between psychological interiority and external 
anatomy – which has not yet had a chance to develop or not develop in the infantile pre-subject – 
would have to be a universally shared experiential condition. And we know, if we listen and pay 
attention to the voices and narratives of our trans brothers and sisters, that it is not.  
 
3.3 Sexual Difference and Transsexuality 
 
In “Doing Justice to Someone: Sex Reassignment and Allegories of Transsexuality,” 
Butler (2001), in a questionable move, takes up the case of David Reimer, the anonymous 
subject of the “John/Joan case” which circulated in medical circles before being widely 
publicized and used as fodder by theorists of gender, feminist activists, and social critics of all 
stripes. Reimer’s experience of gender has been narrativized in a tragic light by numerous 
biographers and journalists, after his death by suicide. But Reimer’s autonomy and dignity as a 
gendered subject was first and most intrusively invaded while he was alive by psychologist and 
sexologist John Money, who encouraged his parents to allow him to undergo surgical and 
hormonal gender reassignment as an infant following a failed circumcision that caused severe 
and irreversible damage to his genitals, and to raise Reimer as a girl. When Reimer, who was 
born with XY chromosomes, “was eight months old, his penis was accidentally burned and 
severed during a [routine] surgical operation” (Butler, 2001, p. 184). Despite extensive efforts on 
the part of his parents and physicians to raise him as a girl, a decision made based on the strong 
professional recommendation of John Money, Reimer recognized or discovered his masculine 
identity early on in his childhood and subsequently lived out his adult life as a man. Ironically, 
Reimer’s life in its retrospective totality has since been appropriated in service of prompting “a 
revision and a reversal in developmental gender theory, providing evidence…that counter’s 
Money’s thesis [regarding the malleability of gender socialization], supporting the notion of an 
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essential gender core tied in some irreversible way to anatomy and to a deterministic sense of 
biology” (Butler, 2001, p. 186).  
Irrespective of ongoing and contentious debates over biological essentialism and social 
constructivism, the bottom line for contemporary gender theory is indisputably clear: we must 
listen to and respect the incontrovertibility of trans claims to belong to a sex. The desire or need 
for anatomical reassignment is evident in a plethora of trans narratives. In what Atalia Israeli-
Nevo (2017) calls the classic narrative of transsexual transition, exemplified by Caitlyn Jenner’s 
highly publicized transition story, both the temporal trajectory of and the physical alterations 
involved in transition align and cohere with established cultural expectations of development and 
biological metrics of male/female physiology and anatomy: the person transitioning seeks, in a 
linearly progressive manner, to confirm or attain an identity deprived to them by their current 
embodied condition with respect to its possession or lack of certain anatomical and/or 
physiological traits (Israeli-Nevo, 2017, p. 35). Accordingly, there is a wealth of “[t]ranssexual 
discourse that understands sexual difference as a dualism” (Poe, 2011, p. 119).  
Likewise, the category of transgender—although it was originally “introduced [in the 
mid-1990s] as a broad umbrella term—bringing together different gender-variant people” 
(Bettcher, 2014, p. 384)—need not be seen as oriented toward the eradication or obfuscation of 
difference: terminologically, the word “transgender” implies an oppositive relation to the subject 
position of “cisgender.” Thus, transgender identification, far from entailing the erasure of the 
many relational differences between sexed subjects, in fact marks a tacit recognition of 
differences and oppositions, albeit not strictly or necessarily in the straightforward sense of 
essential, static, binary, or predetermined difference. Indeed, for Jack Halberstam (2005), 
“[t]ransgender proves to be an important term not to people who want to reside outside of 
categories altogether but to people who want to place themselves in the way of particular forms 
of recognition” (p. 49).  
Talia Mae Bettcher (2014) outlines the inception of what she calls the “transgender 
paradigm,” a radical new vision of gender which subscribes to a “beyond the binary” model 
which ostensibly subverts the gender binary and deconstructs the exclusionary dichotomous 
logic by which trans and gender nonconforming people are systematically marginalized and 
oppressed (pp. 383-384). Since the advent of trans studies in conjunction with the transgender 
politics forged by Leslie Feinberg and Kate Bornstein in the mid-1990s, the notion of gender as 
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spectrum has gained significant traction, eventually attaining widespread acceptance within both 
intersectional feminist-activism and academia (Bettcher, 2014, p. 384). From the perspective of 
the transgender paradigm, the proliferation of identificatory taxonomies is viewed as a 
subversive counter-hegemonic enterprise in opposition to the dichotomous heterosexual 
disciplinary norm. In short, discourses at the frontiers of transgender studies and activism has 
come to reflect a systematic and supposedly unitary “attempt to move beyond dichotomies” 
(Sullivan, 2003, p. 116).  
But the universalizing, utopian vision touted by the “beyond-the-binary” transgender 
movement has been met with measured resistance from transsexuals who “see themselves as 
nonconsensually subsumed under the transgender umbrella” (Bettcher, 2014, p. 385). One major 
concern regarding the transgender paradigm is the way in which its allegiance to social 
constructionism is at odds with “the actual experiences of transsexual people for whom gender 
identity seems impervious to cultural modification” (Bettcher, 2014, p. 385). Indeed, Alenka 
Zupančič (2012) notes that “[o]ne of the conceptual deadlocks in simply emphasizing that gender 
is an entirely social, or cultural, construction is that it remains within the dichotomy 
nature/culture.” Therefore, compared to its predecessor the wrong-body model, the beyond-the-
binary model is equally incapable of justifying the epistemic centrality of constative self-
identification insofar as it takes for granted dominant gender terms (Bettcher, 2014, p. 385). The 
inadequacy of the transgender paradigm to which she subscribes stems from its inability to offer 
strategies of resistance to those who do not conform to its delimiting parameters of subversion. 
In short, the transgender paradigm exclusively “locates the resistant potential of trans people 
beyond the binary” (Bettcher, 2014, p. 404). The transgender paradigm is amnesiac of the fact 
that the transgender paradigm upholds the gender binary by necessitating that all resistance be 
organized in oppositional relation to it. Hence its refusal to authenticate acts of political 
resistance made by those whose mode of gendered identification resides within the binary logic 
of the heterosexual regime.  
Over and against the impulse to eradicate the notion of sexual difference rather than 
rather than reinterpret or expand its purview, I argue that the absolutely inalienable and 
ineradicable force of constative self-identification with respect to gender and/or sex (which often 
entails the rigid assumption of either a male or female identity) can exist in harmonious 
simultaneity with the recognition of irreducible difference. Human beings are historical and 
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social creatures forced to contend simultaneously with our inescapable embodied relationship to 
what Irigaray calls “the natural.” Yet this observation in no way precludes the radical openness 
of either gender or sex to processes of de-/re-construction, transformation, and alteration—
whether imaginary or corporeal, conceptual or practical. The metaphysically essential notion of 
womanhood or femininity endemic to early feminist thought and praxis cannot be universalized 
as a self-evident and irrefutable ontological truth nor has it proven objectively verifiable by 
empirical scientific means; yet simultaneously I see no productive reason to discount or 
invalidate claims which may appear to (or indeed explicitly seek to) recapitulate the hypothesis 
of essentialism. Indeed, subjective claims to possess a native gender or an essentially gendered 
core can be asserted with apodictic certitude by individuals whose felt experience of gender 
contributes to the confirmation of the essentialist outlook which certain theorists and activists 
find untenable. Essentialism and constructivism are but two among a plethora of possible ways 
of orienting oneself toward gender, each of which, I claim, must be defended as equally credible 
from a critical transfeminist standpoint.  
Not only have we moved past the need to rely rigidly and exclusively on the antiquated 
paradigms of biological or metaphysical essentialism, but Irigaray’s work, correspondingly, can 
be read otherwise than as advocating any form of essentialism, whether biological or anatomical, 
despite both her tacit reliance on bodily norms and her admittedly problematic negligence of 
actual discourses on sexual and gender nonconformity. I wish to suggest that Irigaray’s 
nominally parochial notion of female sexual specificity is not indicative of an irredeemably 
essentialist faith in the anatomical reducibility of sexual difference, and thus can be expanded 
and elaborated in radically inclusive directions. Relatedly, Irigaray herself excels (unsurprisingly 
given the extent of her psychoanalytic influence) in articulating the interconnected relationship 
of sex, gender, and sexuality (encapsulated by her notion of “female sexuality”) with attention to 
each term’s thorough implication in the symbolic register. Further, not only is each term which 
comprises the sex-gender-sexuality triad itself caught up in the ethereal domain of language and 
culture but the relationship between each term is also highly symbolic – which is to say 
linguistically and culturally mediated.  
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3.4 Addressing the Charge of Essentialism in Irigaray 
 
In observation of the centrality of the body to Irigaray’s delineation of sexual difference 
in her writings, it is not difficult to locate compelling evidence for the allegations of essentialism 
waged against her. Indeed, as Danielle Poe (2011) observes, “[t]he argument that Irigaray relies 
on biological essentialism for her notion of sexual difference seems to come from her analysis of 
women’s bodies” (p. 113). Identifying a deceptively uniform array of “specifically female 
pleasures” including “[f]ondling the breasts, touching the vulva, spreading the lips, stroking the 
posterior wall of the vagina, brushing against the mouth of the uterus, and so on,” Irigaray (1985) 
posits a closed circuit of plural but ultimately contained features which exist in a state of mutual 
exclusion to the masculine singularity of the phallus (p. 28). However, the boundary between 
feminine and phallic or masculine embodiment, which is palpably present in Irigaray’s writings, 
cannot be ubiquitously upheld in reality. In human embodiment – whether cis, trans, and 
nonbinary – there will always be slippages, crossings, discursive and somatic excesses 
recalcitrant to normative classification.  
We must therefore interrogate our latent presuppositions regarding the corporeal 
specificity of the female body and of female sexuality in a radically anti-essentialist way. And, if 
we are charitable, we can use Irigaray’s framework of sexual difference to do so. Unfortunately, 
as we have seen, discourses which purport to locate gender “beyond the binary” fail to offer a 
sufficient alternative to the hegemony of the gender binary, or to definitively refute the broader 
notion that sexual difference constitutes a central aspect of the human condition. Indeed, the 
proper rejection of dualistic difference – a refutation which would transcend even the ostensibly 
emancipatory notion of gender as spectrum – constitutes a problematic avenue of thought insofar 
as humanity depends for its posterity on reproduction. Relatedly, Hilge Landweer (2005) aims to 
center the debate around the fundamental concept of generativity:  
I claim that reproduction is indeed a topic that has to be negotiated on a social-theoretical level 
and that it should not be turned into a taboo on grounds of a general suspicion of essentialism. 
Due to the anthropologically still valid fact that humans are born and die, generativity leads in 
every culture to categorizations of “gender.” By generativity I mean the simple insight that 
human societies (similar to many animals) depend for their reproduction on two sexes, no matter 
to what extent and with which culturally specific meaning” (Poe, 2011, p. 116).  
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Although it can be developed in a heterosexist manner, there is nothing binding the fundamental 
notion of generativity to the exclusionary legacies of oppression and violence to which it has 
found itself tied for centuries. Technological advancements in reproductive technology 
notwithstanding, it remains an insurmountable fact that the human animal is bound to ongoing 
processes of generation and degeneration, both in life and in death. In spite of the powerful and 
polemical nature of Lee Edelman’s (2004) attack on the ideological imperative of reproductive 
futurity—a notion predicated on a pervasively heterosexualized logic of futural investment 
which underpins the very sphere of the political in the West—we have little hope of completely 
displacing the conceptual “trap” of dualism considering the centrality of reproduction to human 
posterity. Although we can, and should, trenchantly critique the resultant valorization of 
heterosexuality and heterosexual relations which stems from uncritical acceptance of our 
investment in reproduction and the future as ideological constructs, the fact remains that the 
logic of generativity constitutes the fundamental condition of possibility for human existence, 
and a total negation of generativity would spell the eradication of the species.  
Crucially, however, the generative aspect of human life, which renders the notion of 
sexual difference an ineradicable theoretical consideration, does not preclude a cultural 
interpretation of sexual difference as multiplicitous instead of binary. For Poe (2011), “sexual 
difference is something that is perpetually present, but its manifestations continue to change and 
evolve” (p. 117). In other words, sexual difference is not bound by any biologically specific 
criteria to the extent that the male/female dyad (with its attendant sets of mutually opposing 
physiological and anatomical characteristics) falls short of satisfying any fixed criteria which 
could defensibly be rendered as naturally necessary.  
Ample justification for such a speculative assertion can be drawn from the empirical 
findings of a region of current evolutionary biological research which emphasizes not only the 
high degree of physiological variance among individuals assigned to one or the other biological 
sex category but the fact that sex traits can be viewed as dynamic and not static. Specifically, I 
am referring to the dynamic model of sex inaugurated by Malin Ah-King and Sören Nylin 
(2010), in which sex is emphasized as “a dynamic process in which organisms have more or less 
‘open potentials’ of sex, sex related characteristics, and behavior” (Ah-King & Hayward, 2014, 
p. 6). In short, sex, at the physiological level, is not only a highly variant category in that it 
differs from body to body (and incidentally it does so in a pluralistic rather than a merely 
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dualistic fashion), but also a highly variable category (in that its expression(s) is/are reactive and 
subject to change over time within one and the same body). Hence the vast array of unique 
anatomical formations among those who identify as members of the same ‘sex’ demonstrably 
illustrates the constructed and ambiguous nature of sex itself. On this view, the falsely totalizing 
paradigm of sexual dimorphism represents one instantiation among many possible instantiations 
of sexual difference, even if the latter is understood as a fundamental physiological and 
ontological reality.  
Sexual difference can thus be revealed to possess no necessary teleology; considering that 
the trajectory of its cultural development did not have to result, in the absence of divine 
predetermination or biological necessity, in the construction of (and subsequently serve as a basis 
for the disciplinary societal maintenance of) a gendered social stratification system predicated on 
a binary logic of hierarchal dualism, we must thusly concede that the notion of sexual difference 
retains within it, in however diminished a form, the capacity to be retroactively remoulded and 
rearticulated as relational as opposed to hierarchal. No doubt, the unfolding of history thus far in 
the West has tended to privilege hierarchal opposition, resulting in the cultivation of a nearly 
ubiquitous general dynamic of masculine domination and feminine subordination – one well 
concealed by the purportedly primal and original authority attributed to oppressive patriarchal 
structures of power.  
The notion of difference contains within it the possibility to be articulated otherwise than 
in binary hierarchal terms; the fundamental notion of difference is not, at bottom, indebted to the 
hierarchal dualism of dominant gender terms, nor must it loyally maintain its historical 
attachment to the paradigm of sexual dimorphism reinforced by our culture’s legacy of 
biological and medical discourses. Incidentally, not only does the replacement of hierarchy with 
relationality lie firmly within the realm of speculative possibility, but the advent of such a 
paradigmatic shift is not hindered by any known biological conditions. In spite of her recognition 
of the conceptual potentiality of relationality, however, Irigaray is stubborn in her cathexis to 
traditional depictions of the male-female dynamic, clinging to the indissolubility of bodily 
differences between man and woman. In I Love to You, Irigaray (1996) remarks with 
indefensible conviction:  
Some of our prosperous and naïve contemporaries, women and men, would like to wipe out all 
difference by resorting to monosexuality, to the unisex, and to what is called identification: even 
if I am bodily a man or a woman, I can identify with, and so be, the other sex. This new opium of 
 
 
41 
the people annihilates the other in the illusion of a reduction to identity, equality, and sameness, 
especially between man and woman, the ultimate anchorage of real alterity (p. 62).  
The idea that one can be identified as “bodily a man or a woman” blatantly implies an 
unnecessary conflation of a specific set of anatomical traits with the discursive and socially 
mediated identity categories of manhood and womanhood. Such an uncritical conflation violates 
the pluralistic notion of sexual difference that Irigaray herself has developed in opposition to the 
homogenous and delimiting psychoanalytic one. Irigaray’s outright refusal in the above passage 
to admit the conceptual possibility of crossing sex boundaries hinges, troublingly, on a failure to 
rigorously maintain the crucial distinction between anatomy and morphology, a distinction to 
which Irigaray is ironically highly attuned throughout the vast majority of her work.  
“Morphology,” within the context of the innovative conceptual framework of what 
Margaret Whitford calls Irigaray’s Body Symbolic, refers to “the way in which bodies are 
culturally mediated” (Poe, 2011, p. 123). Elizabeth Grosz (1989) notes that “[if] morphology is 
reduced to biology, the charge of essentialism seems well justified,” yet “[the] reduction of 
morphology to biology occurs only on the crudest of misreadings” (p. 113). The notion of 
morphology invokes a host of both cultural and biological norms which get inscribed on the 
body since birth, norms which are endlessly, habitually, and coercively reinforced both at the 
hands of others and internally in the psyche of the subject. Moreover, poststructuralist discourses 
teach us that these features, which can easily be mistakenly understood as being inscribed on the 
pre-discursive surface of already extant material bodies, are actually, paradoxically generative or 
constitutive of the concept of the body itself.28  
Thus, the centrality of genital anatomy to the cultural intelligibility or legibility of one’s 
sex can be revealed as a constructed and arbitrary standard rooted as much in our cultural 
imaginary as it is in the likewise culturally permeated system of sex determination used in the 
biological and medical spheres. Indeed, Sandy Stone (1992), in her groundbreaking 
“Posttranssexual Manifesto,” echoes Judith Shapiro’s (1991)29 insight that “[t]o those…who 
might be inclined to diagnose the transsexual’s focus on the genitals as obsessive or fetishistic, 
 
28 Relatedly, Judith Butler has deftly demonstrated in her work that bodily materiality is always already 
saturated with discursivity and thus affected by masculinist processes of codification; as we begin to 
discern and uncover “the history of sexual difference encoded in the history of matter, it [becomes] 
radically unclear whether a notion of matter or the materiality of bodies can serve as the uncontested 
ground of feminist practice” (Butler, 1990, p. 26).  
29 See Shapiro (1991). 
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the response is that they are, in fact, simply conforming to their culture’s criteria for gender 
assignment” (p. 231). Shapiro’s (1991) prescient defense of anatomical transition coheres with 
insights voiced by a number of scholars on gender and sexuality. Elizabeth Grosz (1990), for 
one, states in Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction that “[t]he body is lived in accordance 
with an individual’s and a culture’s concepts of biology…the imaginary body is the consequence 
of the meaning of biology rather than biology itself (p. 44). Similarly, for Thomas Laqueur 
(1992), “[a]natomy…is obviously not pure fact, unadulterated by thought or convention, but 
rather a richly complicated construction based…on observation, and on a variety of social and 
cultural constraints on the practice of science” (pp. 163-164). Margaret Whitford (1991), for 
another, “points out that…anatomical reference is never an unmediated reflection, even in 
phallomorphic discourse” (100). And in the words of Danielle Poe (2011), “we begin with some 
anatomical structures, but the interpretation of our anatomy is filtered through culture” (p. 123).  
However, the constructedness and historicity of the widespread cultural and subjective 
psychological meaning of anatomy, and specifically the emphasis on genitality, does not detract 
from the significance of its influence on the social and cultural levels. Nor does the fact of its 
historical construction, in and of itself, necessarily have any bearing on its desirability or its 
value as a metric for cultural and clinical processes of sex determination. Nevertheless, such 
insights throw light on the arbitrariness of the procedural centrality of visible factors such as 
external genitalia to the social determination of one’s sex at birth, exposing anatomical 
reductionism as a material effect of the cultural mediation of biology (specifically the biological 
branch of morphology, of which anatomy is technically a subdiscipline). Thus, Irigaray’s 
ungrounded categorical refusal of cross-sex identification as an effacement of difference can 
only indicate a temporary lapse, a slippage from the sharp awareness of the distance between the 
anatomical and the morphological realms which characterizes her work as a whole.  
 
3.5 Redefining the Morphology of the Feminine: A Transfeminist 
Recuperation of Irigaray’s Model of Sexual Difference 
 
Faced, at this juncture, with what can only be viewed as an aporia from a transfeminist 
perspective, one solution is to follow Irigaray’s own counsel in “Women’s Exile”: that “[w]e 
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must go back to the question not of the anatomy but of the morphology of the female sex” (1977, 
p. 64). At the same time, however, the concept of anatomy is also an indispensable aspect of our 
culture’s notion of biological sex, and thus figures prominently in trans discourses. In any case, 
the prejudicial assertion that one’s sexed identity must be cultivated in accordance with the body 
does not preclude the alternative possibility, for others who are not Irigaray, of the cultivation of 
a sexed or sexually differentiated “spirit” that is incongruent with the body with which one is 
born. Irigaray violates the integrity of her own critical project by failing to address the implicit 
assumption latent in her statement, “I was born a woman,” that the anatomical features present in 
her body at birth should determine the character of her spiritual development. She assumes, 
based on her own experience of cisgender embodiment, that the linearly progressive nature of 
her own developmental trajectory of spiritual cultivation with respect to her sexed body can be 
universalized, and thus that, because her relation to sex has remained constant and unchanged 
over the course of her lifetime, that such standards of psychosomatic alignment and temporal 
consistency can be taken as ontological norms.  
Irigaray’s (1996) characterization of sexual difference as an “immediate and natural 
given” (p. 47) need not be taken as a deterministic appeal to biology or to ‘Nature’ in the 
normative sense but instead could be charitably interpreted as an affirmation of the 
indeterminacy of sex, and a recognition of the fact that sexual difference is not a biological given 
but, as Danielle Poe (2011) puts it, a “process of cultivating nature” (p. 123). Irigaray rightfully 
observes that “[n]o one nature can claim to correspond to the whole of the natural. There is no 
‘Natural’ as a singular entity” (1996, p. 35). The trouble, as Poe (2011) succinctly summarizes it, 
stems from the fact that “Irigaray’s descriptions of cultivating the natural require one to cultivate 
the body with which one is born,” while transsexual accounts of identity cultivation, in 
antagonistic relation to this tacit imperative, require a great deal more agency insofar as they 
involve “changing [the body], or the way that others view [the body]” (p. 123). Within Irigaray’s 
underdeveloped paradigm of ontological sexual difference, the rejection of the sex assigned to 
one at birth can only signify a retreat into the deceptive clutches of identity, under which lies an 
illusory abyss of ontological sameness.  
“It’s not as Simone de Beauvoir said: one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman 
(through culture), but rather: I am born a woman, but I still must become this woman that I am 
by nature,” writes Irigaray (1996, p. 107). However, trans claims to womanhood complicate the 
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presumption of inborn femininity that Irigaray appears to take for granted and erodes the solidity 
of the hypothesis of ultimate alterity between the sexes, the ontological disparity between man 
and woman. Take for example Atalia Israeli-Nevo’s (2017) plain and succinct statement, “I 
wasn’t born a trans woman” (p. 34). Unlike Irigaray, Israeli-Nevo holds that she was not born a 
woman, even though she is unquestionably a woman today and therefore holds as much 
dominion over the mantle of ontological femininity as does Irigaray and as do all women. 
Irigaray’s articulation of sexual difference constitutes a clever marriage of biological 
determinism and personal autonomy in which one must existentially come to terms with the 
originary femininity of her body. Yet her method of description fixes the temporality of 
psychosexual development to the birth and death of a static subject, forcing one to identify with 
the body with which one is born, foreclosing (or at least pathologizing) the possibility to alter 
one’s body, and thus to take up a different relationship to the notion of origin, which Irigaray 
parochially restricts to natality and the maternal scene, according absolute primacy to the event 
of biological birth.  
Irigaray remains ignorant to (or at least silent on) the possibility that the generativity of 
maternal-biological birth can be metaphorically appropriated, and its temporally disrupted, 
insofar as one can choose, later in life (either as an adult or an autonomous decision-making 
child) to alter one’s embodiment through the use of hormones, surgery, or both, to such an extent 
that s/he experiences a second birth by assuming, adopting, or being “born into” a female body—
which, importantly, is not to discount the claim that one was always a woman on the part of trans 
women who were indeed, as only they can attest, born women. Israeli-Nevo’s personal narrative 
underscores the absurdity of positing a definitive link between any one form of embodiment to 
the attainment of womanhood. She defines her own transition as a process without a definitive 
ending, which contradicts the classic model that it must eventually – and the quicker the better – 
culminate in a state of “completion.” On this front, Irigaray misses the extent to which the 
materiality of a body designated female at birth (viz. assigned a female sex) constitutes the 
discursive effect of a vast collection of normative culturally inscribed meanings attributed to it 
within the cis/heterosexist grid of cultural intelligibility that designates bodily materiality as male 
or female.  
To be “born a girl” (Irigaray 1990, p. 107) does not constitute the only avenue into 
female embodiment. The possession of corporeal-morphological femininity ought not to be 
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gatekept by such a specific yet empirically ambiguous criterion. Her description of a reality in 
which one must cultivate the natural immediacy and indisputable givenness of sexual difference 
as an affirmational process of becoming what one already is betrays a concealed personal bias 
which can be extracted from the workings of her ultimately robustly inclusive notion of sexual 
difference itself. She regards the inescapable ubiquity of sexually differentiated embodiment as 
tied to a broader situation facing each human being, namely our entrapment within an absolutely 
irreducible condition of existential alterity in opposition to the sexual other.  
But the way in which she binds that conception of ontological alterity to the body is 
arguably problematic. For Irigaray, it seems, there appears to be a fragment of universal 
difference lodged within the individual subject which corresponds exclusively to the anatomical 
organization of the body with which one is born. Yet what of the fact that one’s relationship to 
her or his body, the body into which s/he was born, is not immune to processes of 
transformation, modification, and rearticulation as deemed desirable, even necessary or natural, 
by the subject who inhabits that body? Surgical and medical technologies now engender methods 
of altering the body in accordance with one’s lived experience of sex and gender, while 
historically, and at the same time, the socially visible perceptions dimension of the body has 
always been and continues to be intentionally manipulated, and with far less difficulty in strictly 
pragmatic terms.  
Notably, the thing, besides the body, that is being “manipulated” in such instances is not 
necessarily some essential spiritual or ontological property—though it certainly can be. But it is 
never this property alone that is affected by the process of transition; even in cases in which an 
individual seeks medical intervention as a direct means, not only of ‘passing’ as one gender or 
another, but of ontologically becoming that desired or innate gender, what also inevitably 
undergoes a process of change and evolution during that transition is one’s complex personal 
relationship to a set of hegemonic cultural beliefs and assumptions about sexual difference that 
have been imposed on him or her from birth. And these beliefs and assumptions, in addition to 
having a tendency to evolve and fluctuate over the course of history, cannot be traced back to 
any objective or static origins, in either a metaphysical or biological sense. As such, they must be 
interrogated, even if we are to decide in the end that they still have some use to us.  
Instead of acknowledging that the possibility of changing one’s body to cultivate a 
different subject position remains open, Irigaray refuses to admit the ontological import of 
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constative self-identification, diagnosing the possibility of authentic cross-sex identification, 
rather flippantly to say the least, as an “opium of the people.”  
In my view, however, the limited scope of her work with respect to its fundamental 
inability to incorporate a growing body of theoretical work on transsexual and transgender 
ontology nor the expanding body of scientific research on sex variability in an evolutionary 
context merely indicates an arbitrary personal unwillingness to actively elaborate the theory of 
sexual difference in a radically inclusive direction, but not a foreclosure of that possibility. I 
believe, like Poe (2011), that we can use “Irigaray’s rejection of biological essentialism to 
counter [her own] rejection of transsexual and transgender identification” (p. 116). As such, I 
seek to move toward a radically inclusive recuperation of sexual difference which does not 
threaten to undermine the validity of trans people’s identities or the ontological weight of trans 
narratives. Still, Irigaray’s misapprehension of cross-sex identification as a reduction to 
“sameness” amounts to a stark refusal to consider the vast and open potentialities inherent in the 
notion of “cultivating one’s nature.” Irigaray mistakes the inclusive and non-essentialist alterity 
of sexual difference for static forms of bodily difference which supposedly exist between all men 
and all women. Differences do, of course, exist between men and women. But an equal degree of 
difference also exists among the anatomically diverse field of women and female-identified 
people: some women have penises, and some do not; some women have uteri, and some do not. 
Therefore, it is not justifiable to presuppose any static anatomical criteria for what makes one 
“bodily a man or a woman.” Ironically, it would seem that Irigaray’s cultural biases, in 
combination with her positionality as a cis woman, leave her trapped within the clutches of a 
cissexist relativism that posits a predetermined array of “natural” differences between the 
“sexes” instead of leaving what is to be deemed “natural” up to the subject herself.  
Let us not lose hope too quickly, for whatever has been naturalized can always be 
denaturalized. Freud himself is unambiguous in his refutation of and the necessity of bracketing 
off cultural norms from psychoanalytic investigation into the nature of sexual difference, an 
endeavour he would no doubt characterize as “scientific”: he insists in the Three Essays on the 
Theory of Sexuality (1966)30, as Alenka Zupančič (2012) notes, that  
The auto-erotic activity of the erotogenic zones is…the same in both sexes, and owing to this 
uniformity there is no possibility of a distinction between the two sexes such as arises after 
puberty…Indeed, if we were to give a more definite connotation to the concepts “masculine” and 
 
30 Originally published in 1905. 
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“feminine,” it would even be possible to maintain that libido is invariably and necessary of a 
masculine nature, whether it occurs in men or in women and irrespectively of whether its object is 
a man or a woman (p. 7).  
 
Freud (1966) himself further reinforces the sexual ambiguity of pre-adolescence in a footnote in 
the Essays, in which he warns explicitly that it is “essential to understand clearly that the 
concepts ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine,’ whose meaning seems so unambiguous to ordinary people, 
are among the most confused that occur in science” (p. 141).  
Nevertheless, Irigaray (1996) insists on the biological dimension of sexual difference:  
Between man and woman, there really is otherness: biological, morphological, relational. To be 
able to have a child constitutes a difference, but also being born a girl or a boy of a woman, who 
is of the same or the other gender as oneself, as well as to be or to appear corporeally with 
differing properties and qualities (p. 61).  
 
Not only does Irigaray fail to couch her discussion of the maternal with the caveat that the 
biological ability to bear children not the universal mark of a woman but, through her premature 
desire to identify the pre-subject as a boy or a girl in advance of the processes of subjectivation 
and acculturation which produce sexed subjects, she falls victim to a metaphysical essentialism 
that cuts off the fruitful futural potentiality of the insight that one’s relationship to nature must be 
cultivated instead of given by limiting the abundance of agency available to subjects as they 
undergo and enact those processes of cultivation which mould and shape them into men or 
women.  
As we have seen, Irigaray is well aware that the process of sexing does not end but only 
begins at birth. What she fails to perceive, however, is the extent of the multiplicity of 
trajectories open to the subject who must cultivate her identity in relation to her embodiment. But 
she fails to recognize that the possibility of altering one’s sexual anatomy does not detract from 
her fundamental view of ontological difference in any meaningful way but merely amplifies the 
number of available developmental trajectories open to the subject. She fails to deconstruct the 
uncritical assumption that the “differing properties and qualities” of corporeal bodies, which do 
very well exist, should be accepted as unchangeable aspects of human embodiment. The 
underlying imperative of ontological difference can be left intact even while the imperative of a 
specific and singular relation between the sexed subject and the body into which s/he was born is 
exploded. The subjective and objective “irreducibility…of the sexes to one another” (Irigaray, 
1990, p. 62) on which Irigaray too often insists need not imply the foreclosure of total variability 
in sexed identification among individuals, including those born with similar bodies. The notion 
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of ontological sexual difference, in short, does not foreclose transsexual and transgender 
identification.  
 
4 Gender and Time: From Queer Temporality to Trans Temporalities 
4.1 Chapter Breakdown 
 
If there is one thing universally applicable to the human condition, or essential to any attempt 
to describe the human experience, it is arguably that our existence seems to be ubiquitously and 
inescapably filtered through a constant interaction and negotiation with the concept we call 
“time.” Time is caught up and intertwined with aspect of our existence, including the experience 
and interpretation of gender and sexuality, both in ourself and others. I am not speaking about 
time as an abstract principle but as a subjective condition of experience. Indeed, without the 
subjective experience of time, gendered experience would have no order or meaning, no 
underlying chronology or organizing logic, normative or nonnormative. Thus, the phenomenon 
of gender is inherently temporal. As such, we will now shift from dealing with the theme of 
ontology to an extended exploration of the theme of temporality, and how it affects the 
development and perception of gender identity, and perhaps even sex itself, in ourselves and our 
fellow human beings.  
Time is a polysemic phenomenon. It has been the source of wonderment and debate in 
academic thought from antiquity to modernity, and in the contemporary arena the concept of 
temporality continues to serve as a central area in which theorists set out to revise and reinterpret 
the assertions of their predecessors. Scholars in the humanities tend to emphasize time’s 
inextricable relation both to the historical subject and to the subjective interiority of the living 
subject – i.e. to the inescapable fact of embodied subjectivity that invariably mediates our 
experience of the objective world in which we reside as conscious human beings.  
Since antiquity, some philosophers’ models of time have been based on the necessity of 
reckoning with death. From a Heideggerian perspective, the motivation and impetus for human 
action are impacted by our inescapable awareness of the “horizon of death”; any action or 
activity on the part of Dasein – “the entity which we are ourselves” – “is always essentially 
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ordered by anticipation of the end that is ‘the most extreme possibility’ and that constitutes the 
originary temporality of existence,” namely its own death (Stiegler, 1998, p. 5, emphasis mine). 
As one grapples with the notions of time or duration, s/he is eventually and inevitably pushed 
toward the existential realization of mortality. One may choose to embrace this fact: Plato’s 
Socrates, to use a well-known example, did not hesitate to entertain the possibility that death 
involved the cessation of consciousness, but many choose to reject it.  
Introspective contemplation of the temporal harbors the potential to incite one to adopt an 
attitude of denial in relation to the finality of death, causing him or her to cling fervently and 
faithfully to a belief in the indefinite duration of an afterlife. Indeed, the most potent strategy for 
coping with the reality of human finitude, and the one most commonly employed by individuals 
and cultures the world over, as evinced by the content of numerous scriptural texts, has been to 
posit an absolutely divine being who/force which stands outside of time and, as such, wields the 
power to grant eternal life. This transcendent model of time has the dual effect of producing a 
conceptual division between mind/body (or psyche/soma)31 and ameliorating the constraints of 
time on the body through the promise of eternal conscious life after the organic death of the 
finite body32.  
Time and temporality cannot always be used interchangeably; rather, there exists a 
conceptual distinction between “time” in the quotidian sense (often referred to as “clock-time”) 
and temporality as such (a category which, first and foremost, refers to time as the fundamental 
condition of possibility for being but can also refer to the state of existing within or having some 
relationship with (and/or, paradoxically, being radically indistinct from) time on the part of 
individual subjects. For although mortality, through a theological lens, ostensibly guarantees the 
possibility of an eventual exit from earthly forms of suffering which rely on the sufferer’s 
experience of time in terms of duration and repetition, this does not mean we can so easily 
escape the recognition of time qua temporality as a fundamentally constitutive force, and as the 
very condition which must always already be assumed in order for the notion of being, each 
linguistic formulation of which necessarily implies an intrinsic spatiotemporal situatedness (i.e. 
being-in-the-world, being-in-time), to carry any weight.  
 
31 Lea Melandri (2019) describes this divide as a “split” between what she calls the “thinking being” on 
the one hand and the “body-as-object” in Chapter One of her book, Love and Violence: The Vexatious 
Factors of Civilization (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2019). 
32 See Plato’s Apology of Socrates. 
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As we will soon discover, furthermore, time does not necessarily have to be conceived as 
(and certainly should not be presupposed to be) totally distinct from Being, and therefore to 
describe an enworlded being as existing (or be-ing) in time could be viewed as technically 
untenable, at least in certain contexts. Incidentally, within the context of our analysis it is 
important to note that time is linked ideologically to sexuality via the cultural imperative of 
reproduction. Heterosexual reproduction constitutes the grounding narrative for both history and 
futurity. In my analysis of Martin Heidegger’s treatment of the interrelated themes of temporality 
and historicality in his opus Being and Time in tandem with Immanuel Kant’s writings on time in 
his monumental text, the Critique of Pure Reason, I endeavour to demonstrate that the temporal 
bears a necessary relation to the ontological, as well as to deconstruct a monolithic concept that 
has historically been inextricably intertwined with the themes of time and history, namely 
teleology, for the purpose of debunking a commonly held faith in the teleological nature of 
development as it pertains to the existential subject. In doing so I maintain a sharp underlying 
focus on the ubiquitous existential phenomena of sex and gender, which enable a smooth 
introduction to the emergent notion of “queer temporality” as it relates to the aforementioned 
themes of temporality, ontology, history, and teleology.  
This broader framework informs my subsequent close analysis of some of the divergent 
conceptualizations of trans temporalities (a phrase which alludes to the diverse range of 
temporally saturated experiences associated with gender transition and sex reassignment) carried 
out in relation to a number of real and fictional trans narratives – from former decathlete Caitlyn 
Jenner to the transsexual protagonist of Imogen Binnie’s queer/trans novel Nevada (2013). This 
final portion of the chapter will also address a fundamental tension which often arises in queer 
theoretical discourse, namely the one between sex and/or gender essentialism and the notion of 
fluidity or ‘flexibility.’ This tension will become readily apparent as we tease out the points of 
divergence between the often-conflated signifiers, “transsexuality” and “transgender” – and, 
correspondingly, between the traditional concept of binary transsexuality and what Talia Mae 
Bettcher terms the “transgender paradigm.” 
 
4.2 The Indissoluble Union of Gender and Time 
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From an existential phenomenological perspective, gender and sexuality can be described 
as modalities of being. Relatedly, time is the abstract condition of possibility for the very notion 
of being: one cannot exist in a vacuum; to exist or to be we need time and space—which, at the 
quantum level, are one and the same thing (i.e. spatiotemporality)—in which to do so. Not only 
are all beings, human and nonhuman, suspended in the vast expanse of what we call time, but we 
can also posit the existence of a plethora of distinct and unique times, or temporalities, insofar as 
the term temporality can be made to refer to “the social patterning of experiences and 
understandings of time” (Amin, 2014, p. 219). Hence temporality is not a universally applicable 
organizational framework for gendered subjectivity. It is a much more expansive and 
multiplicitous concept than that. Temporality has a double meaning in our context: it refers not 
only to the state of existing within time, usually conceived as a linear progression of past, 
present, and future, but also our intimately subjective relationships to time, which do not always 
square with the common expectation of progressive linearity.  
Notably, temporality never ceases to be an indispensable aspect of every instantiation of 
gender performativity, though it is no longer an exclusively linear conception of temporality with 
which we are dealing. Time is indispensable to gender insofar as the stylized acts which 
constitute gender, or rather produce and uphold the cohesive illusion thereof, must be carried out 
repeatedly to bolster the perception that one’s gender identity constitutes an innate, essential, and 
permanent aspect of one’s being. But to the keen eye, the unavoidably temporal quality of gender 
betrays the illusory constructedness of static gender identity. Butler (1990) troubles the notion 
that gender is a static and unchanging feature of human existence (and concomitantly the 
naturalness and originality of gender) by mobilizing a philosophical critique of unified 
subjectivity. In the first chapter of Gender Trouble she asserts that “gender is not a noun, but 
neither is it a set of free-floating attributes…gender proves to be performative—that is, 
constituting the identity it is purported to be” (Butler, 1990, p. 25). “In this sense,” she writes, 
“gender is a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to pre-exist the deed” 
(Butler, 1990, 25). She then goes on to quote Nietzsche’s claim in On the Genealogy of Morals 
that “there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added 
to the deed—the deed is everything” (Butler, 1990, p. 25).  
In addition to Nietzsche, Butler’s early work also relies heavily on Foucault and his 
exposure of the productive and constitutive aspect of power over and against the erroneous, or at 
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least parochial, emphasis on the strictly repressive function of laws and norms, such as those 
governing sexuality in Western society and culture. Foucault’s writings help to clarify that the 
true function of the discursive and regulatory norms which govern sex and sexuality is, in short, 
not to repress but to constitute. The Foucaultian insight regarding the blurred lines between 
repression and constitution can also be expressed in terms of a distinction between being and 
becoming, a dichotomy which, originating in ancient Greece in the thought of Heraclitus, would 
continue to plague the metaphysicians for centuries to come. For our purposes, however, the 
distinction between being and becoming naturally raises the question of subjectivation: the 
process by which one becomes a subject. Butler throws into question numerous attributes of 
subjectivity that went unchallenged during the reign of the Enlightenment subject, namely the 
qualities of unity, freedom, autonomy, and rationality. Because gender is largely socially 
constructed and sexed subjects are inherently discursively saturated, the possibility for agential 
transgression or subversion is opened up, especially for marginalized and oppressed subjects.  
Once the universal subject of the eighteenth century is put into question, the way is paved 
for an alternative definition of temporality—one more commensurable with concepts such as 
rupture, contingency, fragmentation, and nonlinearity than with unity, universality, cohesiveness, 
and linear progression. Hence, we can begin to sense the emergence of a salient connection 
between the temporally imbued ontological distinction between being and becoming and the 
metaphysical tension between the two common models of trans ontology, the first of which 
appeals to the idea of a native gender identity and the second of which emphasizes the 
construction of identity as a temporal process (which will be represented by author Imogen 
Binnie and trans theorist Atalia Israeli-Nevo respectively).  
Butler boldly rejects the expressive model of sex/gender, which is predicated on the 
assumption of some essential core which exists independently of the way one behaves, in favour 
of the now-famous performative model in which gender consists, both conceptually and 
materially, precisely and only in the vast and diverse range of stylized acts which we commonly 
(uncritically and erroneously) believe to be expressions of some underlying and invisible 
gendered essence within the subject who performs them. Moreover, she takes this initial insight a 
step further in the early pages of Gender Trouble, daring to consider the implications of the 
possibility that not only gender but sex, too, might be a discursive construct rather than a cut and 
dry biological reality. This opens up the radical notion that sex cannot be objectively determined 
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or verified at any one point in time (let alone singularly maintained throughout the course of 
variably embodied sexed subjects’ lives) due to its imbrication, owing to the status of ‘sex’ as a 
discursive category, with a host of historically and culturally contingent factors, not to mention 
the myriad physiological ambiguities shrouding the clinical determination of sex at birth.  
Butler’s interventions in traditional feminist discourse at the close of the twentieth 
century productively split open the pragmatic and didactic binary between gender and sex which 
originated (and there is some uncertainty dispute regarding its precise historical origin in relation 
to demise of the ancient one-sex model) sometime after the eighteenth century.33 From a 
Butlerian perspective, gender is not a biological given, but a processual phenomenon enacted 
over time. In this vein, Butler (1988) explicitly asserts, before the publication of Gender Trouble, 
in “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist 
Theory,” that “gender is in no way a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts 
proceed; rather, it is an identity tenuously constituted in time—an identity instituted through a 
stylized repetition of acts” (p. 519).  
While series of constantly repeated acts or behaviours may congeal over time to produce 
the appearance of a stable gender identity, we must keep in mind that the performative model 
critically exposes the inherent instability of gender over and against the commonly accepted 
expressive model of gender. The mere appearance of gender as the outward projection of a static 
and enduring essence does not necessarily imply the existence of such an essential entity beneath 
the appearance. Similarly, the mere appearance of autonomous action does not guarantee the 
capacity for unrestricted freedom of action on the part of the acting subject. As one might 
surmise, therefore, what is at issue for Butler is not merely the conceptual tenability of gender 
essentialism but the very unity of the embodied subject – the being whose discrete individuality 
might culminate in a locus of agency which would constitute the condition of possibility for the 
subversion of identity. Furthermore, agency remains a prerequisite to the capacity for subversion 
whether one believes in the universal possession of innate or intrinsic personal gender identity or 
subscribes to a purely social constructivist interpretation of the Beauvoirian maxim “[o]ne is not 
born, but rather becomes, woman” (Beauvoir, 2011, p. 283). In any case, neither sex nor gender 
can be totally reduced to either biology or cultural construction. This line of argumentation has 
 
33 See Laqueur (1990). 
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been demonstrated elsewhere by numerous feminist biologists.34 But we have not the space here 
to analyze such debates in any detail. Instead, I would like us to consider the complex 
relationship between temporality and gender variance in what follows.  
As it happens, the regulation of temporality is one major avenue through which 
heteropatriarchal structures of power accomplish the maintenance of the deeply entrenched 
cultural norms of heteronormativity and cisnormativity at the affective and personal level of 
subjectivity. Specifically, it is evident in narratives such as that of Caitlyn Jenner—who, 
referring to a photograph depicting her former self, a male-identified decathlete, declares “That 
is me, that is her,”—that we as sexed subjects make sense of our intimate experiences of gender 
by bestowing them with a sense of temporal order. Interestingly, the form of Jenner’s claim 
leaves ambiguous whether or not she was fully conscious of her native femininity at the time the 
picture was taken. Regardless, although the ascription of innate femininity onto her past has the 
potential to be ‘read’ as a retrospectively constructed narrative, the truth or falsity of such a 
reading would be irrelevant even if it were objectively verifiable. What matters most is that the 
articulation of such a narrative must and does occur in accordance with the prevailing cultural 
understanding of time as coextensive with progressive linearity. Her explicit attribution of 
internal femininity to her previous embodied self, which was at the time universally read and 
understood as masculine and male to the outside world, affirms the dominant paradigm of 
temporality as progressive linearity—a paradigm inextricably linked to the orderly, consecutive 
temporality which underpins normative psychosexual developmental trajectories and the 
exclusionary norms of cisnormativity and heteronormativity. And to be sure, she has every right 
to subscribe to that model of temporality.  
To recap, I have clarified here that the concept of gender refers to nothing more concrete 
than a series of acts attributed to a single subject which together cement the illusion of a fixed 
identity over time. However, this implies that gender also has the potential to be otherwise than a 
static entity. The fact that we have to constantly perform our gender to maintain it, and police 
others’ gender expressions to guarantee the societal dominance of cisnormativity, means that 
individuals can also subvert dominant norms. But can subversion be overemphasized? Can 
counter-hegemonic subversion of gender and sexual normativity mutate until it has unwittingly 
 
34 See Fausto-Sterling (2000); see also Fausto-Sterling (2012); see also Ah-King & Nylin (2010). 
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accrued a hegemonic status which resembles the very dominant paradigm it set out to resist and 
oppose? Where do calls for the eradication of binary gender leave transsexuals who assert that 
gender identity corresponds to a metaphysically innate gender—one which has been present 
since birth—or a deeply embedded desire to transition so that his or her aspired gender can be 
achieved through somatic transition?  
 
4.3 Dasein: A Temporal Being 
 
I begin this section with an examination of the groundbreaking phenomenological 
conception of time in relation to human being delineated by Martin Heidegger in Being and Time 
before subsequently considering its points of connection to the treatment of temporality by 
Immanuel Kant in his system of transcendental idealism. The overview just mentioned, of two of 
the more influential contributions to the theorization of time in the recent history of the 
philosophical tradition, will then serve as the backdrop against which I launch my discussion of 
queer temporality and my subsequent close investigation of multiple unique and specifically 
trans temporalities, both fictional and autobiographical (which is preceded by a more in depth 
discussion of the temporal nature of gendered subjectivity via Butler’s theory of performativity).  
Michael Wheeler (2018) sums up Heidegger’s influential notion of Dasein – which is 
itself a transfiguration of Husserl’s postulation of an irreducible thinking subject who serves as 
the grounds for all objective inquiry (often referred to under the moniker of “transcendental 
subjectivity”) – as “the inherently social being who already operates with a pre-theoretical grasp 
of the a priori structures that make possible particular modes of Being.” As it pertains to the 
concepts of time and temporality specifically, Dasein is the entity which exists, precisely and 
only, between the two poles of enculturation (or ‘birth’) and finitude (or ‘death’). The being of 
Dasein stretches out across the distance between enculturation and finitude, which together 
comprise the conditions of possibility for Dasein’s unique, enworlded and embodied experience 
of temporality as an existential phenomenon rather than simply a matter of objective relativity or 
linearly sequential chronology.  
Although counterintuitive from a strictly scientific or historical perspective, this latter 
insight becomes all the more evident when we recall the principal defining characteristic of 
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Dasein, namely that Dasein is a (or the) being for whom existence, or Being, itself, is always at 
issue (or an issue). In short, Dasein’s essence is identical with its inherent sense of comportment 
in relation to its Being, which is defined by the potentiality it harbors, at every moment, to take 
up a vantage point, as if from outside itself, on its own Being). Following its ‘birth’ (not a 
biological birth but an existential one) into a pre-existing culture, Dasein assumes its place in the 
world as a creature fundamentally indistinct from culture in an ontological sense and yet, 
simultaneously, thrust into an extrinsic cultural realm not identical with its being, from which 
there is no escape – indeed, even death, in its unlimited finality, offers not a true escape insofar 
as the event of death relegates Dasein to non-existence – a realm (culture) whose norms, 
customs, and rites of passage cultivate in Dasein distinctly other-directed, non-solipsistic modes 
of thought.  
In any case, despite the predominance of the scientistic tendency to conflate the notion of 
time as a whole with the strings of temporally ordered events that comprise a human lifespan, a 
historical society, and civilization as a whole, or even for that matter the unimaginable series of 
moments which constitute the “age” of the extant universe itself, is to falsely attribute to it an air 
of objectivity which the term by no means deserves. Furthermore, even to include in one’s 
mathematical quantification of time those potentially infinite durations, or ‘infinities,’ which 
presumably (must have) elapse(d) before one is born and (will occur) after s/he dies – which, 
incidentally, are at once conceptually multiple and discrete and yet at the same time boundless in 
scope, continuous, and unending – or, indeed, even to account for nuanced variables such as the 
constantly expanding nature of the universe, would not, from an existential phenomenological 
perspective, redeem any formulation of time that renders it as an indefinite succession of distinct 
moments inasmuch as the very notion of succession bears little relevance to phenomenological 
interrogations of the various and variegated subjective experience of time, or ‘temporality.’  
In short, the quantitatively based notion of time-as-linear-succession (or clock-time) 
differs dramatically in kind from a qualitatively attuned conception of temporality as a subjective 
phenomenon experienced by a living subject, opening the door to temporalities which may, for 
instance, be deemed ‘queer,’ or ‘heterosexual/straight,’ among a multitude of other qualitative 
descriptors pertaining to the subjective, experiential nature of temporality within the purview of 
phenomenological investigation. We will address this in greater detail later. We now find 
ourselves in a position to assert with some confidence that time is irreducible to mere succession 
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and that, accordingly, to recognize the plethora of ways in which each of us uniquely experience 
and interpret the phenomenon of temporality is to strike at the heart of what it means to be a 
human being – that is, to be an embodied, enculturated, sexed, and gendered subject.  
 
4.4 Heidegger’s Kantian Roots 
 
The Kantian roots of Heidegger’s treatment of time should not be overlooked, for indeed, 
striking resonances emerge between Heidegger’s and Kant’s theories of time in relation to 
ontology. In fact, Wheeler (2018) goes so far as to suggest that “[t]he ontological emphasis that 
Heidegger places on temporality might usefully be seen as an echo and development of Kant's 
claim that embeddedness in time is a precondition for things to appear to us the way they do.” 
“According to Kant,” he briefly remarks, “embeddedness in time is co-determinative of our 
experience, along with embeddedness in space.” For Kant, temporality is not a concept that is 
derived or abstracted from experience but rather constitutes a necessary a priori condition (along 
with spatiality) for the experience of objects in the first place. While space for Kant represents 
an a priori condition for our outer experience, time represents the a priori condition of our inner 
sense. In his words, “[t]ime is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e. of the intuition of 
our self and our inner state” (Kant, 1998, p. A33/B49).  
Since Kant holds that all representations, even those of external sensible objects, count at 
the most basic level as determinations of the mind, and therefore depend for their existence on 
“inner sense,” he thus holds, similarly to Heidegger, that all appearances (phenomena) 
necessarily take place within time. For the purposes of clarification on this point, “appearances,” 
in Kantian parlance, can be correctly described as being “objects of representation” (Stang, 
2018). Put another way, it might be said that appearances take place within representations. It is 
for this reason that Kant is able to claim, in the “Transcendental Aesthetic,” that time is a 
necessary representation while at the same time rejecting the notion that it is the result of 
appearances:  
Time is a necessary representation that underlies all intuitions. In regard to appearances in general 
one cannot remove time, though one can very well take the appearances away from time. Time is 
therefore given a priori. In it alone is all actuality of appearances possible. Appearances may, one 
and all, vanish; but time itself, as the universal condition of their possibility, cannot be removed 
(1998, p. A31/B46).  
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Thus, it is possible to represent time without ever abstracting from particular appearances.  
Ultimately, Kant wishes to claim not only that time functions as the form of our 
internality but that our experience of sensible objects takes on a pattern of succession, which he 
identifies as an essential and inherent characteristic of time, and therefore of time. A fundamental 
characteristic of time for Kant is that it is successive, whereas, on the other hand, spatiality is 
characterized by its fundamental simultaneity; different times are not simultaneous but 
successive. The assertion that different times occur in succession, and thus temporality can itself 
be called “successive,” serves as an apodictic principle of time for Kant (1998, p. A31/B47).  
 
4.5 Temporalizing 
 
Heidegger’s treatment of time, however, differs significantly from Kant’s in that 
Heidegger’s writings function to weaken the hitherto unquestioned link between time and 
succession – a link that appears positively inviolable from a Kantian perspective. Heidegger 
refrains from characterizing time as a succession of moments, throwing into question the 
successive nature of past, present, and future. He distinguishes between originary temporality, 
which he views as “authentic,” and inauthentic temporality, or “intratemporality.” The latter 
refers to “abstract, homogenous, and alienated time” (which I have been referring to and will 
continue to refer to as “clock-time”), a conception of time divorced from the fundamental and 
primordial (authentic) “time of human experience” (Martineau, 2015, p. 4).35 Heidegger 
implicitly rejects, in Being and Time, the notions of both clock-time (the idea that time is a 
chronologically ordered, infinite succession of self-contained moments) and relativistic time (the 
idea that time has only a relative existence reliant on and influenced by the motion of the 
conscious observer and the distinctness of past, present, and future is therefore only a persistent 
illusion). Considering that both of the above ways of viewing time erroneously portray time as a 
“present-at-hand” phenomenon (meaning, essentially, a fully-fledged independent entity), 
 
35 Jonathan Martineau (2015) helpfully articulates this conceptual schism in terms of a dichotomy 
between “private” and “public” time. See Martineau (2015). 
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Heidegger opts instead to characterize temporality as “an internal feature of Dasein's existential 
constitution” (Wheeler, 2018). “According to Heidegger,” explains Wheeler (2018),  
temporality is a unity against which past, present and future stand out as ecstases while remaining 
essentially interlocked. The importance of this idea is that it frees the phenomenologist from 
thinking of past, present and future as sequentially ordered groupings of distinct events.  
 
In Heidegger’s (1962) own words:  
Temporalizing does not signify that ecstases come in a ‘succession’. The future is not later than 
having been, and having-been is not earlier than the Present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a 
future which makes present in a process of having been (p. 401).  
 
4.6 Historicality 
 
Recognizing, as we now do, the incompleteness from an ontological perspective of 
scientific formulations of temporality as reducible to measurable duration which necessarily 
follows a chrono-linear pattern of succession, let us now mobilize this insight for the purposes of 
interrogating the dominant historical-teleological connotations of the concept of “time.” Should 
we not now find it equally necessary to reject tacit overestimations of the jurisdiction of History 
as an organizing force in ontological matters by resisting the temptation to organize and 
contextualize the passage of time in terms of events of significance for the development of 
civilization, and in doing so equate time with chronology?  
In deconstructing and dismantling the presupposition of chronological linearity with 
respect to temporality, we thereby allow for the possibility of circumventing the closely related 
notion of teleology, or rather subverting it given its hegemonic status. Indeed, not only have 
queer and postmodern theorists found themselves driven by a sense of obligation to deconstruct 
and dismantle the notion of chronology (due, for example, to the harmful nature of normative 
narratives of psychosexual and/or physiological development of normal boys and girls predicated 
on predeterminations regarding the purported existence of biologically intrinsic teleologies 
specific to male and female human organisms respectively), but also and relatedly, postmodern 
and queer theory has aimed, at long last, to dispose with finality of the historically coveted 
notion of teleology.  
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4.7 Queer Temporalities 
 
A certain model of time as a concept reducible to linear progression stems from Platonic 
philosophy and continues into the Judaeo-Christian tradition, and it is precisely this model which 
the notion of queer temporality seeks to interrupt. Queerness is often seen as standing outside of 
biological time (the ‘straight’ time of heterosexual reproduction and futurity). The queer subject 
has been constructed as “stuck in the past,” developmentally arrested or stunted, unable to move 
forward, and therefore recalcitrant to social, economic, historical, and even evolutionary norms 
and standards of progress(ion). Queer theorists E. L. McCallum and Mikko Tuhkanen (2011) 
suggest that “living on the margins of social intelligibility,” as is presumably the fate of many if 
not all queer subjects, “alters one’s pace; one’s tempo becomes at best contrapuntal, syncopated, 
and at worst, erratic, arrested” (p. 1). Tracing a theoretic-intellectual evolution from widespread 
uncritical investment in the static ontological framework of classical Western metaphysics to the 
advent of a queer hermeneutics of suspicion which gave way to critical and deconstructionist 
methodologies that undermine the very notion of ontological stability by way of rejecting 
conventional conceptions of identity as static, McCallum and Tuhkanen seek to resurrect what 
they perceive as “Nietzsche’s radical impulse of appropriating history and temporality for the 
moment” (McCallum and Tuhkanen, 2011, p. 3).  
Accordingly, the two authors suggest that to formulate explicitly queer critiques of so-
called “clock-bound” temporality is to mobilize oneself and one’s thought against the dominant 
teleology of History—a conceptual category whose monolithic and totalizing influence 
perpetuates the delusion that human beings (and nonhuman forms of life alike) are essential and 
static entities. For such a position forecloses the possibility of understanding the temporality of 
life—which inevitably encompasses the lived experience of gender and the sedimented identities 
associated therewith—in relation to the myriad dynamic processes of becoming constitutive of 
the phenomenon we refer to as “life,” but which bear no tangible relation to that linguistic 
signifier. In what remains of this chapter I wish to raise the question of whether it is possible, 
even likely, that increased recognition and acceptance of a plethora of modes of gendered 
expression, including and especially those which fall under the umbrella of trans*, might 
contribute to the Nietzschean revelation of a “mode of life liberated from baleful teleology” 
(McCallum and Tuhkanen, 2011, p. 3). That gendered experience ranges from variable to 
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consistent, and from ambiguous to definitive, provides one occasion to unsettle teleology by 
embracing indeterminacy –at both the level of ontology and that of epistemology.  
Moreover, considering the newly hypothesized (might we venture to say established?) 
objective instability and non-stasis of personal identity, does not a total acknowledgment of self-
determined identification productively fly in the face of the antiquated and outmoded 
metaphysical telos to which Nietzsche supposedly directs his impassioned animosity? (A 
gendered telos?) Gender cannot be determined as stable from the outside (empirical observation 
is powerless in this instance; even cutting-edge endocrinology cannot provide philosophically 
satisfying results) but nevertheless can be asserted as stable by the individual, and is indeed 
described as such by some trans people (as evinced by the exemplary and highly publicized 
narrative of Caitlyn Jenner’s transition).  
Hence a paradox emerges: for such assertions can in some cases be understood 
simultaneously as constituting a passive description of the very core of one’s existence and at the 
same time as holding the power and potentiality to concretely shape and define that gendered 
core. In other words, the act or process of communicating or expressing one’s self-identity 
evinces the autonomous agential capacities s/he wields as an individual subject with respect to 
her or his embodied self; yet in order to arrive at such self-knowledge, the subject must “look 
inward,” taking on the role of observer with respect to her remembered past and her current 
subjective state (a role which no one else is qualified to take on inasmuch as it requires a 
singularly unique and inaccessible vantage point).  
A major deadlock plagues the ostensibly progressive and inclusionary theories of queer 
becoming insofar as many transsexual narratives (e.g. that of transsexual women who lay claim 
to a ‘native’ sex) actually align more closely with a metaphysically essentialist account of gender 
which we hastily took to be outmoded since it conflicts with social constructivist hypotheses 
which privilege social gender while downplaying the category of ‘sex’ in order to emphasize the 
supposed universal malleability and fluidity of gender insofar as it appears to be a social 
construct. In light of this conceptual aporia, however, we must take pains to stress that taking 
transsexual assertions of identity seriously, even and especially when they appear to reinforce a 
binary model of gender as well as a seemingly untenable conflation of sex and gender (and thus a 
return to the previous century’s paradigm of sex-gender), in no way undermines the 
philosophical integrity of nonconventional approaches to the conceptualization and 
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theocratization of gender, but on the contrary, only enriches gender and sexual difference as sites 
of investigation.  
As we have already seen, Butler (1990) alludes, well in advance of the birth of queer 
theory as a distinct discipline, to the unintelligibility of a rigid distinction between biological sex 
and social gender in the following, oft-cited quotation:  
If the immutable character of sex is contested, perhaps this construct called ‘sex’ is as culturally 
constructed as gender; indeed, perhaps it was always already gender, with the consequence that 
the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all (pp. 10-11). 
Despite the problems with defining sex as a purely discursive effect (which, as we have seen, 
Prosser makes abundantly clear in his reading of Gender Trouble) Butler’s point is an invaluable 
one, and it contributed greatly to the tumultuous revolutions in gender theorizing set in motion at 
the turn of the last century. Hidden in the above assertion, however, is not only an implicit 
overestimation of the sovereignty of social construction in relation to the constitution of sexed 
and gendered identities but also the threat of discounting the validity of personal identities which 
complicate or disrupt the logic of social construction.  
As the current century unfolds, I contend, the category of transsexuality represents an 
increasingly necessary foil to the universalizing language of “transgender” which masquerades 
as an adequate signifier in contemporary Liberal human rights discourses.36 Although it might 
appear likely that a radically unrestricted acknowledgment of self-determined gender 
identifications of any and all types serve to displace and unsettle the gendered teleologies of both 
the scientific and sociocultural realms – two interrelated realms reinforce one another’s ‘truths’ 
to the point of constituting a normative, strictly binary epistemological model of gender which 
possesses no identifiable origin – an insurmountable problem remains: namely that some 
identities and narratives (which do not fit neatly into the normative confines placed on gender in 
a culture but are at the same time not necessarily queer), such as those associated with classic 
definition of transsexuality, rebelliously and inconveniently uphold precisely that 
epistemological model. Although I am sympathetic to the McCallum’s and Tuhkanen’s (2011) 
claim that “it is precisely [its] skewed relation to the norm that also gives queerness its singular 
hope” (p. 8), the fact remains that the categories of ‘queer’ and ‘trans’ do not always exist in 
symbiotic relation to one another. The vast symbolic and practical power of queerness with 
 
36 See Nay (2019). 
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respect to advancing explicitly counterhegemonic and anti-normative theoretical and 
sociopolitical objectives is precisely what Lee Edelman recognizes when he identifies 
conservatism’s conception of the queer as being, however counterintuitively, the only 
formulation which truly bears witness to the immense counterhegemonic power inherent to 
queerness, its destructive potential against oppressive regimes which seek to impose social 
norms on its subjects and instill faith in fictitious models of a rightful or natural social ‘order.’  
Thus, it is all too easy to gloss over the often-tenuous relationship between queer theory 
and trans theory and, correspondingly, the disharmonious, non-equivalent struggles and hopes 
between those who identify as queer and/or nonbinary and those who identify as transsexual due 
to radical and irresolvable dissensus of opinion regarding the value and necessity of 
(straightforward) opposition to and/or rebellion against the norm. McCallum and Tuhkanen 
(2011) regard reproduction (which they connect to the ambiguous notion of “fruitfulness” in 
Nietzsche’s parlance) as the primary mechanism of historical progression. Thus, the Edelmanian 
notion of reproductive futurity (a specialized term originating from the domain of queer theory 
specifically) establishes the imagination of queer histories, presents, and imagined futures as a 
legitimate theoretical pursuit, ensuring that queer theoretical investigations and rearticulations of 
dominant history, analyses of the present, and predictions for the future cannot be pre-emptively 
ignored on the basis of their supposed parochial preoccupation with fleshly desires, but must be 
considered epistemologically valuable on the basis that an overdetermining, normative force like 
reproductive futurism, which encapsulates and accounts for the ubiquitous impulse toward 
reproduction (simultaneously an individual and sociocultural impulse), might subtly undergird 
all recourse to the culturally coveted monolith of historicality itself.  
And this intervention on the part of queer theory pollutes the long-standing societal and 
academic perceptions of the study of abstract entities including history and time, removing the 
disguises which allowed them to masquerade as pure and noble pursuits exempt from any 
consideration of the perversely mystifying, all-too-human phenomenon of sexuality which, 
irreducible to biology, endlessly complicates conveniently straightforward explanations 
regarding the formation of civilization and the impetus of individual action. Advancing the 
cultural normativization of heterosexual reproduction can be seen, without a doubt, as the single 
most important task of that monolithic force, namely History, which wishes to coerce us into 
complacency with the delusion of a teleology synonymous with linear progression. In contrast, 
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queer conceptions of temporality can therefore be taken up as potent counterpoints to, or wielded 
as weapons against, the blindly universalizing narrative of history-as-progress.  
For History, when rigidly conflated with linear progress and the capitalistic aim of 
development, functions as the antithesis to a dynamic and nonlinear conception of life, the latter 
term signifying a dynamic, a-teleological phenomenon replete with stunted rhythms and 
nonlinear trajectories, which may be termed “queer.” Such a conception of life can furthermore 
only hope to thrive within a theoretical paradigm which does not merely tolerate but affirms and 
encourages the disorienting oscillations between the unhistorical fervour of “youth” and the 
suprahistorical overcoming of the past in favor of a still anti-futurian affirmation of the present 
as a finality, which cultivate a uniquely queer modes of relating to, engaging with, and 
describing, temporality. Indeed, inasmuch as “the notion of queerness [is] posited not as an 
identity or a substantive mode of being but as a way of becoming,” in the words of McCallum 
and Tuhkanen (2011), “temporality is necessarily bound up in the queer” (p. 8). Temporality is 
thus also bound up in the gendered dimension of life, for cis and trans people alike.  
 
5 Comparative Analysis of a Selection of Autoethnographic and 
Autobiographical Trans Narratives 
 
One is not born, but rather becomes, woman. (Simone de Beauvoir, 2011, p. 283) 
 
I wasn’t born a trans woman. (Atalia Israeli-Nevo, 2017, p. 34)  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The question has been hotly debated in recent decades: does gender identity fall under the 
category of discursive construction or can it be traced back to an intrinsic essence within the 
subject? According to Butler’s (1988; 1990) famous theory of performativity, which has gained 
somewhat of a dominant status in recent queer and feminist theory, temporality is a crucial 
aspect of the performative enactment of gender. Butler’s core innovation is to expose gender as a 
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linguistic and cultural construct, the coherence of which hinges on the non-volitional repetition 
of its performance. Although the performative enactment of gender can easily be conflated with 
expression, gendered performance does not, in fact, imply the necessary existence of an original 
gendered essence or nucleus within the subject. Upon inspection, gender reveals itself to be a 
metaphysically ambiguous and temporally dependent construct. Thus, the phenomenon we call 
gender appears to be no more than a collection of actions habitually carried out by sexed subjects 
and sedimented through repetition over time.  
Yet the stylized manifestations which sustain its pervasive and illusory existence—the 
subtle ways in which we are constantly ‘doing’ gender—nevertheless ubiquitously continue to be 
dutifully performed, albeit often unconsciously or under a kind of duress. I will begin this, the 
second and final part of my chapter on the theme of temporality by firmly establishing the 
importance of temporality to gendered expression and performance. More specifically, a keen, 
phenomenologically inspired observation of the unique temporality of gendered embodiment 
constitutes a key aspect of Butler’s theory of gender performativity: the hypothesis that gender is 
a psychologically ingrained construct insofar as such a notion entails that gender is not itself nor 
does it not arise from a stable or static essence within the subject but relies for its coherence on 
its repetition in time. Thus, I rely on but remain critical of Butler’s (1988) characterization of 
gender as an “identity tenuously constituted in time—an identity instituted through a stylized 
repetition of acts” (p. 519). throughout the remainder of the chapter to inform my investigation 
of both the emergent concept of queer temporality broadly as well as the actuality of certain 
specific trans temporalities insofar as the experience of temporality unavoidably mediates 
diverse (linear and non-linear) trajectories of trans becoming.  
I also introduce the useful analytical distinction succinctly articulated by Talia Mae 
Bettcher in her article “Trapped in the Wrong Theory: Rethinking Trans Oppression and 
Resistance,” between the “trapped in the wrong body” model, which aligns with conventional 
epidemiological wisdom, and the “beyond the binary” model increasingly favoured by the 
current Anglo-American political and epistemological “transgender paradigm,” in which (binary) 
gender is thought to be wholly reducible to social construction.37 I outline this crucial distinction 
to provide a strategic foundation for my rearticulation of the concept of “taking one’s time” 
 
37 See Bettcher (2014), p. 385. 
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outlined by Atalia Israeli-Nevo in “Taking (My) Time: Temporality in Transition, Queer Delays 
and Being (in the) Present” whereby I claim that diverse agential manipulations of temporality 
debunk the fantasy of a universally applicable narrative trajectory of transition and/or a unified 
notion conception of trans temporality. I argue that the coexistence of such dissenting 
perspectives on and narratives of gendered experience and identification is crucial to overcoming 
the conceptual deadlock between fluidity and stasis which frequently arises in the context of 
gender and sexuality studies.  
In section 5.4, I embark on a comparative analysis of Israeli-Nevo’s transition story and 
the fictional transition narrative of Maria Griffiths, the protagonist of Imogen Binnie’s 
queer/trans novel Nevada (2013). Retaining a critical emphasis on the necessarily temporal 
character of gender performativity in tandem with an acute awareness of Bettcher’s dichotomy 
between the two major ways of conceptualizing trans ontology, I deal heavily in this section with 
what has been posited by numerous contemporary theorists as the uniquely queer temporality of 
gender and sexual nonconformity. In doing so I seek to illustrate how diverse and heterogeneous 
trans temporalities complicate and disrupt not only the presupposed temporal unity of transition 
but also the latent metaphysical presupposition of gender (i.e. masculinity or femininity) as an 
innate and eternal aspect of the human being which has fuelled the crude conflation of sex, 
gender and sexuality for centuries.  
Israeli-Nevo complicates normative assumptions about sustained futural aspiration and 
intense bodily dysphoria in trans subjects by choosing to embrace liminality and to resist the 
imperative of linear progression. She does so through her deliberate abstention from conforming 
to the expectations imposed upon (trans)feminine bodies, such as the removal of body hair, and 
through her decision to take occasional breaks from the hormone treatments designed to guide 
one’s process of somatic transitioning along a predetermined and highly medicalized trajectory, 
thus disrupting the linear temporality of hormone replacement therapy (HRT). Similarly, Binnie 
illustrates, in her literary work, a complex narrative of transition affected by normative 
sociocultural demands. But a major point of difference unavoidably crops up between the two 
texts, namely their respective characterizations of transness on the one hand as processual and 
constructed and on the other as an essential and pre-existing component of one’s being since 
birth. I suggest that this asymmetry reveals itself in the exemplary juxtaposition of Israeli-Nevo’s 
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(2017) assertion, “I was not born a trans woman” and Maria Griffiths’ opposing assertion, “I 
have been trans since I was a tiny little baby” (Binnie, 2013, p. 41).  
Finally, I attempt to reconcile the tendency to valorize gender fluidity and/or flexibility 
with the unavoidable and ineradicable existence of less obviously subversive forms of gendered 
embodiment. For trans temporalities can, and often do, exceed the limitations of both the wrong 
body and beyond the binary models, casting trans identification as a practice of discursive excess 
for which dominant culture has no place. Indeed, it is precisely the attribution of excessive 
ambiguity which relegates transness, within the heteronormative symbolic order (the realm of 
language and culture), to a perpetual state of perceived temporal discontinuity and ontological 
illegibility and leads to its designation as a culturally unintelligible form of pathological 
difference. Although it may be justifiably asserted that the coexistence of Bettcher’s two 
competing models leads to an irresolvable epistemological deadlock, Israeli-Nevo’s deliberate 
decision to embrace the liminal tension between the two opposing models generates a productive 
and liberatory manipulation of linear temporality without, however, falling victim to the 
tendency to deify sexual and gender flexibility as inherently queerly subversive. In conclusion, I 
argue that the widescale subjectivization of temporality enacted, in collective isolation, by trans 
people as they navigate divergent experiences of transition liberates the concept of temporality 
from the confines of both cisnormativity and transnormativity and forges an intermediary link 
between the seeming rigidity of the wrong body model and the extreme fluidity of the beyond the 
binary model, both of which have the untenable potential to acquire an almost hegemonic status.  
 
5.2 Opposing Ontologies: Reconciling Seemingly Conflictual 
Ontologico-Temporal Narratives of Transgender Self-
Determination and Discovery 
 
“What gets dropped from transgender in its queer deployment to signify subversive gender performativity 
is the value of the matter that most often concerns the transsexual: the narrative of becoming a biological 
man or a biological woman (as opposed to the performative of effecting one)—in brief and simple the 
materiality of the sexed body” (Prosser, 1998, p. 32) 
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Susan Stryker (2004), in an article titled “Transgender Studies: Queer Theory’s Evil 
Twin,” suggests that within the context of academic queer studies the signifier “transgender” has 
been pushed into an all-subsuming role whereby it “increasingly functions as the site in which to 
contain all gender trouble” (p. 214). In anticipation of the comparative analysis of two trans 
narratives to be undertaken in section 5.4, I shall now briefly introduce Bettcher’s (2014) 
distinction between what she calls the “wrong body” model of transsexuality and the “beyond the 
binary” model. “The wrong body model proper has two versions,” she writes:  
In the weak version, one is born with the medical condition of transsexuality and then, through 
genital reconstruction surgery, becomes a woman or a man in proper alignment with an innate 
gender identity. In the strong version, one’s real sex is determined by gender identity. On the 
basis of this native identity one affirms that one has always really been the woman or a man that 
one claims to be. In both versions, one is effectively a man or woman “trapped in the wrong 
body” (p. 383).  
 
In contrast, the revolution in trans theorizing and activism which began to gain traction near the 
close of the last century “witnessed the introduction of the word ‘transgender’ as a broad 
umbrella term” (Bettcher, 2014, p. 383). Bettcher (2014) claims that the new vision of gender 
nonnormativity  
subscribed to a ‘beyond the binary’ model. It claimed that because transgender people don’t fit 
neatly into the two dichotomous categories of man and woman, attempts are made to force them 
into this binary system. The medical regulation of transsexuality, in this account, is one of the 
main ways that society tries to erase transgender people (p. 384).  
 
It should be recognized, in any case, that femaleness is not synonymous with or 
dependent on the implication of a specific type of personal history, nor on the general notion of 
the past. Trans existence can be described in the same temporal terms as cisgender gendered 
existence. A trans woman is both trans and a woman in the present moment, and the act of 
emphasizing her transness does not have to mean emphasizing her past or a linear temporal 
trajectory of her transition, even if her transition occurred along normative lines and was 
temporally linear. Transness is a feature of present gendered existence. The phenomenon of trans 
existence, like cis existence, does not require temporal contextualization in order to be, or be 
seen as, valid or authentic. To focus on one's transness in its isolation can be done independently 
of any focus on her past.  
Furthermore, transness can be separated out analytically from womanhood or femininity. 
Current trans identification – by which I mean the fact that one currently identifies as trans – 
does not necessarily imply, in any way or to any extent, any specific details about one's past. The 
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act of identifying as trans today does not imply or require that one has formerly occupied a body 
commonly gendered as the opposite sex, was formerly perceived as the opposite sex (in everyday 
life and in public or private settings), or that one formerly personally identified with a sex or 
gender other than the one with which he, she or they identify presently. Rather, the precondition 
for being trans is identifying as trans in the present, in the here and now. It is in this sense that 
existence and identification, being and identifying, are inextricably intertwined when it comes to 
the gendered aspect of trans, and of human, existence. I have no intention here of 
employing/deploying trans identity abstractly as a disembodied figure of exceptionality, as 
inherently transgressive38 nor as an abstract allegory of bodily transcendence39. Relatedly, I hold 
– contra the numerous outmoded and conceptual frameworks of gender such as Butler’s (1990) 
seminal model of ‘gender-as-drag,’ or Rosi Braidotti’s (2011) construction of the “transsexual 
imaginary,”40 which she uses as “a floating signifier for the trouble with modernity” (Hayward, 
2011, p. 227) – that no gender identity or form of gendered embodiment, including 
transsexuality, should be fixed by the logic of exception – much less cast as the ‘exception’ par 
excellence – to the culturally established and preferred norm of cis identity, which functions to 
expose, or 'show up,' the constructedness of the norm itself – or indeed emblematic of the 
contradictory and unsustainable nature of modernity itself.  
The relative naturality or constructedness of gender norms, each of which is culturally 
and historically specific, is peripheral to our present investigation. The looming dichotomy 
between "natural" and "constructed" (nature/culture) ought to be superseded by the more 
pressing issue of personal identification, and by the urgencies and complexities which undergird 
the necessary labor of realizing, recognizing, and respecting (on both a broader sociocultural 
level and an interpersonal one) the inviolable authority individuals ought to be assumed to 
possess over their identities. To avoid the emergence of a deadlock between fluidity and rigidity 
with respect to the conceptualization of gender identity, I claim, it is crucial to recognize that the 
theoretical project of divorcing 'transness' from its common cultural association, if not conflation 
 
38 Indeed, “[discourses] about trans-becoming [are] often delimited by the ways trans-identities resist or 
‘transgress’ gender/sex categories” (Hayward, 2011, p. 227). 
39 “Transsexuals do not transcend the body” (Hayward, 2011, p. 227). 
40 “[T]he technological field has evolved into a space of sexual indeterminacy, which I rendered in terms 
of a transsexual imaginary. Advanced capitalism has consumed and subsumed the old gender system” 
(Braidotti, 2011). 
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with, 'pastness41,’ can be done in simultaneity with the celebration of trans narratives that do 
conform to normative expectations.  
An innovation such as Susan Stryker’s notion of “pastpresents” – “an always present past 
in the present” (Hayward, 2011, p. 236) – is indispensable in this regard insofar as it encourages 
us to bracket the distracting question of whether trans-identification is “in fact” intrinsic to the 
individual (in either an empirical, biological sense, a spiritual sense, or both) or a culturally 
constructed identity category that derives meaning only oppositionally, viz. in relation to 
cisnormative identities and identificatory practices. Such a notion could provide a theoretical 
launching point from which to begin dispensing with the rigidity of the invisible boundaries 
between individual subjectivity and social world(s), and to embrace the “sensuous transaction 
between body and environment” (Hayward, 2011, p. 225), without ever sacrificing the possibility 
of a robust defence of the ethical authority one possesses, to wield as she pleases, over her 
identity on the basis of the self-avowal of subjective experience alone.  
Thus, to wonder how you yourself, as a cis person or as a trans person, might interact 
with your own gender in the absence of transphobia or hegemonic cultural gender norms – and of 
course to assume the existence of such an interaction is to presuppose gender-as-a-concept, vis-à-
vis a general category called ‘gender’ that is separate from individuality or personhood, and then 
to subsequently assume the necessity or inevitability of a tangible and quantifiable (conscious or 
unconscious) personal relationship to it – is a separate consideration entirely from the ethical 
question of whether one should be free to (or has a ‘right’ to) identify in this or that way 
regardless of how they might actually choose to, or feel compelled to identify if she lived in a 
world in which the conditions of reality were other than they currently are and historically have 
been in our world.  
Without doubt, there is much to discover and much to learn from engaging with the realm 
of speculative inquiry on the topic of gender. We might ask ourselves, for example, “How might 
 
41 While Sandy Stone (1992) evocatively critiqued “the ways transsexuality [is coerced into conforming] 
to narratives of conversion [and of] lost history,” there are, of course, “counter narratives…about the 
desire for passing, for finally being sexed or ‘at home in the body’” (Hayward, 2011, pp. 234-235). The 
crucial thing to note in light of the potential discrepancy that might appear to arise between these two 
seemingly disparate theoretical approaches – of seeking to liberate transness from the confines of a 
temporally linear, absolutist, and relentlessly future-oriented model of sexual transitioning on the one 
hand and of embracing the straightforward narrative model implied by the term “conversion” as itself 
potentially liberatory and desirable on the other – is that they need not be seen as mutually destructive or 
agonistic in relation to one another. 
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my relationship to my gender identity and/or sex change in a trans-inclusive society?” Or, “What 
gendered behaviours would I disavow or discontinue and which aspects of my gendered 
existence/features of my gender identity would I seek to continue and/or reinforce?” Such 
inquiries as these are captivating and indeed important to explore, but my goal here is quite 
distinct and far less ambiguous: I aim to naturalize and defend one's freedom to identify how one 
wishes (as male, female, other, or neither) regardless of the cultural conditions or constraints 
operating on him/her/them with respect to the taxonomic procedures of gender assignment and 
categorization, and the laws and norms governing how gender is expected to be or should be 
performed and/or embodied.  
 
5.3 A Preface to the Analysis of Nevada’s Literary 
Narrativization of Transgender Experience 
 
“I read transsexual narratives to consider how transition may be the very route to identity and 
bodily integrity. In transsexual accounts, transition does not shift the subject away from the embodiment 
of sexual difference but more fully into it” (Prosser, 1998, p. 6).  
 
In juxtaposing the narrative of Imogen Binnie’s (2013) fictional text Nevada with the 
personal narrative of Atalia Israeli-Nevo, I have no intention of conflating the articulation or 
recollection of lived experience with the imaginative act of constructing a fictional narrative. I do 
wish to highlight the capacity of literature with respect to its inherent socio-politically 
transformative and revolutionary capacities, the capacious potentialities of the literary narrative 
form with respect to its “political efficacy for imagining alternatives” (Cranston-Reimer, 2014, p. 
34) – in our case, alternative ways of embodying and identifying with gender/methods of 
gendered identification and embodiment.  
As a society, it is important that we hear stories from real people, stories that are true-to-
life, when attempting to address and assuage the social contention and hostility surrounding 
issues of gender nonnormativity. It is also important that nondominant narratives of gender begin 
to infiltrate other aspects of life, culture, and language – including, for example, the literary 
realm – to inspire the indiscriminate perception of gender conforming and nonconforming 
characters alike as human and as equals, as they are and should be considered in reality. 
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Optimistically, one might reflect that a shift has been initiated in recent times in the very 
possibility of imagining and articulating gender as a concept.  
Accordingly, a vast range of possibilities of imagining and living-with gender that have 
always existed but have only begun to be more widely recognized and celebrated in recent times, 
also exist beyond the confines of quotidian life in the realm of fiction and storytelling, in which 
dominant ways of articulating gendered experience have long prevailed to the exclusion of 
nondominant alternative stories and trajectories of gendered experience. It would not be a stretch 
to say that all literary genres involve some degree of political engagement with contemporary 
reality, whether that engagement be direct or indirect. And this remains no less true when the 
literary fictional work takes on the form of a personal autobiographical narrative, as does Imogen 
Binnie’s Nevada. A great number of diverse gendered subject positions and gendered ways of 
being exist both conceptually (as in the fictional world of Nevada) and concretely (as in the 
multitude of real trans narratives including and in addition to the ones I reference) within and 
outside of the dominant paradigm of gender (i.e. the cisnormative gender binary).  
As such, those who occupy nondominant positions must navigate the dominant “world” 
(or numerous “worlds”) of sense in which gender is strictly delimited and circumscribed in the 
ways which we call ‘dominant’ or ‘normative’ or ‘hegemonic.’ However, such individuals also 
can, and do, carve out and live in alternative “worlds” in which their identities are perceived 
differently. In such worlds one may not only identify in different ways but might even be said to 
possess different ontological attributes, the choosing or discovery of which may occur more 
freely in the new “world” – as in the way Argentine feminist philosopher María Lugones (1987) 
finds herself to be “playful” in some worlds and not in others.  
While trans narratives of becoming are often excluded from or pushed to the margins of 
mainstream discourses such as biology, we must remember and remain attuned to the fact that 
Biology in its own right is a producer of narratives and scripts, of which dominant versions and 
methods of interpretation exist paralogously to a plethora of nondominant authorial and 
hermeneutical possibilities related to the articulation/trajectory of biological research, its 
interpretation, and the often discontinuous and fragmented ways in which it gets picked up by 
and rearticulated in the cultural imaginary, or ‘zeitgeist.’  
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5.4 Comparative Analysis 
 
Atalia Israeli-Nevo was not born a trans woman. Likewise, it took time for Maria 
Griffiths, the transgender protagonist of Imogen Binnie’s (2013) queer/trans Bildungsroman, 
Nevada, to discover her transness. Binnie (2013) describes Maria’s path to self-knowledge as a 
process of connecting a “constellation of dots” which, viewed collectively, precipitated a shift in 
her subjective experience of gender: “the sometimes I want to wear dresses dot…The oh man do 
I get more fucked up than I mean to, every time I start drinking dot. The I might hate sex dot” 
(5). She alludes to a long personal history of perpetual entrapment in a tormented affective state: 
“for as long as she could remember, she had felt all fucked up” (Binnie, 2013, p. 5). It took time 
for her confusion to crystalize into a state of definitive self-realization with respect to her identity 
as a trans woman. Indeed, in a passage early in the novel she reminisces about teenage past in 
which she “hadn’t figured out yet that she wasn’t [a boy]” (Binnie, 2013, p. 14).  
Israeli-Nevo (2017) attests that she faced “enormous pressure” from both cis and trans 
people to either “go on with” her transition or “forfeit this trans escapade” (p. 38). However, she 
tells us that, instead of rushing herself, she resolved to embrace the liminality of physical 
transition (Israeli-Nevo, 2017, p. 39). In contrast to the “classic” rubric of transition exemplified 
by Caitlyn Jenner, whose path to public female identification bears points of connection to the 
formulaic trappings of an “extreme makeover storyline,” Israeli-Nevo’s (2017) notion of “taking 
time” encapsulates a range of deliberate ways of being (in the) present. “This is a mindful 
embodied present,” she clarifies, “in which one has a chance to halt and delay his/her futural 
aspirations regarding his/her identity and explore them” (Israeli-Nevo, 2017, p. 39). Recalling 
McCallum’s and Tuhkanen’s (2011) remarks on queer temporality as “at best contrapuntal, 
syncopated, and at worst erratic, arrested” (p. 1), it is easy to account for the formation of the 
plethora of pathological diagnoses to which nonnormative bodies, subjectivities, and identities 
have historically been susceptible. But the vast majority of (if not all) clinical or extra-medical 
diagnoses and stereotypes related to “irregular” or “abnormal” psychosexual development, 
whether perpetrated today or in the past, are predicated on the notion of a failure, or stubborn 
refusal, to live up to numerous medically and socially constructed standards and expectations 
that all harken back to conventional (i.e. cis-/hetero-normative) models or trajectories of 
development laid out for the subject/body/person that have one thing in common: their reliance 
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on a linearly progressive model of temporality. As such, does it not seem that what I am calling 
“chrononormativity” could be, if not the root of the problem, then at least a significant barrier to 
the attainment of free and unrestricted self-identification and self-actualization for all gendered 
subjects?  
In a similar vein, Israeli-Nevo (2017) respectfully appropriates Nasser Abourahme’s 
notion of a “halted present”42 in which temporal markers become blurred and past and future 
appear “more closed and yet more present” (p. 38). “We [trans people] are dissociated,” 
continues Israeli-Nevo (2017) following her exegesis of the “halted present” hypothesis, “from 
our bodies, our loved ones, and our general environment” (p. 38). Thus, her strategy of giving 
herself time constitutes a reclamation of temporality from the margins; in taking her time she 
wrests her experience of time from its capture by the heteronormative domain, disrupts the 
normative tempo of linear progression, and enacts a refusal to acquiesce to the pathological 
attribution of stunted development imposed by the agents of a hostile heterosexual matrix. These 
agents are not abstract entities but employers who serve as the custodians of financial stability, 
livelihood, and even survival, family members who can give or refuse loving care, and medical 
professionals, including physicians and psychiatrists, the authoritative gatekeepers to hormone 
replacement therapy and/or sex reassignment surgery.  
Israeli-Nevo (2017) clearly suggests that she had to undergo a period of self-
realization/discovery regarding her already extant transness. Likewise, Maria, who did not 
realize concretely that she was trans until she reached her twenties, describes a similar process of 
gradual internal recognition in relation to her trans identity. Not only did Israeli-Nevo (2017) 
have to discover her trans identity, but for her, the very fact of its hiddenness, its concealment 
both from the outside world and from herself, entails, ontologically speaking, that she was not 
always trans. Maria, on the other hand, asserts repeatedly throughout the novel that she has 
 
42 Notably, Nasser Abourahme’s own discussions of temporality in terms of a stunted or “halted” 
“present” emerge from his analysis of the failures of Palestinian revolutionary politics. Hence a 
juxtaposition between the affective connotation of failure engrained in his notion of the halted present and 
the myriad affective feelings of failure that can result from one’s embodied inability to live up to his/her 
gendered aspirations (and/or cultural expectations of femininity or masculinity) proves fruitful in 
uncovering points of connection between the melancholic affects shared by many gender variant subjects 
and the somber solidarity in “failure” of ethnic minority citizens oppressed by an occupying force. See 
Abourahme (2020); see also Abourahme (2014). 
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always been trans (Binnie, 2013, p. 9; Binnie, 2013, p. 41; Binnie, 2013, p. 42; Binnie, 2013, p. 
127).  
I have been trans since I was a tiny little baby. Whether it was something in my brain from before 
I was born, like people argue sometimes, or it was something I picked up developmentally after I 
was born, like other people argue sometime, or whether somebody sexually abused me and then I 
repressed the shit out of it and then that repression transmogrified into transsexuality, as some 
other folks will argue, who fucking cares (Binnie, 2013, p. 41).  
The above passage in particular powerfully illustrates a crucial point of difference between the 
two trans narratives. On the one hand, Binnie’s (2013) portrayal of fictional protagonist Maria 
serves, however subtly or inadvertently, to reinforce the metaphysical essentialist claim that trans 
identity is an innate and original aspect of oneself, whereas Nevo does not. Incidentally, although 
Nevada’s narrator clearly states that Maria has been trans “since [she] was a tiny little baby” (p. 
41), she qualifies this assertion shortly thereafter by stating that took time to recognize her trans 
identity despite the fact that, as a trans person, “you are supposed to have known you are trans 
since you were a tiny little baby” (p. 42).43 In another passage midway through the novel, Maria 
manipulates (or queers, in the verb sense) temporality by reimagining her teenage past, a time 
before she had identified, or rather discovered, her transness: “She’s sixteen, but she’s the right 
sex this time, and it feels mostly liberating and exciting but also a little sad” (Binnie, 2013, p. 
125). Her use of the phrase “the right sex” in this quotation is illustrative of a particular 
ontological position in relation to her gender identity, one that is not temporally dependent but a 
seemingly atemporal and absolute aspect of one’s gender identity deeply entrenched in her being. 
It is evident, in short, that Maria believes the innermost dimensions of her being to be, and to 
always have been, completely shot through with transfemininity, viz. with both transness and 
femininity. As a younger child, Maria “didn’t know she was trans, she couldn’t put into words 
that she was a little girl, but she did know that something was horribly wrong and she blamed 
herself for it” (Binnie, 2013, p. 127). In spite of her former existential naivety, it is 
retrospectively clear to her, looking back, that she was nonetheless decisively and categorically 
trans throughout her younger years. Her transness has no identifiable causal origin. It simply is. 
It was not something which suddenly came into being from within at a certain stage in her 
 
43 Note that we can map the aforementioned distinction between the “strong” and “weak” versions of the 
wrong-body model delineated by Bettcher onto these opposing perspectives: Maria’s narrative 
corresponds to the former while Israeli-Nevo’s is more commensurable with the latter. 
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psychosexual development, nor something engendered by an external force. It was there all 
along in one form or another, merely waiting to be discovered and properly articulated.  
Importantly, neither Binnie nor Israeli-Nevo is more “correct” than the other. One 
perspective does not, and cannot, emerge victorious over the other, or any other for that matter, 
lest the sphere of trans politics devolve into a state of irresolvable divisiveness. Hence, I claim 
that the dogmatic will-to-truth so often demanded by dominant culture, with its insatiable desire 
for epistemological certainty and/or validity, must be subordinated to the unconditional validity 
of acts of constative self-identification, even and especially when they appear to be conflictual. 
We must refrain, I claim, from hierarchizing the various theoretical postulations regarding the 
precise origin of the elusive and ambiguous notion of (trans)gender identity. We must make 
room for a diverse assemblage of trans narratives to speak on their own terms, with their so-
called logical contradictions in full view.  
In foregrounding Israeli-Nevo’s (2017) autobiographical narrative of transfeminine 
transitioning, I have aimed to demonstrate the quasi-hegemonic status of “progressive linearity” 
in what she dubs “classic” trans temporalities, namely those which accede to the normative 
cultural demand for the renunciation of past identities in favor of forward oriented and 
unambiguously “complete” narratives of gender/sex transition. I argue that, by radically 
embracing the liminality of transition and refusing to validate the demand for such narrative 
homogeneity, Israeli-Nevo (2017) opens a horizon of alternative possibilities to conventional or 
“classic” conceptualizations of trans temporality. Moreover, she validates the viability of 
embracing liminality and ambiguity in the temporal present without in the same stroke 
discounting the value of transition narratives which do appear to conform to normative 
expectations.  
 
6 A Mobilization of María Lugones’ Notion of Ontological Pluralism 
 
6.1 “World”-Travelling 
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In “Playfulness, ‘World’-Travelling, and Loving Perception,” María Lugones (1987) 
emphasizes that the “failure of love” that exists between individuals and groups and those whom 
they view as ‘other’ – such as the failure of some white/Anglo women to love women of color – 
“lies in part in the failure to identify” (p. 8). She intends here to evoke the possibility of 
authentically “identifying” with others while retaining the solidity of one’s own identity. She 
hints at the importance of attempting to see the world through another’s eyes does not necessitate 
that one severs any aspect of the connection which binds her to her own perspective(s) or 
worldview(s). Instilled in the psyches of many white/Anglo women is the problematic 
unconscious or not-quite-conscious conviction that to afford solid identities to their sisters of 
color would threaten to dissolve or diminish the solidity and/or stability of their own identities. “I 
am profoundly dependent on others,” Lugones (1987) writes, “without having to be their 
subordinate” (p. 8). “We are fully dependent on each other for the possibility of being 
understood and without this understanding we are not intelligible” (Lugones, 1987, p. 8). She 
suggests that the practice of “world”-traveling can engender the cultivation of a unique and 
undertheorized form of identification with others (specifically other women), one that does not 
erode the independence of either subject in a given encounter or dynamic. To travel to another 
woman’s “world,” to “see with her eyes,” allows one to identify with her as an/Other, as separate 
from oneself, in a way that does not imply subordination or dependency.  
Although Lugones (1987) is reticent to assign a static definition to the notion of a 
“world,” citing what she views as the “suggestiveness” of the concept, she describes what she 
means by “worlds” in some detail. A “world” can be a society – “an actual society”; however, 
the same society viewed through various and distinct lenses of personal experience can at once 
be constitutive of multiple different “worlds” (Lugones, 1987, p. 10). She says concretely, 
furthermore, that “for something to be a ‘world’ in my sense it has to be inhabited at present by 
some flesh and blood people,” thus foreclosing any possibility of the term’s conflation with the 
future-oriented and phantasmatic notion of ‘utopia’ (Lugones, 1987, p. 9). “A ‘world’ in my 
sense may be an actual society given its dominant culture’s description and construction of 
life…But a ‘world’ can also be such a society given its non-dominant construction” (Lugones, 
1987, 10). At the same time, a “world” need not refer to the (dominant or non-dominant) cultural 
climate or ethos of a “whole society” but may also refer to that of “a tiny portion of a particular 
society” (Lugones, 1987, p. 10).  
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Put simply, a “world” is a “construction of life.” “In a ‘world’ some of the inhabitants 
may not understand or hold the particular construction of them that constructs them I that 
‘world.’ So, there may be “worlds” that construct me in ways that I do not even understand” 
(Lugones, 1987, p. 10). “Or it may be,” she continues – and this may be the point that has the 
most relevance to our present investigation – that I understand the construction, but I do not hold 
it of myself. I may not accept it as an account of myself, a construction of myself” (Lugones, 
1987, 10, emphasis mine). “And yet, she concludes warningly, it is not impossible for one to be 
“animating such a construction,” however inadvertently (Lugones, 1987, p. 10). She then moves 
on to the crux of her theory with respect to its implications in the everyday/quotidian life of those 
whose bodies reside within, but who at the same time are routinely cast out, relegated to the 
margins of, and are forced to live (or choose to live) as ‘outsiders’ to, dominant society. And 
dominant society must be understood as fundamentally capitalist, heterosexist, white 
supremacist, cissexist in nature, with the further implication that all those who live within its 
domain (which is to say, whose life itself is, without exception, constructed and sustained by 
those same interlocking systems of oppression we just named) as an agent and representative of 
that all-subsuming matrix of intelligibility which renders perceived-nonnormative or 
nonconforming identities and persons unintelligible, both symbolically and actually.  
Because of the fact that, as Lugones (1987) asserts, “[o]ne can ‘travel’ between these 
‘worlds’ and one can inhabit more than one of these ‘worlds’ at the very same time,” it follows 
logically that those who are/have been constructed as outsiders to mainstream society or culture, 
or to a “dominant construction or organization of life,” can be identified, in Lugones’ parlance, 
as “world travelers” (pp. 10-11). Whereas she herself offers the example of ethnic (Hispanic and 
Latino) identity to illuminate her model of world-traveling and multiple ontologies, arguing that 
“[o]ne can be at the same time in a ‘world’ that constructs one as stereotypically latin [sic], for 
example, and in a ‘world’ that constructs one as [simply] latin” (Lugones, 1987, p. 11), I intend 
to demonstrate how another form of personal and/or collective identity, namely gender identity, 
can be seen to be equally relevant and applicable to this model.  
Specifically, I would like to introduce one socioculturally marginalized identity that I 
believe, taking my lead from prominent trans theorist and philosopher Talia Mae Bettcher, also 
aligns quite seamlessly with the intersectionally oriented theory of “world”-travel under 
development by Lugones: transsexual identity. If one were to substitute “latin” identity for trans 
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identity, for the sake of illustration, the next line of Lugones’ (1987) article would read as 
follows: “Being stereotypically [trans] and being simply [trans] are different simultaneous 
constructions of persons that are part of different ‘worlds.’ One animates one or the other or both 
[constructions] at the same time” (p. 11).  
 
6.2 Travelling While Trans, or Traveling as an Ally 
 
“Ask yourself if you can travel in our trans worlds. If not, you probably don’t get what we’re talking 
about. Remember that we live most of our lives in non-transsexual worlds, so we probably do get what 
you’re talking about.” (C. Jacob Hale, 1997) 
 
Trans women are forced to live in and navigate a world that is directly and relentlessly 
hostile to them on the basis of their identities and/or their bodily appearance. Such hostility is 
unfortunately a hallmark of the current dominant trans-resistant cultural order, and as such 
features prominently in the dominant “world” (or “worlds,” for there may be multiple) in which a 
ubiquitously accepted narrow and exclusionary model of (binary) ‘gender conformity’ serves as 
justification for the outright exclusion of trans women from ‘normal’ social life. In extremely 
blatant instances of transphobic policy or rule-enforcement, trans women’s participation in 
gender-specific activities, including in some cases the use of women’s washrooms, admittance to 
‘women-only’ spaces, and accessing of feminized or ‘female-specific’ forms of health and 
medical care, has been unjustly limited or even prohibited.  
From an unapologetically anti-transphobic perspective, it is plain to see that any and all 
such prohibitions have in common is that they stem from a misrecognition of trans women’s 
identities as women. Trans women as a group are also disproportionately victimized by lethal 
gender-based violence and made targets of transphobic hate speech, and with respect to this 
issue, it is similarly straightforward to discern from a transfeminist perspective that at the 
nucleus of such bigoted remarks resides the nonsensical notion, whether it remains implicit or is 
directly asserted, that trans women are not really women. The assertion that a woman “is a 
man”44 due to her possession, or assumed possession, of genitalia or bodily attributes commonly 
 
44 This false assertion can be found woven into the writings of such widely celebrated and respected 
feminist thinkers as Elizabeth Grosz, whose use of the masculine pronoun, “his,” in reference to 
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gendered as masculine or male, is not only inaccurate but poses a threat to trans women’s 
personal autonomy. It throws into question something that is always already in question for trans 
women living in transphobic societies, namely their right to be viewed as competent agential 
subjects worthy and capable of determining their own identities. Whether or not such a verbal 
violation is followed by a violation of her bodily autonomy in the form of physical violence or 
unwanted sexual or physical contact, the notion that a trans woman is, in any sense, more 
“masculine,” or less “female,” than a cis woman is in actuality an absurd proposition.  
The term “man” and the masculine subject position exist in antithetical relation to the 
kind of gendered subject a transsexual woman is, ontologically and biologically, concretely and 
abstractly, materially and symbolically, and therefore ought to be registered as simply incorrect 
and inaccurate when and if it should ever be directed at her. A transsexual woman is a woman, 
on the surface and at the very core of her being. She is woman and, if she wishes, female; she 
participates in womanhood and femininity in the deepest and most superficial senses of her 
ontological and material existence at the very same time. The signifier “man,” and actual flesh 
and blood men, can serve, respectively, as symbolic of and representative of absolute alterity in 
relation to trans women’s own gendered subject positions in precisely the same way that they 
(“man” and men) serve that function for cis women.  
The external judgment or evaluation of a trans person’s authentic or ‘real’ sex imposed, 
hastily but with no less conviction, by the cisgender enforcer-of-hegemonic-gender-norms on the 
basis of the trans person’s physical appearance (an assessment which relies on assumed 
knowledge about the nature and shape of her genitalia, even though her actual genitalia are by no 
means necessarily visible, rendering such ‘knowledge’ doomed to inaccuracy even if it were a 
clue or indicator of sex, which, in and of itself, it is not; a penis can be female, and a vagina male 
in tandem with the affirmation of the individual to whom such genitals are attached).  
Without detracting from the extraordinary fruitfulness of the concept of “world”-travel – 
for let us not forget that the practice of world-traveling a “matter of necessity and of survival” for 
many (Lugones, 1987, p. 11) – I want to emphasize that although it is accurate to say that the 
violence that characterizes hostile encounters between cis perpetrators of transphobic violence 
 
transsexual women is not only abhorrently disrespectful but inexplicably runs counter to her own 
emphasis on “the centrality of bodily knowledge for the formation of subjectivity” (Hayward, 2011, p. 
234).  
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and their trans or gender nonconforming victims (encounters of the type which plague North 
American society on a level that can only be described as systemic) stems from an illogical 
misrecognition of the nature of gender identity on the part of the perpetrator (and this is not only 
a frustrating “mistake” but a cruel, inhumane and often lethal one), the failure to respect trans 
women as women it is not only a logical misapprehension but an ethical failure. It constitutes a 
failure, in an ethical sense, to set aside cultural biases regarding the necessary and/or requisite 
conditions for female “category membership” and to instead apprehend the true nature of the 
category of female or feminine identity: i.e. as a radically open and inclusive category. The 
widespread and systemic phenomenon of transphobic violence, unsettling both in scope and with 
regard to the extent of its cruelty, is compounded by the fact that misrecognitions of this type are 
not recognized as harmful and incorrect but in fact perpetuated and protected by dominant 
society, its institutions and its agents/figures of (legal, moral, etc.) authority, thus sheltering the 
heinous actions of those who take it upon themselves to enforce gender conformity in others with 
violence from unmitigated condemnation they rationally and objectively deserve and allowing a 
regime of vigilantism to operate with relative impunity and in the absence of significant social or 
legal obstacles. For these norms are always and without exception viewed as implicitly 
inviolable norms of both conduct and appearance in cisnormative/trans-resistant society.  
Whether we happen to be emphasizing the microcosmic interpersonal effects of 
transphobia or the wider trend of transphobia in the systemic register, the phenomenon remains 
rooted in an unwillingness, a refusal – one that is simultaneously collective and individual – to 
expand and rework outmoded conventional understandings and definitions of womanhood and 
femininity. At worst, this refusal is deliberate; at best it is unrecognized unacknowledged and 
thereby invisibilized. To harbor the belief, silently or vocally, that a trans woman is anything but 
a woman is, plainly and simply, to misapprehend the incontestable solidity of her self-given 
gender identity, one aspect among others of her overall personal identity, over which she alone 
presides and which no other party but she retains the authority to assert or ‘verify.’ To contest 
one individual’s claim to femininity is, moreover, to discount the process of self-avowal in 
general.  
But when contextualized as the logical and inevitable consequence of a nearly ubiquitous 
cultural sentiment of trans-resistance/transphobia, such a “mistake” cannot simply be remedied 
by pointing out its irrationality or logical incoherency. For misrecognition in this context is 
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bound up with and inseparable from a broader culture of violence and erasure predicated on the 
oppression of trans existence itself, a culture predicated on the deliberate and systematic erasure 
of trans lives and, arguably, heavily invested in a coordinated campaign of genocide against trans 
bodies. Let me therefore state the following unequivocally: the misrecognition of identity is a 
form of violence. This sentiment is as applicable to the phenomenon of institutionalized 
transphobia as it is to that of transphobic hate speech and physical violence. The refusal to 
recognize or accept one’s avowed gender identity, whether perpetrated on a systemic or 
individual basis, cannot be entirely divorced from the threat of concrete violence. It cannot be 
divorced from the epidemic of social exclusion or the gatekeeping practices that run rampant in 
the social, medical, and legal realms and have the effect of jeopardizing the welfare, and the very 
lives, of trans women – especially trans women of color, who inhabit multiply marginalized 
identities – and the communities of which they are a part.  
While it may be plainly evident at this point that individuals ought to be afforded ethical 
authority over their identities, it is important to remember that such a claim operates in a register 
distinct from the register of ontology. This is consequential because, in the realm of “oppression 
theory,” according to Lugones (1990), “[t]he ontological or metaphysical possibility of liberation 
remains to be argued” (p. 502). One way to accomplish “the ontological possibility of 
liberation,” she suggests promisingly, is through the embracement of ontological pluralism 
(1990, p. 502). I therefore claim that through by highlighting the liberatory potentiality of 
ontological pluralism at the same time as we embrace the idea that everyone possesses absolute 
ethical authority over his or her identity, it is not only possible to construct a philosophically 
robust notion of gender that is both inclusive and multiplicitous, but also to clear a path toward 
liberation from the systemic form of oppression we call transphobia.  
 
7 Conclusion 
 
7.1 Embracing Diverse Trans Temporalities 
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Kadji Amin (2014) asserts, in his keyword contribution to the inaugural issue of TSQ: 
Transgender Studies Quarterly, that “transgender experiences are constituted by yet 
[simultaneously] exceed normative temporalities” (p. 219). Paradoxically, nonnormative 
experiences of gender are partially constituted by the normative temporal paradigm in which 
they are forced to exist, even if such constrained modes of gendered existence are often figured 
as illegible, unimaginable, even unlivable. Queerness and transness hang suspended in 
paralogous states of constitutive abjection beneath Western culture’s hegemonically constructed 
ideals of sexuality and gender, namely heteronormativity and cisnormativity. Because of the 
current dominant status of heterosexuality and cissexuality, trans and queer instantiations of 
difference are relentlessly pathologized. Far from being a necessary reality, however, this 
situation is but a second order addition to external behaviours and traits which, we have been 
conditioned to believe, variously reflect our internal embodied experiences of gender.  
Thus, the potential for the reversal of gender and sexual norms is always already 
guaranteed by the very fact of their prior constitution by historically contingent structures of 
power; it is, counterintuitively, precisely the presumed inviolability of such norms which exposes 
them as fallible – as modifiable and not immutable. If heterosexuality and cissexuality were in 
fact natural and original – whether biologically given or metaphysically innate – society would 
have no need of endorsing the array of coercive and regulatory norms and injunctions with which 
we find ourselves inundated to secure the maintenance of such norms and to ensure widespread 
conformity to normative sexual and gendered behaviours.  
With specific respect to temporality, it is precisely the inescapable fact of the imaginary, 
phantasmatic constitution of gender normative experiences of time as natural which implies the 
ineradicable possibility of deviance and/or nonconformity by means of gender variant 
experience; sexual and gendered deviation(s) are indispensable to dominant homophobic and 
transphobic sociocultural regimes insofar as the constructed norms of heteronormativity and 
cisnormativity would have no coherence without them, and without the dominant notion of time 
figured as progressive linearity, along with this “heterosexual” notion of temporality’s attendant 
set of acceptable, ideologically imbued ways of relating to the past, the future, and the present. In 
short, the naturalization of heterotemporality implies its porosity to processes of denaturalization, 
or rather, queering.  
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Trans temporalities often exceed the limitations of both the ‘wrong body’ and ‘beyond 
the binary’ models of transgender experience, relegating transness to a perpetual state of 
ambiguity which can lead to its designation as a culturally illegible form of pathological 
difference recalcitrant to straightforward classification. However, the pathologizing effects of 
dominant gender norms can only be sustained as long the inherent ambiguity at the heart of the 
discursive categories of gender and sex remains concealed and/or disavowed through the 
construction of cisgender, heterosexual identification as a natural and original norm predicated 
on the exclusion and disavowal of gender and sexual nonconformity.  
In a related vein, Bettcher’s reconsideration of trans oppression and resistance benefits 
from her sharp awareness of the ontological tension between flexibility and rigidity, a tension 
which transcends the already fragile division between transfeminist theory and trans politics. The 
epistemological uncertainty with respect to the true nature of gender nonconformity continues to 
haunt the field of queer and feminist theoretical discourse due to the insurmountable existence of 
a mutually exclusive dichotomy between the “beyond the binary” model of transgender 
experience, criticized for its “alleged commitment to the [problematic] view that gender is a 
mere cultural construction” and the apparent metaphysical essentialism of the (trapped in the) 
“wrong body” model (Bettcher, 2014, p. 385). Although it may be justifiably asserted that the 
coexistence of these two opposing perspectives leads to an irresolvable epistemological 
deadlock, however, it can also crucially be rearticulated as a generative of a productive form of 
ambiguity. Like many trans and queer individuals in reality, Maria Griffiths, the protagonist of 
Imogen Binnie’s (2013) Nevada, spends a great deal of time pondering the socially aleatory or 
marginalizing implications of the ontological identity she inhabits. Although the potential for 
uncertainty, introspection, and even dysphoria (due to the radical potential of trans temporalities 
to break with cis temporality) of nonnormative gendered experience is troublingly vulnerable to 
pathologization, it is also loaded with productive potentiality. Indeed, the apparent disjunct 
between heterotemporality and queer temporalities is especially relevant in current cultural 
climates in which trans people are disproportionately forced to navigate a hostile heterosexual 
matrix bound up with structures of power which place a premium on the heterosexualized 
temporality of linear progression, masculinized psychosexual development, and reproductive 
futurity.  
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As I have showcased, Israeli-Nevo convincingly argues that “as trans subjects in this 
transphobic world, we are encouraged and forced into a position of not being present” (emphasis 
mine). Therefore, presence, though it is certainly not inherently queer nor is it the only queer 
modality of temporal experience, can be both a valuable tool in the struggle to resist cis 
temporality in that its mobilization as a (queer) alternative to hegemonic temporalities which 
does not tend toward becoming a hegemonic imperative itself. If treated with care, the concept of 
taking one’s time poses little danger of mutating into a totalizing force, unlike the paradigm of 
fluidity which threatens to unwittingly recapitulate the normativizing tendencies of precisely the 
paradigm it is meant to resist. By making room for the liminality of transition, Israeli-Nevo 
opens a horizon of alternative possibilities to “classic” conceptualizations of trans temporality 
without discounting the value of narratives which do conform to normative expectations – such 
as Caitlyn Jenner’s highly publicized and chronologically progressive transition narrative. 
Importantly, Israeli-Nevo makes no claims to universalize the concept of taking time, nor to 
prescribe it as an ethical imperative, acknowledging that trans people can be forced into delaying 
the process of somatic transition due to structural inequalities and that her privileged position 
allows her to take her time in ways that others cannot. Israeli-Nevo’s article takes a uniquely 
egalitarian approach to the phenomenon of gender transitioning insofar as it wages a powerful 
critique of linear progression which nevertheless leaves intact more conventional modes of being 
in time and ontological becoming including narratives of aspirational transition in which one 
deliberately seeks to transition as quickly and “completely” as possible, namely enterprises of 
transsexual crossing aimed at passing as distinctly and inflexibly male or female.  
Furthermore, the embracement of liminality through the template of taking one’s time 
need not and does not inadvertently function to hierarchically displace or pathologize more rigid 
narratives and/or experiences of trans temporality (such as the classic of linearly progressive and 
fully complete transition exemplified by Caitlyn Jenner). Therefore, the concept of taking time 
represents an attractive alternative to the model of fluidity insofar as the former opens up the 
option to remain for a time (either temporarily or indefinitely) in a state of fluid ambiguity if one 
so chooses but stops short of inscribing such inclinations as imperative or as prerequisite to the 
assumption of a transgender identity or other queer mode(s) of identification. On the one hand, 
the common conservative view of gender operates, unsurprisingly, in sync with the cissexist and 
transphobic disciplinary regulation and enforcement of gender norms enacted and sustained by 
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heteropatriarchal, capitalist structures of power. On the other hand, purportedly progressive 
liberal assimilationist gay rights discourses subtly collude with heteronormative regimes of 
power to invent contrived and (inadvertently?) homogenizing models of trans identity and gender 
performance which elide the diverse actuality of trans experience. For Lee Edelman, both 
conservative and liberal politics are likewise invested in the logic of reproductive futurity which 
underpins all political discourse: in his polemic text No Future: Queer Theory and the Death 
Drive, he diagnoses “every political vision as a vision of futurity,” arguing that, within the 
current paradigm of oppositional queer politics, “the only queerness that queer sexualities could 
ever hope to claim would spring from their determined opposition to this underlying structure of 
the political” (Edelman, 2004, p. 291).  
Amidst the universal consensus in the political sphere regarding the value of reproduction 
and futurity posited by Edelman (2004), I claim, trans identity is locked into a problematic 
double bind: from the conservative standpoint, a false dichotomy is manufactured in which 
transness, like homosexuality, must either be eradicated or assimilated to preserve the social 
order, while from a radically progressive or liberal standpoint it perpetuates the imaginary 
preponderance of an idealized transnormative subject eager to disavow his or her past, a subject 
for whom transition is always aspirational, complete, and irreversible, a subject who always 
looks forward, never backward. As such, the disproportionate attention afforded to “classic” 
transition narratives in media coverage and popular culture, reinforces the totalizing influence of 
a singular ideal of transfemininity rigidly oriented toward the anatomical and physiological 
approximation of normative femininity.  
Diversity and dissensus within the vast and richly multiplicitous field of trans(sexual) 
narratives, however, productively threatens to de-naturalize, as it were, this ironically proto-
hegemonic model of nonnormative transgender/nonbinary temporality, to challenge its absolute 
primacy and its ability to represent all trans people, especially transsexual persons. As long as 
even a minority of individuals resist subsumption by such an ideal and refuse to subscribe to the 
fantasy of its supposedly universal applicability, there will still always be ruptures to be 
exploited by those who so choose in the straightforward temporal fabric of linear progression, 
but at the same time, the “classic” trajectory will not (and must not) be forcibly foreclosed to 
those who currently derive fulfilment and empowerment from it.  
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7.2 The Vital Force of Self-Identification 
 
In “From Duration to Self-Identification? The Temporal Politics of the California Gender 
Recognition Act,” published in Transgender Studies Quarterly (TSQ), Marie Draz (2019) 
prefaces her investigation of the agonistic interplay between nonnormative gender identification 
and state legislative policy by acknowledging that trans and genderqueer experiences of time can 
appear to “emerge against a backdrop of a normative temporality in which gender identity is 
understood as a single discoverable thread moving from a knowable past to a knowable future” 
(p. 593). Arguing that “temporality is a generative framework” rather than an inherently 
restrictive one, she speculates about the possibility of a general social and cultural shift towards 
the recognition of identity – both gender identity and the historically rigidly biologized category 
of ‘sex’ – “grounded in self-identification rather than duration” (Draz, 2019, p. 595). In her 
estimation, recent developments in North American legislative policy such as the 2017 
California Gender Recognition Act (CGRA) “[appear] to open trans futures, and multiple 
temporalities of gender more broadly, rather than insist that a particular temporal model must 
legitimate all trans identity” (Draz, 2019, p. 595). With this line, Draz (2019) implicitly testifies 
that, in regards to both the social management and personal navigation of gender, we need not 
absolutely privilege or insist upon ubiquitous conformity to one particular temporal model, 
namely the historico-culturally dominant linear model of time known as “straight time” in many 
contemporary queer theoretical discourses on temporality. The “logic of duration” (Draz, 2019, 
596) traditionally favored in Western culture and employed in service of state-sanctioned 
programs of social organization and control, is not only logically incoherent but pragmatically 
impotent in its outmoded/outdated capacity as the silent and invisible guardian-and-enforcer of 
the prescriptive sociocultural norm of cisnormativity.  
Rather, it seems possible, and indeed logically evident, that a potentially infinite plurality 
of personally specific and highly diverse, experientially grounded/informed conceptual models 
of ‘temporality’ may coexist alongside a multiplicity of identities/gendered ways of identifying. 
This would also inevitably imply the existence of a myriad of corresponding and conflictual 
relations between an infinitely various array of experiences/models of time and a similarly 
unlimited array of categories of identity and modes of identification. Such an insight is at once 
especially applicable in a logical sense to the nonnormative timelines of trans and gender variant 
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narratives of identification and intimately relevant in a phenomenological sense to the everyday 
experience of those forced to navigate a paradigm of temporality (‘straight time’) at odds with 
their own divergent lived experience of time.  
Draz’s (2019) article orbits around the central theme of the relation between time and 
identity. She demonstrates beautifully how the contested nature of that conceptual relation 
becomes problematic when one realizes that, in the context of “the larger relationship between 
time and state practices,” it is precisely a lack of change, “or the duration of an identity across 
time, that is often used to justify the legitimacy of a marginalized identity” (Draz, 2019, p. 597). 
The socio-juridical preoccupation with ‘duration’ in the context of gender corresponds, moreover 
and more specifically, to a corollary fixation on the length of time that one has been, and/or 
known themselves to be, in possession of a ‘male,’ ‘female,’ or otherwise gendered core self. To 
this end, legally sanctioned changes to the type of sex marker recorded on an official document 
are often accompanied by the explicit expectation that for such an administrative amendment to 
occur, the gender or sex listed on the amended document must not only be supported by the 
individual testimony of the person to whom it belongs but additionally legitimated by medical 
and/or psychiatric “testimony about the legitimacy of such a claim” (Draz, 2019, p. 596).  
In a sociocultural paradigm in which gender identity is taken to be permanent and 
unchanging from birth until death, nonnormative gender identities may seem durationally 
irregular and those who occupy them coerced into striving toward the durational extreme of 
permanence with respect to their identity as one gender or the/an-other. Whereas the idealized 
status of “authenticity” is afforded to cis subjects without question, instances of nonnormative 
gender identification are only deemed legitimate on the basis of their verifiable alignment with 
the ideal of permanence, a fact “proven” (or disproven) by the presence of sufficient evidence 
that one will not change his or her mind in the future and has not changed it too frequently or at 
all in the past. Indeed, according to Draz, the medicalized social and legal emphasis on duration 
has “shifted [in recent years] to focus more explicitly on the permanence of an identity” (p. 596). 
Ideally, according to the dominant model of the interaction between personal identity and time in 
which the former is presumed to maintain a strictly coextensive relationship to the latter and vice 
versa, one’s gender identity should stretch all the way back to one’s earliest memory, with no 
gaps or moments of uncertainty plaguing the narrative. In other words one’s lived experience 
should mirror and reinforce the ‘born this way’ ontological narrative in which one is always 
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already assumed to have been in possession of a permanent, immutable, and unchanging gender 
identity, one that either straightforwardly aligns with or conflicts with the sex s/he was assigned 
at birth.  
Legal documentation undeniably serves a “promissory” function, binding the “document 
holder” to a linear orientation both to their own personal future and to the very notion of futurity 
itself (Draz, 2019, p. 597). Thus, the moment one is granted approval by the state to alter the way 
a given document represents one’s gender identity or sex, the gendered subject is catapulted into 
a presumptive relationship to time that is not necessarily her own; for in reality the temporality of 
gender is not always or necessarily static, immutable, or concretely or straightforwardly 
comprehensible or coherent, but can also, alternatively or simultaneously, be erratic, evanescent, 
shifting, multiplicitous, schizophrenic, even provisional, even if it returns to stasis after a period 
of rupture. Thus, simply opting to define gender as self-identification instead of duration is not 
alone sufficient to assuage the deeply rooted normativizing effects of the socioculturally 
established relation between identity and time on a fundamental level; the underlying fixity of 
this relation, in which temporality-as-linear-progression dictates and circumscribes the 
conditions in which identity must exist, thus forcing the latter to operate and appear legible in 
only one limited and specific way, namely as an unchanging entity reliant upon its possession of 
a stable past. Draz (2019) suggests that, beginning in the late twentieth century, the normative 
and binary conceptual paradigm undergirding the state-administration of gender in Western 
society has begun adapting to the possibility that gender is not always perfectly commensurable 
with a model of continuous duration.  
However, “even when changes are granted to [state] policies,” she asserts, “the 
underlying view of time and identity has often remained untouched” (Draz, 2019, p. 596). It is 
precisely this “underlying view of time and identity,” the one privileged by Western culture in 
which time is portrayed as progressive linearity and identity is portrayed as static, unchanging, 
and always oriented toward a knowable future) to which María Lugones’ (1990) notion of 
“ontological pluralism” (p. 502) poses a considerable challenge. For society to afford sexed 
subjects the freedom not only to determine every aspect of their gender identity without 
restriction, but also the possibility of identifying in multiple different ways at different times, in 
different situations, or in different “worlds”—and of switching between these identities 
seamlessly, not in the way that an actor might perform different roles but as a wholly natural and 
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authentic way of being-in-the-world, at the appropriate time, or in the appropriate situation or 
“world” (even if one’s ontological status in one “world” directly conflicts with her status in 
another)—society must adjust its fundamental conceptions of both time and identity and the 
underlying relation between the two.  
We should attempt to shift away, I claim, from a strictly chrononormative conception of 
temporality and toward a more pluralistic understanding of subjective time – away from the 
static and singularizing traditional approach to ontology which informs our strictly unitary model 
of gendered personal identity toward an embracement of ontological and identificatory pluralism. 
Only then will we achieve radical inclusivity and begin to unconditionally accept the infinite 
potentiality of gender variability as a principle inherent in humanity, allowing us to become 
equally accepting of cis, trans, and nonbinary ways of being. In other words, we must depart 
from the established normative models of time-as-linear-progression and identity-as-static-and-
immutable in order to afford intelligibility and dignity to individuals whose experiences of 
gender, whose narratives and ontologies, confound normative assumptions and conflict with 
normative standards.  
One crucial step María Lugones takes in this direction is to flatly reject the assumption of 
unified subjectivity. “I am giving up the idea of a unified subject”, she declares in 
“Structure/Antistructure and Agency Under Oppression” (Lugones, 1990, p. 503). And in 
“Playfulness, World-Travelling, and Loving Perception”: “One does not experience an 
underlying ‘I’” (Lugones, 1987, p. 12). She detaches herself from and remains radically 
uncommitted, in other words, to the traditional notion of a “transcendental self” (Lugones, 1990, 
p. 506), the stable, unified entity that supposedly lies beneath or behind one’s outward identity or 
identities, or the “doer behind the deed” in Butlerian/Nietzschean terms. While she admits that 
her phenomenological conceptualization of identification might be seen in some sense as 
“ontologically problematic,” she suggests that “any account of identity that could not be true to 
[the] experience of outsiders to the mainstream would be faulty even if ontologically 
unproblematic” (Lugones, 1987, p. 11). Yet the ethical dilemma of ensuring control over 
gendered individuals’ own identities persists; individuals must be afforded the freedom to 
identify how they wish lest the ideal of the highest possible degree of agency and freedom with 
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regard to the existential project of self-determination, from which no human being should be 
exempt or disqualified, be compromised.45  
The notion that someone whose experience of gender conflicts with the gender identity  
assigned to them at birth, or who may possess bodily features commonly associated with the 
gender or sex opposite to or other than their felt gender or sex, should only transition if, should 
only live openly as a member of the sex category to which they know they belong if they “truly” 
are (and preferably have always known, or at minimum have known for a long enough duration 
of time) that they are really a member of that sex, undermines the validity of transgender identity 
on the whole and discounts the fact that trans identities are equally as valid as their normative 
counterparts, namely cisgender identities. The logic of truth or falsity, the notion of 
‘verifiability,’ and the fallacious absolutism of empiricist verificationism are irrelevant and 
immaterial to the validity and authenticity of one’s avowed identity. As Marie Draz (2019) 
makes clear, shifting our understanding of gender as primarily an act of self-identification – 
“Gender as Self-Identification” (p. 598) – as opposed to viewing it as reducible to duration 
doesn’t fully resolve the problems of “Gender as Duration” (p. 595). For even if it is conceded 
that one should have the authority to determine his or her gender identity the underlying 
conception of temporality as a linear progression from past to present to future which reinforces 
the cultural expectation that the nature of an individual’s identity be static and immutable, 
remains unchallenged; the assumption is never compromised that one’s gender identity must be 
determined once and for all, such that the avowal of a new way of identifying can never coexist 
with a previous way of identifying but should be seen as completely and permanently 
delegitimizing any past assessment of sex or gender identity attributed to or avowed by the 
subject.  
 
7.3 Ontological and Temporal Diversity Contra 
Chrononormativity and the Injunction to Be Flexible 
 
 
45 Hence, Talia Mae Bettcher’s (2014) model of FPA is not an ontological authority but an ethical 
authority. 
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At this late stage of our investigation I think we are prepared to ask: what effect might the 
embracement of dominant gender terms as a source of empowerment as opposed to an obstacle 
to liberation have on the much-celebrated notion of queer subversion? Should ‘subversion’ be 
defined solely on the basis of an opposing or antagonistic relation to heteronormativity and 
hetero/cis-temporality, or can the concept be reimagined in a more expansive light – rearticulated 
in a way that accounts for the plethora of possible ways of interacting with the universal features 
of human experience known as temporality and embodiment? Can it be deemed subversive not 
only to subvert expectations but to “take one’s time,” as Israeli-Nevo puts it, in fulfilling 
precisely such (“normative”) expectations – to linger in the uncertainty and indeterminacy of a 
present in which one has not yet fully “completed” the highly personal process of transitioning? 
How might queerly subversive formulations of transgender identity inadvertently displace or 
further marginalize forcibly non-normativized subjects who do not find unmitigated value in the 
“subversion of identity”46 but instead wish to occupy a gendered subject position that is either 
normative (i.e. heterosexual female or male) or conventionally queer (i.e. lesbian female, gay 
male, or bisexual male or female)?  
We are now well familiar with Bettcher’s (2014) exposition of the politically charged 
disjunct between two disparate metaphysical models of transness – the “wrong-body” model and 
“beyond-the-binary” model – as a consequence of which some transsexual subjects “see 
themselves as nonconsensually subsumed under the transgender umbrella” (p. 385). With this 
nuanced point of concern in mind, I wish to elaborate upon an insight voiced by Jack Halberstam 
(2007), who opines that “the emphasis within contemporary subcultures on 
‘flexibility’…ascribes mobility over time to some notion of liberation and casts stubborn 
identification as a way of being stuck in time, unevolved, not versatile” (Dinshaw et al, 2007, p. 
190).47 To what extent might binary transsexuality be susceptible to being stereotypically 
portrayed as an instantiation of just such a “stubborn” mode of identification? From an ethical 
perspective, if we are to claim to have even the slightest regard for ontological agency, we 
cannot afford to allow individuals or their identities to be hierarchized on the basis of their 
 
46 As evoked by the latter half of the title of Judith Butler’s seminal text, Gender Trouble: Feminism and 
the Subversion of Identity. 
47 The expression of this statement occurred in the context of a virtual roundtable discussion edited by 
Elizabeth Freeman and published as part of a special issue on queer temporalities in GLQ: A Journal of 
Lesbian and Gay Studies. See Dinshaw et al (2007). 
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amenability to the subversion or transgression of normative boundaries. Nor can we condone, in 
good conscience, the tendency to unilaterally conflate immobility or inflexibility with 
“stubbornness.” Individuals who refuse, for whatever reason, to adhere to a specific blueprint of 
“subversion” or resistance, deserve to be regarded with greater consideration and respect.  
Given the skewed emphasis on fluidity and subversion to which Halberstam alludes, the 
comparatively straightforward and inflexible desire to transition from male-to-female or female-
to-male cannot escape the possibility of being viewed symptomatically as resulting from a 
pathologized internalization of gender normativity on the part of the transsexual subject. We 
ignore the liberatory power of unbridled self-determination at our own philosophical and social 
peril. Though it may seem counterintuitive to some, we cannot treat conformity to the idealized 
traits commonly associated with cissexuality as counterrevolutionary. We cannot view acts or 
identities that may appear to reinforce or reinscribe ‘normativity’ as necessarily indicative of an 
uncritical subscription to the belief that gender identity must fall statically and inflexibly on one 
side of the gender binary or the other.  
In defense of less-obviously-subversive forms of gendered embodiment, I therefore wish 
to challenge the exclusionary tendency to valorize sexual and gendered fluidity or flexibility over 
and against other non-hegemonic or non-normative ways of embodying gender. We must not 
allow ourselves to become too deeply entrenched within the parochial ethos of a specific 
historical model of queer subversion that, if it has not outlived its usefulness, remains inadequate 
to the experiences of the most marginalized and targeted sexed subjects. The simple reality is 
that neither subversion nor conformity is preferable in and of itself. Neither fluidity nor stasis can 
be deemed preferable in and of itself. Herein lies the heart of the tension at play between an anti-
normative queer paradigm that valorizes acts and modes of identification which it perceives as 
“queerly subversive,” and transsexuals who lay no claim to “nonnormativity” but who routinely 
come up against significant barriers to being accepted as “normal,” or, for that matter, “real,” 
within a trans-resistant society. The queer or homosexual transgression of heteronormativity, 
while important and potentially liberatory, reproduces a hetero/homo binary pertaining to 
sexuality specifically that leaves transsexual subjects who both wish to be viewed definitively as 
men or women and desire the opposite sex without a stable place in queer theoretical discourse; 
queer theory has failed, in other words, to construct an adequate framework in which to elaborate 
the unique relationship between transsexuality and sexual and gender hegemony.  
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Unsurprisingly, Butler (1993) appears to fall victim to precisely such an uncritical 
valorization of queer subversion to the exclusion of the possibility of unrestricted gender 
diversity in Bodies That Matter, the follow up to her massively influential Gender Trouble. This 
is most readily apparent in her portrayal of Venus Xtravaganza, a Latina transsexual among a 
group of drag queens portrayed in the documentary Paris Is Burning, to whom she attributes the 
desire for a “transubstantiation of gender” (p. 89). Butler’s (1993) portrayal of Venus’ “fantasy” 
foregrounds the fact that Xtravaganza does not simply wish to perform her femininity freely but 
to become “real” – to thoroughly and authentically assume an embodied subject position other 
than the one to which she currently has access; and it is clear that for Venus, this would have 
entailed “both achieving coherent sexed embodiment and middle-class security” (Prosser, 1998, 
p. 81). In Jay Prosser’s (1998) estimation, Butler (1993) perpetrates a twofold presupposition 
with respect to the general relationship between transsexuality and gender realness. Firstly, she 
assumes that “inherent to doing realness is an agency resistant to and transformative of 
hegemonic constraint that the desire to be real lacks; and following this, that the transsexual’s 
crossing signifies a failure to be subversive and transgressive of hegemonic constraint where it 
ought to be” (Prosser, 1998, p. 82). Against the monolithic trend of fluidity, which arguably has 
the potential to become a dominant script in its own right48, I argue that we must refrain from 
valorizing one specific model of queer subversion at the expense of sexual and gender identities 
and modes of being which cannot be characterized as fluid or flexible and do not 
straightforwardly disrupt the dominant paradigm of gender normativity, and therefore may be in 
danger of being seen as not “queer enough.”  
While it is tempting to make the reductive claim that queerness is fundamentally 
incommensurable with the linearly progressive, chrono-normative, nature of heterosexual 
temporality, the truly revolutionary potentiality of queer temporalities is rooted, I claim, in 
queerness’ general “refusal to submit to a temporal logic” (Dinshaw et al, 2007, p. 188); 
likewise, trans temporalities are not bound or obligated to any specific or singular temporal logic. 
We must begin to recognize, as individuals and as a society, that any and every way of 
 
48 I want to stress here that while I categorically resist universalization and normativization with respect to 
human experience or identity, I do not seek to discount the viability or validity of non-
dichotomous/dualistic forms of gender expression. Rather, I advocate for a position of sustained dissensus 
within gender theory and trans feminism whereby all identities are equally valued regardless of the 
theoretical positions they might appear to implicitly reinforce or negate. 
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narrativizing the complex internal interplay between temporality and gender should be viewed as 
valid avenue to human flourishing. Trans narratives have no more obligation to adhere to a 
nondominant, or queerly subversive model of temporality than they do to adhere to the currently 
dominant teleological model of temporality – i.e. chrononormativity – which undergirds both 
heterosexual time or “hetero-temporality” and cis normative time (or “cis-temporality”?). Trans 
men and women as well as nonbinary individuals should be under no obligation to pledge 
allegiance to any one temporal or ontological model of gendered existence.
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